West Point in Our Next War

The Only Way to Create and to Maintain an Army

Maxwell Van Zandt Woodhull

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in
Our Next War

The Only Way to Create and to Maintain an Army

By

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SECOND EDITION

FIRST EDITION PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER 1915.
SECOND EDITION PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER 1919.

GIBSON BROTHERS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1919.

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To

THE MEMORY OF

MY DEAR AND GALLANT FATHER

COMMANDER MAXWELL WOODHULL

UNITED STATES NAVY

THESE PAGES ARE AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

By the Author

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

HUNDREDS of millions of dollars—I had almost written thousands of millions of dollars—could have been saved in the prosecution of the war with Germany had the Government of the United States adopted the recommendations of this book, and have given the country an expansible military organization for war in the period between the date of its publication, in December, 1915, and our declaration of war against Germany, on the 6th of April, 1917, a period of one year and four months in which nothing, absolutely nothing, was done to put the country in a condition of defense, and, through defense, in a condition to meet war whenever war should come.

A year and four months of the most valuable time for preparation was lost to the nation by the failure of the President and the Government of the United States to heed the warnings brought to their ears by every wind from the battlefields of the European War, a war which held within itself the constant threat of war for the United States, either immediately or within six or eight years after its termination.

This period of temporary peace, which should have been a period of preparation for the United

States, if availed of, would have put us at least six months or a year ahead of the time, when unprepared, we might hope to get our troops in the field, whenever war should break out. It should not be forgotten that while we were organizing our war army *after war had broken out*, that we were doing so under the protection of the guns of France, of Great Britain, and of Italy, otherwise we should not have had so peaceful a period of organization as we had, and never again shall we be so fortunate when sad war shall come to us and to our dear country.

When this book was published I doubt if there were five hundred people in the United States who favored raising an army by conscription. England was still wedded to the volunteer system of raising armies. I wrote the book because, although a volunteer soldier of the United States in the War of the Rebellion, I believed that the day of the volunteer soldier had passed, and that the only way to create and to maintain a modern army was by conscription: I consequently adopted that principle of organization as the controlling principle of this book.

I wrote the book in the summer and autumn of 1915, a year and a half before we entered the war, and published it at my own expense, entirely from a sense of duty to my country. I saw clearly the danger our country ran in drifting, unprepared for war, and I realized the sacrifices, the loss of inestimably valuable time, the possibility of defeat which she might incur, should we enter war

unprepared, and I wished to awaken her from the fool's paradise in which she was so complacently living.

I distributed, with my compliments, upward of five hundred copies of the book, sending copies to those whom I thought, because of their official position, would be interested in the discussion of the subject of the defense of the country, especially since the National Security League, of which organization, by the way, I am a life member, was holding congresses of the order in advocacy of universal military service, which I believed to be an utterly chimerical plan of organization, if the object was the creation of soldiers, and it seemed to me that soldiers, and not masses of men with arms in their hands, was and should be the only object of the nation. I attended two of the congresses of the order as a delegate from two universities with which I had affiliations, and opposed openly the plan of the organization, advocating conscription as the only practical method of mobilizing and creating soldiers, and out of such soldiers an army capable of maintaining the honor of the nation in war. Of course, my proposition was voted down in a congress organized to advocate a fad of the moment, but I was encouraged to observe that the affirmative vote on my proposition in the second congress of the order was much larger in volume than in the first congress, which proved to me that a part of the congress was at least groping toward the light.

I sent copies of my book to the President of the

United States, to the Secretaries of State, of War, and of the Navy; to the Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army, and to a number of Bureau Chiefs of the War Department; to the Admiral of the Navy; to every Senator of the United States, and to the leading members of the House of Representatives, including every member of the Military Committee; to a number of officers of the Army and the Navy; to the libraries of the War and Navy Departments, of the Military Academy at West Point, of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, of the War Colleges of the Army and the Navy; to the five leading clubs of Washington, the Army and Navy, the Metropolitan, the Cosmos, the University and the Press Club, and generally to a certain number of gentlemen in different parts of the country, who might be supposed to be interested in the subject of national defense. My publishers meanwhile reporting the sale of between three and four hundred copies of the book, and that the first edition was practically exhausted.

I do not claim that my book, as widely as it was thus distributed, was the cause of the awakening of the Government and of the country to the wisdom of raising the army of several millions of men which the war demanded, by conscription. But I fancy that I have the right to think that it was one of the moving causes to such wisdom of action.

The great war is now over. The great bulk of the vast army which was created has been

demobilized. The country is now facing the creation of a peace army; and Congress seems to be almost as much at sea as to a military policy, and as uncertain as to the best method of creating an army, as in the period of peace before the outbreak of the late war.

We now face the probable establishment of universal service as the principle of military organization, the experience of the creation and maintenance of our war army apparently being forgotten, and Congress is showing a disposition, common to fallible human nature, of forsaking experience for theory, regardless of the fact that there are few directions in which the path of theory is fuller of thorns than that of military organization.

The War Department has submitted its plan of military organization in which it asks for a regular army of upward of five hundred thousand men, supplementing this demand with clauses providing for universal military service, with three months' training for the men so called to the colors, as its main reliance in war for a war army fit to meet an enemy in the field.

By mutual agreement between the House and Senate Military Committees, or their respective Chairmen, bills providing for universal military training, *with six months service with the colors*, have been presented to the two Houses of Congress.

I respectfully protest against both of these plans on the broad ground that neither of them will give the country soldiers ready to take the field against a well-organized and disciplined enemy's

army the moment war breaks out. *Soldiers, in the fullest acceptation of the term, are what we need, and the only kind of soldiers that we should have.*

I have insisted in my book, and I insist even more strongly here and now, that what the United States needs is an army thoroughly disciplined and trained, ready to meet any enemy, no matter who he may be, or whence he may come, on a plane of appreciable superiority, allowing for the influence of patriotism added to efficient training, to give our army the superiority in actual battle. We should not wish to place before a veteran European or Japanese army in battle an army undertrained and inferior in morale to our enemy, and such will surely be the case if either the military plan of the General Staff or the plan of the House and Senate Military Committees' bill is enacted into law.

We are told that our soldiers of six months' training met and sustained successfully the shock of the best troops of the German army in battle. But remember that we declared war upon Germany on the 6th of April, 1917, and that our first serious encounter with the German army *in the open* took place toward the end of July and in August, 1918, *or fully one year and five months after we entered into the war.* If in that year and five months our General Staff was only able to give our troops six months' training before putting them into battle, there was gross blundering on the part of the General Staff. But I do not believe the statement in its baldness. Our best infantry,

the United States Marines, hold the honor of our first decisive victory over the enemy, and I do not think, with their glorious record in all of our wars, that the Marines should be classed as six months' troops, and unless my memory misleads me, our regular troops supported the gallant Marines at Chateau Thierry; and they surely can not be spoken of as six months' troops.

Remember that in the war with Germany we had all the time necessary to create, in a most leisurely manner, an army of soldiers, because we organized our army behind the protecting fire of the French, the English, and the Italian guns, precisely as Great Britain organized her volunteer army behind the French guns which rang out victory in the battle of the Marne.

Do not let us be fooled by this experience. It will never come again, unless we are to do our fighting round the world, under the auspices of the League of Nations, and I have very little doubt that we shall have fighting enough under the League to satisfy all the lovers of peace in the country, who are now saying that the heart of the world will break unless we ratify the German treaty of peace, with its attachment of the covenant of the League of Nations, as it stands written at Versailles.

As for the Plan of the General Staff, aside from its provisions in respect to the regular army, which I do not now discuss, it is unwise in its proposition of three months' training for the men of the Reserve Army. The Chief of Staff of the

Army, if he be a soldier, and it is fair to assume that he is a soldier, must know that the advice which he has given the Congress to rely upon a Reserve Army which has had but three months' training, is utterly unsound and misleading advice and that such advice is opposed to every principle of military organization and training.

A soldier can not be made in three months, nor can a dependable army be created out of soldiers who have had but three months' training. Perhaps the Chief of Staff is thinking of completing the training of his three months' men after war breaks out. But it is to oppose such reliance upon the training of our soldiers *after* war breaks out that I wrote this book, and am now writing this preface to its second edition. I want my country to start fair in the next war in which we engage, or to be so fully prepared for war that that condition of preparedness will prove its worth by saving us from war.

Three months' men may, and have been known to fight well, but it is a toss of a copper whether they may not flee the field, as the militia fled the field of Bladensburg, leaving the gallant Barney and his handful of sailors and marines to maintain the battle, and to cover the flight of the militia. It is no reflection upon the courage of these militiamen that they fled the field. The reason that they ran was that they were not soldiers. With proper training and discipline they would have stood their ground, and possibly have saved our

capital from the degradation of the presence of the hostile British flag.

Congressional legislation, even if directed by the advice of the Chief of Staff of the Army, can not do the impossible. And I say, what every soldier knows to be true, that soldiers can not be made in three months. Every officer of the army, who is himself a soldier, knows this to be true as well as I know it to be true, and consequently a recommendation from the General Staff advising the creation of the Reserve Army on the basis of three months' service with he colors, should be rejected by Congress as utterly improper and bad advice.

I have rarely seen a well thought out, clearly expressed, consistent and well balanced plan of military organization come out of the War Department or from the General Staff. There is, of course, always something to commend in their plans, but they are overloaded with what may be called camouflage; by that something which is thought to render the chief objects of such measures acceptable to Congress. I have always wished that the War Department or the General Staff would give Congress a clear and well-balanced plan of military organization, unclouded by what they may think good politics. Then we should have a direct issue made for the action of Congress.

Congress wants sound military advice. It needs clear and honest thinking. It needs the best, and only the best plan of military organization which the best thought of the army can give it, free from

surplusage, and free from all absurdities of an overloaded military system.

Congress is as honest and as patriotic as the army, and is earnest in its effort to give the country the best army organization possible. But it needs professional or rather technical guidance. This it has a right to look to the officers of the regular army to give it.

The bad form of some of the legislation advised and presented by the General Staff, or by the War Department, in its present military bill, which is clogged with various classes of officers and enlisted men, is manifested by the provision of a couple of military bands, or of one large band with various classes of musicians, and a number of trumpeters for the equipment of the Department of the Adjutant General, which, I think I may say that I know, as an Adjutant General of an Army Corps in the field in time of war, to be not only unnecessary, but an amusing adjunct to the Adjutant General's Department. But perhaps the esoteric thought of the General Staff may be contemplating a return to the employment of the Adjutant General as a herald of medieval times, and as those officers were found in the armies, let us say, of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, and to add to his present duties, that of appearing in person before a beleaguered fortress to formally demand the surrender of the fortress and its garrison to the puissant arms of the United States. The Adjutant General is to be supplied with trumpeters, who could sound a fanfare on their bugles

before the portcullis of the hostile fortress before he should demand the surrender of the garrison, but I fear his summons would fail of the effect of its medieval antetype, because of his lacking in picturesqueness, and it will be necessary to add to the circumstance of our khaki-clad Adjutant General before he can rival the heralds of medieval times. Tabards must be allowed to him and his followers to conceal the very simple effect of the khaki, and pursuivants must be accorded to him to form his suite, so as to impress the minds of the defenders of the fortress, and to convince them of the might of the United States. There should be found a use in this form of ceremony for the military band of the Adjutant General, but I confess great difficulty in finding a place for it in this effort at the reestablishment of medievalism in our military system, except that should it be discovered that there were some small boys within the walls of the fortress, the band might strike up such a sterling martial air as "There is a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight," and to trust to their delight to put the commandant in a surrendering frame of mind.

I think I can perceive in the military bill presented by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Military Committees, the influence, even if unconscious influence, of this book upon its composition.

There is a manifest effort made in this House and Senate bill to create a Reserve Army which shall, through its organization and training, sup-

plement the Active Army, represented by what is called the Regulr Army of the United States. And there is a suggestion of the thought of this book that this Reserve Army shall be a part of the Regular Army, which shall consist of the Active Army and the Reserve Army, and there is an effort made to give this Reserve Army a firm and consistent military organization, through six months' intensive training, with a recognition of the necessity of requiring two or three weeks of training with the colors in each year, after this six months' period of intensive training, to freshen up and keep the men of the reserves in actual touch with the army. This very important yearly return to the colors of the reservists is entirely wanting in the universal military service provisions of the War Department's or General Staff's military bill, which is an utterly inexplicable omission, assuming honesty in the preparation of the bill submitted to the Congress by the War Department and the General Staff.

As much more valuable as I regard the military bill of the House and Senate than the military bill of the War Department, I do not regard it as answering the need of the country for a satisfactory army; and therefore I hold that the plan of organization set forth in this book is much better than this plan of the House and Senate Committees. Nor do I think that the army will need the number of young men which this bill is susceptible of yielding under universal military service.

I believe that an organization aggregating 200,-

000 or 250,000 men in the active army is ample to form the backbone of our army, and that a reserve army of 800,000 or 750,000 men, both the active and the reserve armies to constitute the Regular Army of the United States, is sufficient to maintain the honor and the safety of the country. But because I am thinking of an army wholly consisting of soldiers, ready at a moment's notice to be mobilized for war and to be sent anywhere, and at any time, by order of the President, I advise that the Active Army should consist of men conscripted for five years to serve their whole term of enlistment with the colors, and that the men of the Reserve Army should also be conscripted for five years' service, the first year to be spent with the colors, in intensive training, and the other four years of their term of service to be disposable according to their pleasure, except that each Reservist must expect to serve, and is to be called for three weeks' service with the colors, in each of the four years, after the first year of his reserve service in the army.

There need be no longer a shock produced to the nerves of the nation by the use of the word conscription. The people know what conscription is, and how fairly it acts, taking the young man for service in the army with absolute impartiality, whether he be rich or poor, cultured or uncultured, with the fairness, the implacability of fate. My plan is not so sweeping in its seizure of the youth of the nation as the two plans for universal military service which I am criticising.

It calls a certain percentage of the youth of the country to the army for a year of service, at the period of their life when it is most to their advantage to learn the great lesson which the army teaches, *obedience*, a lesson which the youth of our country is now more than ever in need of learning. We hear a great deal about the excellence of the physical training which the army gives to the youth of the country serving in its ranks, which is entirely true, but the moral influence of its teaching of obedience, and its correlative, the power of commanding men, is of much more importance to the youth of our country today than all the physical culture which they may get from the army.

I shall not discuss the method of filling the ranks of the active army by conscription, because I have already and fully discussed this branch of the subject in this book. I may refer to such discussion as expressing my views today, matured and intensified if such a thing could be possible, as I favor supplying our active army with recruits by—*and only by—and through conscription.*

I am opposed to the plan of recruitment by individual appeal and personal enlistment, for the active army as well as for the reserve army. Both the active, and reserve armies constituting in themselves the Regular Army of the United States, should be filled by conscription, the only difference being that the active army should have the first claim upon the proceeds of conscription in any one year, and after the ranks of the active army

have been filled, then the claim of the Reserve Army for recruits should take the balance of the draft or conscription for the year. This plan of filling the active and the reserve army by conscription insures that the ranks in both classes of the army, the active and the reserve armies, shall always be full so that the country may always know how many troops it can depend upon, and their character and worth. Under the plan of voluntary enlistment for the regular army, the army never knows exactly what its strength is, and rarely has its ranks full. It results in maintaining an unnecessarily large number of officers for the men in the ranks and thus spending a very considerable sum of the public money to little or no purpose.

It is a marvel to me, who wrote, in 1915, in favor of conscription to a doubting and almost hostile country, now to find not only that the War Department is asking for the services of the whole of the youth of the country between certain ages, but that so reconciled is the Congress of the United States to this plan of raising armies, that bills have been presented to the Senate and the House by the Chairmen of the Military Committees providing for a similar call upon the youth of the country to constitute the Reserve Army.

I sincerely trust that Congress will hold to the policy of conscription although it has masqueraded under the phrasing of "selective draft," because under that meaningless term it produced with ease and certainty an army of four million of men for

the war. It is the only philosophical, efficient, and prompt method of creating armies.

I hold him in such high respect that it is with sincere regret that I find myself in opposition to the Honorable Mr. Kahn, Chairman of the Military Commiteee of the House of Representatives, on the subject of universal service, but holding that his views upon this subject are not only wrong in theory, but that in a vast country like ours, destined to be unproductive of the results which he is aiming to accomplish, the production of soldiers, and of dependable armies, I find myself compelled to differ with him as pointedly as I can.

It is understood that Mr. Kahn visited Switzerland this past summer to study, in that country, the effect of universal military training upon the people and upon the Swiss army, failing to realize that the Swiss government had no alternative but the adoption of universal service, at the risk of allowing their country to remain undefended and at the mercy of its neighbors.

Switzerland had to face the problem of providing as suitable an army as possible at the smallest cost. She has not our thousands of millions of dollars to squander. She has not a sufficient revenue to allow her to differentiate her population, and to create an army of sufficient strength to defend her frontiers in the only way that such an army could be created, by conscription. Switzerland is a small, a mountainous, and a poor country. A large part of her national income is

derived from tourist travel, and like all small, mountainous, and poor countries she has been compelled to convert her whole population into an army. Therefore every Swiss is compelled to serve his country in the ranks of her army, which, as a measure of further economy, is commanded by a Colonel. The amazement of our Generals, and Lieutenant Generals, and Major Generals whom it is proposed to create in bulk by the Military Bill of the War Department now before Congress, can be imagined should it be suggested to put our army under the command of a Colonel, except in time of war, when a few gentlemen under the inspiration of the Swiss system would doubtless be selected for the command of the army with the ranks of Brigadier and Major General.

Our continental country, with its hundred millions and more of population, is entirely unsuited to the system found to be the only system of military defense permissible for Switzerland. In that country every citizen old enough, and not too old, is liable to service in the army when war demands that its citizenry shall be called to the colors. Doubtless in the small country of Switzerland patriotism reconciles her people to such a levy en masse, because it is the only possible way that her independence may be maintained. But our recent levy of 4,000,000 of men for our war army only claimed 4 per cent of our population. The contrast is startling. In place of the Swiss army which proposes to call to the colors in time of war all of her citizens of military age,

we should probably not call to the colors over 4 per cent or 5 per cent of our citizens, and so far as the peace army which I recommend is concerned, including both the active and the reserve armies amounting to one million men, the demand on our citizenry would not be over 1 per cent of our population.

It is wise in Switzerland to prepare for war as she has done, surrounded by possible enemies, any one of whom, if free to act out her part, would delight in seizing Switzerland, and annexing her mountains and her brave mountaineers. Switzerland has created her army in the only way possible to her. Her army looks to be a good army. It is surely a patriotic army, but just how good an army it actually is no one knows, because, as now constituted, it has not been tested, and consequently no one can know whether it is a dependable army or not until it is tested in war.

Why then should we adopt the Swiss system of military organization, *of actually unknown value*, disregarding our own experience during the war with conscription, which produced a satisfactory army? Nor is it wise to accept too readily the claimed experiences of the recent war as demonstrating beyond question the actual sufficiency of six months' training, because it should be remembered that our army fought side by side with the veteran armies of France and Great Britain, and under the superior command of a French soldier, Foch, receiving the stimulus of such an association, which, acting upon the emotions of our

army, encouraged them to emulate and to surpass *in advancing upon the enemy*, the heroism of the French and British armies. Thank God, our soldiers were not subjected to the trial and the test of efficiency, which defeat would have given. *Their morale in advance was fine.* It is a thankless, but a very necessary inquiry, whether it is believed by our own general officers in the field, that the morale produced by six months' training of our troops, let us say, would have insured their being as steady and as excellent in defeat as in victory. Let it be noted that I am referring to the six months' term of service proposed for the reserve army by the Senate and House bill, not that I am assuming that six months' training was the limit of training of our army in France.

During the great war in the United States fifty odd years ago, many regiments were rushed to the field the moment they were organized entities, and they were required to learn everything which converts a man into a soldier, after they were in the presence of the enemy. These raw troops were pushed into battle, before they could have pretended to be soldiers, and in many cases they acted well and nobly, but in this calm moment of discussion as to the best method of creating an efficient army, do not let us be misled in our judgment by the gallantry of these patriotic regiments which had volunteered in the sacred cause of liberty and for the maintenance of the integrity of the union. These men were not soldiers when they first went into battle directly from the farms, the counting

rooms, the law offices of the country, and it took them many weary months of bitter service to be created into soldiers, notwithstanding the stimulus of patriotism under which they were acting.

It would be amusing to hear the snort of contempt with which General von Ludendorff would dismiss the subject of three months' soldiers, and it is in this connection that I venture to advise the Chairmen of the Military Committees of the Senate and the House to read General von Ludendorf's memoirs, now appearing in the American press, or so much thereof as bears upon the loss of morale of the German army.

Pause, my reader, and ask yourself what you, as a citizen of our dear country, want to have created? Do you want *soldiers, actual soldiers,* in your army, or do you want a large aggregation of men in your army, who are only half soldiers, or quarter soldiers, as your Chief of Staff proposes, something a little better and only a little better, perhaps, than the militia who fled the field at the Battle of Blandensburg.

I believe with every force of my intellect that the only method of producing a dependable army in time of peace is through conscription, with, for the reserve section of the army, one year's service with the colors, in intensive training and association with the active army, a part, and by no means the least important part, of their training being this association with the active army, under the orders of the President of the United States. Therefore I protest against any and every other

method of attempting the production of an army as empirical and unworthy of the action of my country. I want, and I believe that the Congress of the United States, and the people of the United States, my countrymen, also want an army of soldiers, not make-believe soldiers—of thoroughly trained soldiers—and consequently I hold to the only principle of military organization which will give us soldiers, and I urge the rejection of every other system or principle of military organization, as illogical, unscientific and unable to produce what the nation needs—a dependable army made up of thoroughly trained and disciplined soldiers.

General Pershing in his speech to the Congress of the United States on the 18th of September, 1919, in acknowledgment of the thanks of Congress, says:

"To you gentlemen of the Congress we owe the existence and maintenance of our armies in the field. With a clear conception of the magnitude of the struggle *you adopted the draft as the surest means of utilizing our man power.* You promptly enacted wise laws to develop and apply our resources to the best effect."

This clear and appreciative expression from General Pershing should class him with the advocates of raising our armies by conscription.

Whereas the War Department appears to be in favor of filling the ranks of the Regular Army by voluntary enlistment, an entirely archaic method of procedure, and prepares one for the equally unimaginative statement of the Chief of Staff of

the Army to the House Military Committee, in reference to the force of three months' men to be provided for by the Military Bill fathered by the General Staff, that in no sense of the word are these men to be regarded as a part of the regular army, nor does the War Department contend for the right to treat these men, when they may have been called to the colors, as other soldiers of the United States are treated, subject to the orders of the President of the United States, for service wherever he may direct.

This latter remark discloses equally unfortunate advice with that unfortunate advice which he gave to the Congress as to the length of instructive service of Reserves when serving under the colors.

To both of these policies I am unalterably opposed.

But presumably the Chief of Staff and I are thinking of soldiers of a different type. I am thinking of soldiers taught to be obedient to command, and the Chief of Staff of soldiers merely so in name, with the creation of which he proposes to titilate the fancy and to calm the conscience of Congress to the end that rioters may riot without the fear of consequences, and at the same time the Congress may point to the advice given by the Chief of Staff of the Army as the assurance that they have done their duty in providing amply for the defense of the nation, and the quietude of our home cities.

To my mind a soldier is a man who is taught to obey the orders of his superior officer: To go where

he may be bidden to go, and to do what he may be bidden to do; and to shoot straight when ordered to fire, whether upon a public enemy or a mob at home.

And if the Congress will calmly think of the subject as herein clearly stated, I think that they will agree that the kind of soldiers the Nation needs are those subject to and obedient to the orders of the head of the Army and of the President of the United States.

It is to be regretted that the officers of the army should not feel entire freedom to express their opinions upon military subjects. They could be of inestimable service to Congress if they would tell Congress exactly what the army thinks upon the subject of the best method of furnishing the country with adequate defense. Personally I do not accept the philospohy of military organization of the Chief of Staff, and I do not believe that the majority of the officers of the Regular Army agree with him any more than I do.

There is no reason to anticipate another great world war for the next forty or fifty years, certainly not for twenty-five years, if we shall maintain, in its purity, the doctrines of Washington, Hamilton, Adams, Madison, and Monroe, of avoiding entangling alliances; meanwhile maintaining an army of adequate size and quality to serve as notice to the world that we are capable of making a defense of our country should our independence ever be threatened with attack.

It will be observed that I rest my prediction of

our exemption from war for forty or fifty years upon the condition that we should avoid entangling alliances with foreign powers. This, of course, means that we should have nothing to do with the so-called League of Nations, recently arranged in Paris under the auspices of Great Britain, and in the interest of the British Empire. The covenant of the League of Nations is sown with dragons' teeth, and rightly regarded, so far as the interests and the fate of our country are concerned, full of the threat and danger of war. It is my deliberate judgment that the only danger of war which we have to fear, if we maintain a sufficient army of defense, is from the League of Nations.

It was the height of folly that we should have become entangled in the meshes of this convention, and I sincerely hope that the Senate will amend the covenant so as to preserve our entire liberty of action and our national sovereignty.

"In time of peace prepare for war" is as sound advice today as it was when uttered by Washington, and it is as sound as that other piece of advice given to the people of our then young Republic by the Father of his Country, to avoid entangling alliances. It is quite true that Washington did not use the expression "entangling alliances." But he embodied the idea and the injunction in quite as strong and quite as clear language, and it has been up to the present time the controlling principle of our diplomacy. The words "entangling alliances" were given to the thought by, I believe, Jefferson, who was especially addicted to phrase making.

Here we have in these two injunctions the chart by which we should guide and order the destinies of our country.

If we would maintain the peace of the Nation, let us create an active and a reserve army such as I recommend in this book, and no nation will risk the chance of war with the United States thus adequately prepared for war. And if in addition to such adequate preparation for war, we refrain from entangling alliances, and from taking part in the quarrels and the brawls of Europe, we may repose in the safe conscieousness that the peace of the Nation will not be disturbed.

Apropos of the leading part Great Britain played in the negotiation of the treaty of peace with Germany and the proposed creation of the League of Nations, the Boston News Bureau of September 4, 1919, publishes this item of news from Paris:

"Paris reports state Belgium will receive portion of former German East Africa, in return for which she will cede to England considerable part of Congo line, Britain thus securing direct way from Cape to Cairo."

It is impossible to verify this news item, but from its vrai-semblance it may be assumed to be a truthful summary of the negotiation. It shows how completely Great Britain has assumed that the mandate in her favor for the government of the German territories in Africa, which she expects to receive from and under the peace treaty with Germany and the League of Nations, is

equivalent to the annexation of these territories to her empire, otherwise how would she dare to exchange with Belgium a certain portion of German East Africa for a considerable part of the Congo basin, which Belgium is to *cede* to her?

In this case Great Britain is acting as she has always acted. She has built her empire by a succession of similar encroachments, supported by diplomatic bluff, as notably in the case of Egypt, and in this negotiation with Belgium, exchanging with that power territory which is not hers to dispose of, receiving, however, territory in exchange actually belonging to Belgium under the sanction of the world: thus disposing of a trust estate and receiving in exchange a fee simple estate from Belgium. I remember smiling incredulously as I read Mr. Gladstone's statement of Great Britain's intention to retire from Egypt so soon as she should have restored peace and order to the land of the Khedive. I did not believe Mr. Gladstone's statement when I read it, and I think I can appeal to the history of Egypt since the British occupancy for the proof of the correctness of my judgment.

It would have been much better diplomacy in reference to Africa if our President had not given so much thought to saving the heartbreak of the world, and had considered our interests in Africa which demanded that he should have provided in the treaty for the expansion of the Territory of the Republic of Liberia, or for the acquisition of New African territories, lately belonging to Germany,

as the future home of our negro population. In either case we should not have taken over the territory so accorded to us, for our own profit, but to hold as trustee for the benefit of the negro race. But the President was altogether too much under the influence of world politics to entertain such liberty of thought. When he surrendered the freedom of the seas to Great Britain he virtually underwrote all of her wishes and demands.

I cannot allow it to be thought, by not referring to the subject in this preface to this the second edition of my book, that I have lessened in the fervor of my advocacy of the argument for the enlargement of West Point which I made in the book itself. I maintain the wisdom of everything that I contended for in this respect, and heartily renew my recommendations in respect to the expansion of the corps of cadets to the size of a brigade of thirty-six hundred men.

Congress in its war legislation, it is true, increased the strength of the corps of cadets to 1,000 men, but in doing so the Congress acted without considering the principle involved, and except that it gave the army the chance to receive an additional number of graduates of the Academy in its list of officers, it accomplished nothing of value to the army.

The proposition is a very simple one. Is it worth while to maintain the West Point Academy? Is it of value to the army to receive educated officers from West Point to command its troops?

To both of these questions I answer, *Yes*. I had the honor to serve in the Volunteer Army of the United States during the war of the rebellion, and I felt in my own case the need of such military education as West Point affords. Thus impressed as to the advantage of military training in my own case through the lack of it, I should be false to my sense of right and justice should I not advocate it for the army.

Nor do I deem it wise to have a relatively small proportion of the officers of the army graduates of the Military Academy. Nor do I think it wise to create a caste in the army, which, by instinct, differentiates the officers of the army into two classes, "the graduates" and the "non-graduates."

Relying upon the affirmation of the two propositions above stated, I advocate a large enough corps of cadets to insure the ultimate supply of officers for the active army altogether from the Military Academy, with the certainty that in time the officers of the Reserve Army can be supplied by the two-year graduates of the Military Academy.

And I think it wise that the corps be increased to the proportions of a brigade of 3,600 men, consisting of three regiments of 1,200 men each, each regiment consisting of three battalions of four companies each, as I consider the instructive value of such an augmented corps of cadets as incalculable to the efficient development of the cadets as soldiers. I advocate the instruction of the cadets through their *eyes* as well as through their *ears*.

This would give the cadets the opportunity which their predecessors at the Academy have never had, of seeing and being a part of a full brigade, with the opportunity of treating the brigade of cadets as a tactical division by considering each battalion a regiment, and each Regiment a brigade in tactical and strategic maneuvers.

Does the Congress of the United States realize that very few of the officers of the army had ever seen so large an aggregation of forces as a brigade before the Mexican war, and that very few even so large a force as a regiment in formation?

Does the Congress of the United States realize that relatively few of our officers, except those who had served in Mexico during the war and in the brief operations in Utah, had at the outbreak of the War of the Rebellion, ever seen a full regiment, and scarcely any one of them had ever seen a ful l brigade of troops in formation, and that their acquaintance with the association of the three arms of the service under the flag of one commanding Officer was so limited that it might be said to consist of nothing but vague imaginings on their part?

The philosophy of my contentions in this book is that I urge upon the Congress the creation of an army of soldiers, commanded by a body of educated officers: of officers as highly educated as possible, all of whom shall have served in and been a part of comparatively large bodies of troops.

I contend that it is true economy to create such a dependable army, composed of dependable

soldiers, led by dependable officers, because such an organization will save us from war; should we, however, be forced to go to war, we shall be strong enough through such an organized army to uphold the honor of our country.

I think that my contention is sound that the only way that the country can secure such a dependable army so commanded is by accepting and following the recommendations in this book. I have thought over the question for years, and I feel that I have thought out the subject to a logical conclusion, and I am so impressed with the importance of the subject that I have been impelled to write my beliefs in this book. Had I spared myself the necessary effort, which I may say has been quite a serious one for one of my age, I should have felt that I had failed in my duty to my country.

Returning to the consideration of the Senate as a constituent part of the treaty-making power of the United States, its intervention in respect to the modification of treaties may be said to have been singularly fortunate. Its restraining action has improved the greater number of the treaties submitted to it for ratification. The only occasion of regret in reference to this participation of the Senate in the ratification of treaties is that it has been entirely too lenient in the use of its power of consent. These remarks apply not only to our historical relations, but to those treaties still in the indeterminate stage of treaties awaiting the examination and ratification of the Senate; not-

ably in reference to the pending treaty with Colombia in respect to the Panama Canal. In the chapter on the Diplomacy of National Defense in this book, I point out the omissions in this treaty with Colombia, and express the hope that it will not be ratified until after its amendment in several particulars, notably until Colombia shall cede to the United States the Valley of the Atrato and the valleys of the confluent streams on the Pacific side of the isthmus. We should have control of the Atrato route to the Pacific to protect the Panama Canal both strategically and commercially, and to complete our hold upon the various crossings of the Isthmus.

In fact I discuss fully the relationships of the Panama Canal to our diplomacy in the Chapter on "The Diplomacy of National Defense." I endeavor to show the vulnerability of the Canal to attack by a combination of powers of great naval strength, such for instance as Great Britain and Japan, and how utterly defenseless it lies awaiting seizure by such a combination, and I sought to suggest a diplomatic association with Mexico, the nations of Central America, and Colombia for its defense and protection.

It should be our object to obtain control of all of the practicable canal routes between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, so as to protect, by such ownership, the Panama Canal. It would be a serious blow to our commerce and to our naval power should a foreign nation own or control a canal, using for the construc-

tion of such a canal the Valley of the Atrato; or the valley through the mountains connecting the Chiriqui Lagoon with the Gulf of Dulce; or through the occupancy of the historic Nicaragua route. It is as sure as anything can be in the future, unless we foreclose such action by the ownership of all practicable routes for a canal between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, that some hostile and powerful nation or combination of nations will attempt the construction of another canal, connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific, and so enjoy an interior line between our ports and the Panama Canal.

Concerning the Nicaragua Route for a canal, a most favorable treaty giving us control of that route, with a good harbor on the Gulf of Fonseca, was placed before the Senate for ratification, which, if it has not yet been ratified, should be ratified at once. The sum to go to Nicaragua in payment for this valuable concession is but *$3,000,000*, which would be the wisest investment of such a sum of money that the United States could make.

Now that we have a treaty before the Senate under which we shall be required to pay Colombia twenty-five millions of dollars for nothing but to reopen for consideration *a fait accompli*, we should see that we get something for our money. Twenty-five millions of dollars to the statesmen of Colombia represents the wealth of the Indies, and no other government in the world would be so silly as to propose to pay to her that, or any other measureably large sum of money, to induce her to

smooth down her ruffled plumage. Any sensible nation would look over her assets, and before agreeing to pay her this sum of money would select what she deemed to be of use to herself, and to base the proposed payment upon her acquiescence in such a cession of territory. The possession of the route and the adjacent territory of the Valley of the Atrato through to the Pacific would be worth the sum of twenty-five millions, on the basis of the free and easy method of throwing about millions which our Government has fallen into under the influence of the war appropriations, or at least it would represent the possession of territory in exchange for millions of dollars, and to that extent would make the treaty with Colombia a better bargain for the United States than it is now. A larger knowledge of international relationships in some of our countrymen would be an asset of incalculable value to the United States, and is to be earnestly prayed for by all of our citizens who believe in the efficacy of prayer.

But Colombia should be required to consent as well, and for the same reason, to the cancellation of all especial rights inuring to her benefit under the Canal Treaty now before the Senate. It should be our object to free the Canal from all obligations pertaining to foreign powers of every sort and condition, so that it should be our Canal and ours only.

It should be remembered that I wrote this book in the summer and autumn of 1915, while yet the President of the United States was holding and

expressing pacifist views of our relation to the war and impressing the duty of neutrality upon our people. I confess frankly, that, as I could not contemplate such abysmal stupidity as was shown by the German Emperor in forcing us into war with Germany by a revival of German attack upon the commerce of the world through a resumption of submarine activity, I could not bring myself to believe in the ultimate defeat of Germany by the entente powers. Nor do I think that Germany would have been defeated had we not entered the war by the side of Great Britain, France, and Italy. Hence, as I realized fully the vulnerability to attack of the Panama Canal, I conceived the idea of insuring the guarantee of our possession of the Panama Canal by Germany through the sale to her of the Philippine Islands after the conclusion of the war, as, should she be placed in possession of the Philippines, it would be manifestly more to her interest to have *us* in possession of the Panama Canal than to be in possession of the Canal *herself*. Realizing that under the existing military situation in the Philippines we are simply the locum tenens of Japan, I thought it would be a wise move for the United States to sell the Islands while yet we should have anything in the Islands of salable value, and also I thought of the creation of a balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, to counterbalance the united power of Great Britain and Japan in that ocean.

The result of the world war, ending through our entrance into the war in the defeat of Germany,

has made all these speculations nothing but dreams. Germany, in defeat, passes out of the immediate scope of vision so far as a sale to her of the Philippines is concerned, and the guarantee by her of our possession of the Panama Canal, and the creation of a balance of power in the Pacific through association with her.

Situated as we are at present in reference to the Philippinos we should endeavor to develop a sentiment of loyalty to the United States among them, basing such sentiment upon the creation of a United States-Philippino army in the Islands of at least two hundred and fifty thousand men: the army to be created by conscription. Such a plan is, at least, theoretically practicable, and I suggest it for thought, because it seems to me to be the only alternative to our surrender of the Islands to Japan whenever that nation shall deem that the time has arrived for her to enter into possession of them.

As to the establishment of a balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, I confess the problem is much more difficult than it seemed to me to be when I wrote this book, and while yet a powerful Germany was in arms, with the prospect of victory in the world war.

But it can be created by careful work, and thought and courage by the United States through the modernization of China, and her development as a military and naval power. Therefore, since the downfall of Germany, and as a first step toward the realization of this thought, I am strongly in favor of the excision of the Shantung

provisions from the treaty of peace with Germany by the Senate, at least so far as the United States is concerned.

But the process of the military and naval development of China will be a slow process, and one which can only succeed in its accomplishment through the action of the United States along the lines of a fixed policy.

The United States in association with a strong China, should it be possible to create a strong China, would establish a power which could give peace to the Pacific, as both the United States and China are not war-provoking nations, both of them standing for peace within their sphere of influence. As between such an alliance and a union with Japan and Great Britain in respect to the Pacific, I think that a revived and reorganized Russia could be relied upon as a sympathetic component part of such a peaceful combination of powers. Russia's interests are all in line with peace in the Pacific, and consequently she should be in sympathy with the policy and the aspirations of the United States. I do not despair of a rebirth of Russia and Russian power under a limited monarchy. I fear it will be impossible to establish a Republican form of government in Russia, as it is impossible to create a Republic without Republicans, and the present regime enthroned at Moscow has demonstrated that Russia is without Republicans. It is the fervent wish of all well wishers of Russia that her gallant people may soon find themselves, and under peace and calmness reorganize within her wide realm a government of power and order.

Major General McAndrew, Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, recently testified before a committee of Congress upon the subject of the military policy of the United States, in which testimony he says that, in the event of war, we must hold both the Panama Canal and the Hawaiian Islands.

Of course; but how?

The gallant General's plan would appear to be to establish one full division of troops on the line of the Panama Canal, and another full division of troops in the Hawaiian Islands, admitting that, "It is likely that in any war in the Pacific we might *not at first* have the preponderance of naval strength."

But why confine the war to the Pacific? Is it not entirely probable that Japan will have an ally or allies in the Atlantic, where war would be made upon us as well as in the Pacific?

It would be interesting to have his opinion, in view of the ease with which we transported two million of men to France, *holding the sea*, at the rate of 250,000 and even 300,000 men a month, how, *after we shall have lost coutrol of the sea*, as he admits that we should lose control of the sea, we can hope to reinforce our garrisons in the Panama Canal Zone and in the Hawaiian Islands? Pending his further consideration of the subject, and assuming that he has stated his full plan for the defense of the Panama Canal and Hawaiian Islands, I venture to think that under that plan we should surely lose the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, and the Panama Canal.

Should our enemy be, for instance, Japan and Great Britain, they would absolutely command the sea, and consequently they would open the war by an attack upon the Panama Canal, which great waterway they would be successful in seizing, notwithstanding the gallant General's full Division of troops.

In my book I say that the very smallest force that should be allotted for the defense of the Panama Canal in war is a mobile force of 150,000 men aside from and in addition to the allotment of Coast Artillery for the defense of the fortifications of the Canal Zone.

Conceding that in a war with Japan and Great Britain, or in a war with Japan and reorganized and revived Germany, we should lose command of the sea, I have prefigured, as I have stated in my book, the establishment of a zone of influence for the United States covering Mexico, Central America, and Colombia, with the right of the construction and maintenance by the United States of a line of railway from the Rio Grande south to the Panama Canal.

I recognize fully that such a railroad would be liable to interruption by an attack from the enemy, but as we should have the right not only to construct but to defend the railroad from the Rio Grande to Panama, we should be in the position of being able to pour troops south from the Rio Grande over this line of railway, and of concentrating our forces against the enemy who might have affected a landing anywhere between

the Rio Grande and the Canal, and through their defeat, reestablish our communication with Panama.

The method of our ability to make good our hold upon such a railroad may be a subject of discussion, but I do not regard the plan of such a strategic railroad as an open question. It is not only a possible, but it is the only possible, plan under which we can have a chance of holding the Panama Canal in war with any one or two naval powers of superior naval strength to the United States, the American fleet having been driven from the sea. Should the railroad be broken by the landing of the enemy and the seizure of the railroad, *he must be defeated, and the integrity of our line of railway communication with Panama must be reestablished.* There is no discussing this proposition. The enemy in possession of this line of communication with Panama *must* be defeated and our communication with Panama *must* be restored; nor should this be at all impossible, as we would be able to pour our troops into the gap in sufficient numbers to destroy the enemy.

But the maintenance of our hold upon Panama in any case is not merely a matter of men, but of guns, of munitions of war, and of supplies as well. In no war have armaments and munitions counted for so much as in the recent European war. Such a strategic railway will be quite as necessary in supplying our garrison in time of war in the Canal Zone with guns and ammunition and food for our troops, as with reinforcements, and with the

command of the sea *lost* to the United States, we may count upon the loss of the Panama Canal, without such a railway from the Rio Grande to Panama. Nor will it be possible for us to build such a line of railway to Panama after war begins. We could not then acquire the right to construct such a railroad from the nations through which it is proposed that it shall run. That would be the work of peacible negotiation. I quite understand that laisser-faire is the cornerstone of our military system, but we must abandon it in respect to the Panama Canal unless we are prepared to lose the Canal during the period of the war.

I have discussed this subject quite fully in this book, and I refer to the subject in this preface to bring the question of the proper garrison for the Panama Canal Zone, and the proper method of reinforcing and supplying the garrison in war, to the attention of the army in order that they may formulate a practical and a practicable plan for holding the Panama Canal, should we find ourselves face to face with a preponderance of naval power in war. But in asking the army to give attention to this question, I do not mean that the General Staff should draw up a beautiful theoretic plan of operations and then, having admired their handiwork sufficiently, to put it away in a drawer of a cabinet at the War College, proclaiming to the world that the problem has been solved.

I have long entertained the hope that should Japan attack us that it may be in alliance with Great Britain, because our northern frontier

marches for three thousand miles on England's flank, and should we lose possession of the Panama Canal, of the Hawaiian Islands, and of Alaska by our fleets being driven from the sea, that we should so firmly have established ourselves in Canada during the progress of the war as to be in a position to dictate the terms of peace to our enemies, and to compel the restoration of the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands and Alaska, and possibly the Philippine Islands, should we want them back, to the jurisdiction of our Flag, as a condition precedent to any treaty of peace that we should be willing to negotiate. I have long held that almost the only power that Great Britain need hold in dread is the United States, because, should she ever go to war with the United States, she would find the war a long one, and one which can end in but one way, in the disintegration of the British Empire.

Why do not our soldiers and our sailors, and our statesmen as well, see situations as they are? Why do they shut their eyes to the military and naval needs of the nation?

If it is possible for me to see clearly what the nation needs for its defense, why can not they? Why should they trifle with half measures, or quarter measures? Why should our army officers in giving testimony on military matters before committees of Congress hold back anything that they think should be said to Congress?

I have said, and I repeat it here again, that the advice which our military and naval officers should give Congress is the whole truth and nothing but

ideas of my book. Considering the bearing of these letters upon the subject of preparation for war, I may be excused from the charge of vanity in presenting them to my readers, especially as I do not allow myself the liberty of publishing the names of the authors, which, if published, would add weight to their remarks.

I end this discussion with the expression of the most loyal and earnest hope that I may not have written in vain.

MAXWELL VAN ZANDT WOODHULL.

Washington City, D. C.
October 16, 1919.

LETTER FROM AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY.

The Army and Navy Club,
Washington.

1st February, 1916.

Dear General:

I have finished with much interest your book on "West Point in Our Next War." You say a good deal which some of us are only authorized so far to think, but I believe that the movement of thought is toward your ideas. I write, however, to tell you that the British army by a late royal warrant has adopted your ideas about the proper organization of machine guns. They now form a corps like the corps of artillery in that service, and are independent of the infantry and cavalry in the sense that artillery is. This change is of course a result of the experience of the present war. As it is quite possible you may not have heard of this, for the order is quite recent, I thought you might be interested in hearing that the plan which you recommend has been carried into effect.

Yours sincerely,

LETTER FROM AN OFFICER OF THE NAVY.

Washington, *July 19, 1916.*

My Dear General:

I have read your book with the greatest interest and do not hesitate to say that it presents the *best* exposition of the unprepared condition our country is in and the very best and only remedy for an improvement.

I particularly commend the West Point proposition. It is fundamental.

Without a body of officers to train the conscripts they would be useless, and your project would procure them at comparatively little expense. If you could induce intelligent Members of Congress to read your book I am sure there would be action at once.

I fully agree with you in everything the book contains except perhaps some little difference in your estimate of some of the higher officers of the Rebellion.

With high regards, believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

INTRODUCTION

I AM the son of an officer of the old navy, *a Regular of Regulars*, and I had the honour to serve in the Volunteer Army of the United States during the War of the Rebellion.

My Father was a consistent advocate of a large and powerful navy. As a youth I met and knew many officers of the two services, friends of my Father, many of whom distinguished themselves in the army and navy of the United States, and in the service of the South, during the great war.

My Father's loyalty was of the sacred kind, which made his devotion to his country a part of his religion. Admiral Ammen, writing to me several years after the war, speaking of my Father, said, "His gallantry was unquestioned by all who knew him."

Reared under such auspices, associated from my earliest days up to the period of his untimely death with so noble a character as my Father, it would have been impossible for me not to have assimilated as my own some of his feelings and beliefs as to the service, and as to the officers of the army and navy, his associates and comrades.

Owing to the temper of the times, and to the spirit of secession which filled the air, my Father, whose belief in the national character of our people was unchangeable, wisely, *very wisely* as I have felt throughout my life, sent me to Miami University in the State of Ohio, instead of sending me to Harvard, for my college education. He told me that I should find the boys with whom I should play on the college campus the same kind of boys with whom I had been playing in Washington; that in character and in all essentials these boys were Americans, differing from the boys in the East only in non-essentials. I was the only boy from the east of the Alleghenies in the college. My associates were from Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. After the novelty of my association wore off, and after I had become used to the difference of intonation between the East and the West, I found that my Father had been right: that the boys—of course we called ourselves young men—whom I met in the classrooms and on the college campus were in all essentials the same kind of boys as my young friends in Washington—*all Americans*, whether they happened to come from Indiana or Michigan, from Kentucky or Ohio. I look back, across the dead years, upon my residence at Miami with profound thankfulness for the judgment shown by my Father in sending me to this Western college, and with the tenderest recollections of my in-

structors and my college associates, from whatsoever part of the country they may have come.

While at college, in anticipation of entering the army, I read several military books, notably Jomini's *Art of War*, which was quite the vogue in the earnest days of 1861–1862. I followed the movements of the armies, as reported in the public press, with close attention, often, I fear, to the prejudice of my studies; but, like most of the young men about me, talked and thought much of military matters, impatiently awaiting the coming of the time when I should have the opportunity of going into the army.

After entering the army, guided by experience, I had to modify many of my impressions which I had considered as firmly bedded as the great hills, and to form new impressions as time passed and experience grew. In the army, *in time of war*, men grow rapidly; they think fast, they observe acutely, and they form impressions readily. If this be not the effect of service upon them they are useless in the army. If a man does not grow, and grow rapidly, as experiences unfold themselves, he may have all the technique of the profession at his fingers' ends, and yet be worthless as a soldier.

I think I may say that I carried into the army a clear and observing mind, disciplined by study, and a disposition to do my duty cheerfully and

to the best of my ability, a disposition which I afterward found to be the true spirit of discipline.

So much by way of introduction to my entrance into the volunteer army of the United States, shortly after I had passed my nineteenth birthday, toward the end of 1862.

That my experience in the army during the great war entitles me to speak upon military subjects will become apparent from the perusal of the following extract from the "Rebellion Records," and the three following letters, two from Major-General John A. Logan of the volunteers, and one from Major-General Oliver O. Howard of the army, two as gallant gentlemen as ever wore swords.

The extract from the "Rebellion Records" is from the official report of Major-General Lew Wallace of the battle of the Monocacy, which was fought on the 9th of July, 1864, in which battle I acted as General Wallace's Adjutant-General. Although one of the smaller battles of the war, the battle of the Monocacy was one of the most important in its results fought during the war, as it undoubtedly saved Washington from capture by the army of Lieutenant-General Early, giving time for the arrival of reinforcements at the national capital. In his very interesting account of the battle given in his *Memoirs*, General Wallace mentions me several times by name.

The extract from General Wallace's report of the battle will be found at page 199, series I., vol. xxxvii., part I., *War of the Rebellion. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, published by the War Department;

Extract.—Besides the officers mentioned in my informal report of 10th of July, the following deserve similar notice for their excellent behaviour in action and the services they rendered: Lieut.-Colonel Lynd Catlin, Assistant Inspector-General; *Major Max V. Z. Woodhull, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General;* and Major James R. Ross, Senior Aide-de-camp, all of my Staff.

After the battle of the Monocacy I was ordered to duty in the War Department, in the office of the Inspector-General of the army, Colonel James A. Hardie: and here I would venture to remind the gentlemen of the army of today, that during the great war the position of Inspector-General of the army only carried the rank of Colonel. I served with Colonel Hardie for about six weeks, when, on my own request, I was ordered to the Western Army.

I had known the Adjutant-General of the army, General Townsend, as a youth, but I made the acquaintance, while on duty in the War Department, of Colonel Vincent, General Fry, Colonel Ruggles, Colonel Williams, Colonel Pelouze—all of the Adjutant-General's department, General

Fry then being on duty as Provost Marshal General. I learned to esteem highly as officers of especial worth Colonel Vincent and General Fry.

It had been my fortune to receive my training as an Assistant Adjutant-General under the eye of Colonel Wm. D. Whipple, an officer of the army, and I wrote to him immediately on reporting for duty in the War Department, asking for service in the Western Army. I received the following letter from him upon which I based my request to the Adjutant-General for orders to the Army of the Tennessee.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
NEAR ATLANTA, GA., Aug. 16, 1864.

DEAR MAJOR:

Your letter was received at the time changes were taking place in the commanders of our armies, and I deferred action upon it until things became a little more settled. I have since conversed with Major-General Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, on the subject.

I enclose a short telegram from him which explains itself. If you can get ordered to him, he would be glad to have you come. He is a very pleasant officer and I think you will like him, and it would afford you an excellent opportunity to participate in this glorious campaign.

Sincerely yours,

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
A. A.-G.

MAJ. MAXWELL WOODHULL,
A. A.-G.

U. S. Military Telegraph
15 186

By telegraph from Howard.
To Gen. Whipple.

Let Woodhull come. I can assign him to duty.

O. O. Howard,
Maj.-Gen.

I reported to General Howard in Georgia, and was assigned to duty on his staff as aide-de-camp, and also to duty with the chief of artillery of the Army of the Tennessee as Assistant Adjutant-General.

Upon the capture of Savannah I was recommended by General Howard to General Osterhaus, then in temporary command of the 15th Army Corps, as Assistant Adjutant-General of the Corps, and upon the return of Major-General John A. Logan (a few days later) to the command of the Corps, I was promoted, on his recommendation, to be Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General of the 15th Army Corps. When General Logan was assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee he took me with him, under assignment, as Assistant Adjutant-General of the army.

General Logan's letters, referred to above, are as follows:

First Letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
LOUISVILLE, KY., July 31, 1865.

Col. MAX WOODHULL,
A. A.-Gen'l.

MY DEAR SIR:

I cannot sever our official relations without expressing to you my entire satisfaction with the manner in which you have conducted the Adjutant-General's Department since you have been with me, and also without giving you to understand that I recognize the fact that your conduct has at all times been that of a soldier and gentleman, ever ready and willing to perform any duty that was imposed upon you. You have a bright future before you; be energetic and assiduous hereafter as you have ever been while with me, and you have nothing to fear. Wherever you may go, or in whatever position you may be placed, be doubly assured that you have my kindest regards, as well as my best wishes for your future welfare and prosperity.

Your true friend,

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Major-General.

Second Letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE,
August 1, 1865.

Lt.-Gen'l U. S. GRANT,
Com'd'g, &c.

SIR:

Allow me to earnestly recommend Col. Max Woodhull for a position in the regular army. He has served with me as A. A.-General since I left Savannah in the 15 A. C. and Army of the Tennessee, and a

more efficient officer in his Department is not in the army anywhere. He is honest, energetic, and capable; he is a young man of rare abilities, and such a man as should be placed in a good position. I think for his age I have not at any time made the acquaintance of a man with more attainments than he possesses. I think he should at least have the rank of Major in the Department of the Adjt.-General, and I do hope that you will give him such assistance as will insure him such position.

Your friend truly,

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Maj.-Gen'l.

After the muster out of the Army of the Tennessee I took a month's leave of absence, and then reported to Major-General Oliver O. Howard as Adjutant-General of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, which position I held until May, 1866, when I resigned from the army.

I was brevetted Colonel on the recommendation of Major-General John A. Logan, and Brigadier-General on the recommendation of Major-General Oliver O. Howard.

Letter from General Howard.

WAR DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS.
WASHINGTON, May 20, 1866.

Bvt. Brig.-General MAX WOODHULL.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

As you have decided to leave the service, permit me to express to you the great satisfaction your public

service has afforded me. You joined me in the midst of that trying campaign under General Sherman, just before Hood had crossed the Tennessee River, and before the eventful march from Atlanta to Savannah had been undertaken. You shared in that campaign on my staff and so conspicuous your merit appeared to me that I recommended you to Gen. Osterhaus for Adjutant of the 15th Army Corps. You were subsequently promoted to Lieut.-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General of that Corps. In this position Gen. Logan on his return honoured you with his confidence, and you aided in no small degree in promoting the system and order that prevailed in the 15th Corps during the remarkable marches and combats that occurred on the march from Savannah, Ga., to Washington, D. C. Your uniform courtesy to me, your promptitude and efficiency as an officer, and your fidelity to duty during that time, and subsequently in the trying duties of this Bureau, will not soon be forgotten.

Whenever the need calls you, look to me for any aid I may be able to extend to you.

Wishing you a prosperous life and a sure immortality among the blessed,

I am affectionately

Your friend,

O. O. Howard,

Maj.-Gen., Com'r, etc.

These letters from Generals Logan and Howard are autograph letters. General Logan's letter to Lieut.-General Grant was never presented, because

I had no wish to go into the regular army. It may not be inappropriate for me to say, however, that I could have gone into the regular army at the close of the war had I cared to do so. Indeed, the Adjutant-General of the army, General Townsend, said that I was one of the volunteer officers he wished to see transferred to the regular service.

In the following pages I have written freely and frankly, and as I am giving my views and opinions upon military subjects, I have not hesitated to write personally, using with entire freedom the phrases "I think" and "I believe."

I have stated what I believe to be the true method of preparing the army for the eventualities of the future, *indeed, the only method of preparing the army for the eventualities of the future*, and I submit this book to the consideration of my countrymen, asking for it their candid judgment.

MAXWELL VAN ZANDT WOODHULL.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
November 20, 1915.

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POSTSCRIPT, NOVEMBER 20, 1915

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West Point in our Next War

CHAPTER I

UNREADY: A WARNING

WITHIN the past two years a general officer of the army said to me, "The army of the United States is essentially a peace army."

The remark was made and was received as a matter of course: as merely the statement of an incontrovertible fact.

Do the people of the United States know that their army is essentially a peace army? Do they want an army which is merely a peace army, or do they want an army capable of defending the country in the event of war being forced upon the nation?

The United States is always for peace except when her vital interests and rights are attacked, and then she makes war in self-defence. She does not belong to the class of ambitious nations ever striving for the expansion of boundaries. She is content with her present boundaries, and yet she

has assumed, within the past few years, serious international and territorial responsibilities.

She has the longest coast line of any nation in the world, and fronts the two great oceans, facing the military and naval powers of Europe and Asia. She is open to attack on the Atlantic and on the Pacific, in the Caribbean Sea, and in the Gulf of Mexico.

Yet her army is "essentially a peace army," and her navy, upon which arm of the national defence the first shock of war would fall, is of insufficient strength to meet successfully the weight of attack of the fleets of any one of the three or four great Powers.

Sea power, or the power to defeat an enemy in battle on the seas, is of pre-eminent importance to the United States.

Without command of the sea we could not hold the Panama Canal, nor could we retain control of the Hawaiian Islands, of the Philippines, or of Alaska.

As to the Monroe Doctrine, its life is in the power of our guns. So long as we can command the sea it is a sound and living force in international law. The moment we lose command of the sea, or find ourselves in a position where our command of the sea may safely be questioned by a first-class Power, we shall be compelled to let the Monroe Doctrine drift into the abyss of withered ambitions.

It was argued during the period of enthusiasm

under the influence of which the construction of the Panama Canal was undertaken, that the building of the canal would double at least the efficiency of our navy. Visions of the concentration of our fleets in the Atlantic or in the Pacific as we should will, or as occasion should demand, victoriously to meet on either ocean the fleets of an enemy, filled the imagination of the country.

Instead, however, of the canal furnishing an interior line of communication and defence, the construction of the canal has increased in a vast degree not only the naval and military, but also the political danger of complications with possibly ambitious enemies. Instead of increasing our naval efficiency, the canal has brought into the problem of national defence new responsibilities, so that now not only are we compelled to be in readiness to defend ourselves on the Atlantic and the Pacific but also to hold command of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea in order to retain possession of the Panama Canal.

The construction of the Panama Canal, assuming that the peace of the world could be guaranteed, is a great accomplishment. But the peace of the world cannot be guaranteed, consequently the canal has become a prize of war of the nations. Instead of being an influence for peace, it is an inducement to war, and has increased, by extending the sphere of our responsibilities, the need for increased armaments and more battleships.

Our fleet is inferior to the fleets of Great Britain and Germany and will soon drop below that of France. While it is true that our Atlantic Fleet comprises the greater part of our fighting strength, the protection of our interests in the Gulf of Mexico, in the Caribbean Sea, and in the eastern and western Pacific compel a distinct allotment of ships to those seas, and our available battle fleets on the Atlantic and the Pacific are consequently outclassed by the battle fleets of the other first-class Powers. They have restricted coast lines to defend whereas we have vast and, from a military and naval point of view, almost illimitable reaches of coasts to defend.

The construction of the Panama Canal, instead of increasing the availability of our fleet for national defence, renders necessary the construction and maintenance of a distinct Caribbean Sea fleet for the defence of that sea. Without such a fleet, strong enough to hold the Caribbean Sea against any probable enemy, the Panama Canal can be seized and held by any enemy dominating the Caribbean.

Whereas the principles of the art of war are immutable, their application changes with the changing conditions of the world.

In the days of sailing ships, and in the early days of steam men-of-war, there was a limit to oversea operations determined by the carrying

capacity of the merchant marine which could be commanded for the movement of troops.

This rule holds good today, with the difference, however, that the carrying capacity of the merchant marine of the world has been so vastly increased that what was difficult then is easy of accomplishment now once command of the sea be obtained. During the great war we dispatched by sea large expeditions against Hatteras Inlet, Charleston, Fort Pulaski, Mobile, and for the capture of New Orleans and Fort Fisher in co-operation with the fleet, in all of which expeditions the arms of the United States were successful; and during the greater part of the war we maintained an entirely satisfactory supply service by sea for our armies in the coast States of the South, and for the vessels of the blockading fleet from the capes of the Chesapeake to the Mexican border. Now it is entirely possible to mobilize fleets of transports of sufficient tonnage to transport large armies across the seas for the invasion of hostile shores, and to maintain such armies in the field by re-enforcements, and with supplies and munitions of war.

The guns of the fleets of fifty years ago were inferior in effectiveness of fire to the guns of fortresses, calibre for calibre. The stable gun platforms of the fortress guns rendered their fire more effective than that of the guns of fleets.

But now, with almost stable gun platforms

furnished by great battleships and dreadnoughts, the guns of the fleet and the guns of the fortresses are on a much nearer basis of equality, with the difference, however, still in favour of the land defence, gun for gun, and calibre for calibre, but by no means so clearly in favour of the army as was the case fifty or even twenty-five years ago. The determinative difference now is in range of fire, and here the dreadnoughts of foreign navies, with their 15-inch guns, have an advantage over the guns in our fortifications.

Our coast defences were mostly planned and constructed before the day of the modern battleship and of the modern gun. Whether guns of present heavy calibre have been installed in all of our fortifications supplanting guns of an earlier date and construction, I do not know. I doubt, however, if the defensive power of our fortifications has increased proportionally with the increased power of offence in the fleets of the great powers.

The usual defensive work on our coasts is either an open work at the rear, or is weak on its land face. The effort of the engineers engaged in their construction has been directed to the development and maintenance of seaward fire, relying upon the protection of the good God for defence from land attack. Our defensive works have been built to defend our harbours from attack by hostile fleets without regard to the changed conditions of mod-

ern war which not only provide for, but almost demand, simultaneous attacks by both land and sea forces.

Without a mobile army of sufficient strength to defeat an enemy who may have effected a landing on our coast from the convoys of a hostile fleet, I do not regard a single harbour on our coast, or the cities lying on their shores, as safe from successful attack by the fleet and army of any one of the first-class Powers with whom we should be at war.

The defeat, or serious crippling, of our fleet would open every harbour on our coast, and the coast States of the Union, to attack by a combined naval and military force of any one of the first-class Powers with whom we might be at war. Nor need there be the slightest doubt as to the sufficiency of transport capacity abroad to land, and to maintain by reinforcements, an army of from a quarter to a half million of men on our shores, once our naval defence had been broken or driven from the sea.

The same argument and the same course of reasoning leads to the same conclusion as to the Panama Canal. The first condition for the defence of the Panama Canal is a powerful Caribbean Sea fleet, which could meet on a basis of equality the convoying fleet of an enemy, and defeat or seriously cripple such fleet of the enemy before the army under its convoy could effect a landing on the Isthmus of Panama. The second

condition for the defence of the Panama Canal is to be found, and can only be found, in the presence of a mobile army large enough to insure the defeat of any expeditionary force of an enemy which should succeed in effecting a landing on the Isthmus.

It should not be doubted that the fortifications erected for the defence of Colon and Panama, and of the débouchés of the canal into the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, have been intelligently constructed and that the guns in place are of adequate calibre and range, but it is seriously doubted whether they are defensible from land attack.

Equally must it be conceded that they would amount to little, so far as the defence of the canal is concerned, without the aid of an adequate mobile army on the Isthmus, because it is not thought that the canal would be attacked by a naval force alone. It is believed that any attack on the canal will be made by a combined naval and military force, the naval or convoying and covering force being deemed to be of sufficient strength to overcome our Caribbean Sea fleet, and the military force being deemed to be sufficient to overcome any military force which we might have on the Isthmus.

It is not pretended that a mobile army of one hundred and fifty thousand men would be sufficient to hold the Panama Canal against the attack of one of the first-class Powers, but it may be

assumed that we should lose the canal in war with a first-class Power should we attempt the defence of the canal zone with a smaller army than one hundred and fifty thousand men.

With this estimate of a mobile army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, in addition to the necessary coast artillery to man the guns in the coast defences, required for the defence of the Panama Canal, let us see how we are prepared at present to resist an attack on the canal.

The Secretary of War says in his last admirable annual report addressed to the President, and dated November 15, 1914:

> The regular army of the United States on June 30, 1914, consisted of 4701 officers and 87,781 men, . . . which includes Quartermaster Corps 3809, and Hospital Corps 4055, . . . at that time the various characters of troops were disposed of approximately as follows. . . .
>
> In the canal zone, 1 Regiment of Infantry, 3 Companies of Coast Artillery (aggregate strength 2179). . . . Of the troops that we now have, the numbers and organizations of which are shown above, it will be necessary in the near future to take from the United States and put in the . . . Panama Canal Zone 1 Regiment of Infantry, 1 Squadron of Cavalry, 1 Battalion of Field Artillery, 1 Company of Engineers, and 12 Companies of Coast Artillery, 4774 men.

Assuming a force of between five thousand and six thousand men as constituting the strength of

the army of the United States on the Isthmus of Panama—and I doubt if the force at present on the Isthmus is of such strength—how insufficient it appears to be for the defence of the canal! How utterly inadequate to defeat the landing of an hostile army under the protection of the guns of a victorious hostile fleet!

All that the commanding general of our forces on the Isthmus of Panama could possibly do in the event of being attacked by a greatly superior force, would be to blow up the locks of the canal and render its use by an enemy during the progress of the war utterly impossible.

Nor could we reinforce our garrison on the Isthmus of Panama, except through certain diplomatic arrangements discussed in the concluding chapter of this book, should we find ourselves at war with one of the first-class naval and military Powers, without command of the sea; and with the demands upon our fleet, as the first line of defence of our home coasts and harbours, it is difficult to see how, unless vastly increased in ships and guns, our navy could meet the first attack of the enemy upon our coasts and yet provide a Caribbean Sea fleet large enough to defeat a naval and military attack upon the Panama Canal.

Holding the Panama Canal makes it imperative that we should command the sea: not only command the Atlantic and the eastern Pacific, but also the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.

Losing command of the sea, we lose the Panama Canal, unless, before hostilities shall begin, we fill the fortresses defending the débouchés of the canal with coast artillery, and establish upon the Isthmus a mobile army large enough to defeat a land attack from an enemy able to overcome, through the superiority of his fleet, the sea defence of the canal by our fleet.

I have indicated the minimum of the mobile army needed for the defence of the Panama Canal as one hundred and fifty thousand men. But mere men without ammunition, and without sufficient military supplies and provisions, do not constitute an effective army. Without adequate supplies of ammunition, military supplies, and provisions—and modern war seems to demand an illimitable supply of ammunition—we could not hold the Panama Canal.

Is there reason to believe that the country appreciates the danger there is of losing the Panama Canal should we find ourselves at war with a first-class Power?

As shown above, the Secretary of War reported to the President under date of November 15, 1914, that the regular army "on June 30, 1914, consisted of 4701 officers and 87,781 men," and that he hoped soon to be able to concentrate in the Panama Canal Zone between 5000 and 6000 men.

With such a force, how can the Panama Canal be defended?

With the demands on our fleet so great as they are, and as they will become the moment war breaks out, what reason is there to believe that the navy can furnish for the defence of the canal a fleet strong enough to command the Caribbean Sea?

What is true of the Panama Canal is equally true of the Hawaiian Islands and of the Philippines, and equally true of Alaska, if it should profit an enemy, strong enough for the effort, to attack Alaska.

In the same report of November 15, 1914, the Secretary of War gives our strength in the Hawaiian Islands, in the Philippines, and in Alaska as follows:

In the Hawaiian Islands, 3 Regiments Infantry, 1 Regiment Cavalry, 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 1 Company Engineers, 8 Companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength 8195).

In the Philippines, 3½ Regiments Infantry, 2 Regiments Cavalry, 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 2 Companies Engineers, 11 Companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength 9572).

In addition to the above troops of the regular army there are in the Philippines fifty-two companies of Philippine Scouts aggregating 182 officers and 5733 enlisted men.

"In Alaska one Regiment of Infantry (aggregate 862)."

It is ludicrously absurd to suppose that these garrisons could defend these islands and hold Alaska in war.

Nor is our Asiatic Fleet a war fleet: and it is difficult to see how it could be increased to the proportions required to give it strength to resist the attack of the fleet of any one of the first-class Powers because of the demands upon the navy for the defence of our Atlantic and Pacific coasts and of the Panama Canal.

It would be matter of sincere regret should we lose the Philippine Islands in war, and yet lose them we should because it would be impossible for us to re-enforce the garrison, and maintain its supplies of ammunition during the war, without complete command of the sea, and it would be impossible for us to hope to hold command of the sea against the sea power of any one of the nations which would be likely to challenge our right to the possession of the islands, without an unhoped-for increase of the navy.

No attempt to estimate the number of troops required for the successful defence of the Philippines is undertaken because of its seeming futility.

Should war break out with one of the first-class Powers, the commanding general in the Philippines would have but one course open to him. He should at once concentrate all the troops under his command, with all accessible ammunition and material of war, at some one defensible point in

the islands, and there to provision himself for a siege of at least a year. The point selected for the final stand of our army in the islands should be chosen for purely military reasons, free from all political considerations; and it should be chosen especially because of its freedom from dominance by commanding heights, which, if seized by the enemy, would demand the evacuation of the position or the surrender of the army. The only hope of the commanding general would be that he might be able to hold this position until the end of the war, a hope which it is feared would end in disappointment.

All that our fleet could do on the breaking out of war would be to sail away and leave the islands to their fate.

Instead of waiting for the outbreak of war the Philippine Islands should be sold to Germany at the conclusion of the present European War, reserving to ourselves in the treaty of sale and cession certain advantages of trade with the islands. The presence of Germany in the Philippines should be regarded as making for our interests, because her possession of the islands would create a much-needed balance of power in the Pacific, and would give her a direct interest in the maintenance of the neutrality of the Panama Canal through its possession by ourselves. The chief consideration of the sale and cession of the Philippine Islands to Germany to be expressed in the treaty of sale and

cession shall be a stipulation on the part of Germany guaranteeing in perpetuity the possession of the Panama Canal to the United States.

Germany could colonize the Philippine Islands, and could develop their resources as we cannot. They could become a constituent part of the German Empire. They can never become a constituent part of the Republic of the United States, because our Republic is founded upon the principle of the citizenship of its people. Germany could make the islands a great naval and military stronghold in the East by settling in the islands considerable military colonies, and she could find homes on the fertile lands of the islands for millions of her subjects, who, under her aggressive civilization, would assimilate the present inhabitants to herself greatly to their own advantage.

With the Philippines in her possession, Germany need not let her eyes rest greedily upon southern Brazil, contenting herself with the commercial advantages which she derives from the colony of her people settled in that section of the southern republic.

The Philippines, lying upon the line of communication between British India and Japan, Germany would measurably neutralize, or at least limit to a certain extent, the offensive strength of those allies in the Pacific, thereby creating the much-needed balance of power in the Pacific Ocean.

Under such circumstances the possession of the

Panama Canal by the United States would be so much more to the interest of Germany than the possession of the canal herself, that, so far as we may look into the future, the cession of the Philippines to Germany, with or without a guarantee of our possession of the canal in the treaty of cession, would, of itself, guarantee our possession of the canal. The inclusion of such a clause in the treaty, however, upon which we should insist as the chief consideration for the cession of the islands, would not only insure us the support of Germany in holding the canal should war come upon the United States through the desire on the part of any other nation to possess the canal, but the possibility that the flags of Germany and the United States should fly side by side in the breeze of battle would have a sensibly chilling effect upon the ambition of any of the Powers desiring the possession of the canal.

That we have the legal right to sell the Philippines cannot be doubted. The capture of Manila took place after the signing of the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United States, and consequently our title to the islands cannot be held to be a title by conquest.

We paid Spain $20,000,000 for her property and rights in the islands, and the Philippines became ours to do with as we pleased.

The officious in contradistinction to the official diplomatic attitude of our country toward

Russia during the Russo-Japanese War is unaccountable from any correct view of our interests in the Pacific. Our interests called for a strong Russia, with open ports on the Pacific Ocean throughout the whole year. The long and loyal friendship between Russia and the United States, and the absence of points of contest or conflict between the two countries, seemed to assure the continuance of friendly relations between Russia and the United States; and a strong Russia in the Pacific should have been taken as the guarantee of the maintenance of a balance of power in the North Pacific. Instead of a strong Russia we find a strong Japan, and the consequent complete destruction of the balance of power in the Pacific. This destruction of the balance of power in the Pacific places us *vis-à-vis* with Japan.

This great and almost uncontrollable power of Japan does not appear, for the moment, to be matter of serious concern to us. The eyes of Japan are fixed upon the continent of Asia and she seems to see there the seat of her expanding power. She has annexed to her empire the kingdom of Corea, and she is advancing into the heart of China with, as yet, undeterminate plans, but with her eyes full of the light of the future.

Japan knows very well that she can seize the Philippines the moment she deems that the time has come for action. She looks upon the United States as her *locum tenens* in the islands, and she

does not wish us to leave the islands in behalf of any other Power. She knows our present impotence, and is content to let matters stand as they are. But when the hour strikes she proposes to drive us out of the islands.

But she is venturing upon endeavours on the continent of Asia which hold within the mantle of time great surprises and possibly great misfortunes. At present her way seems clear and her future bright. Leaving out of account the great reserve force in a people so vast as the Chinese, occupying a country so vast as China, it would seem that Japan's hold upon the imperial country cannot be shaken. Japan occupies a place in China similar to that of England in France in the time of the Black Prince.

Has the future the same transformation in store for Japan?

But whether continuously victorious or ultimately vanquished Japan regards herself as the inheritor of the Philippines. She does not wish to disturb our present hold upon the islands because she is not ready at present to take possession of them herself.

To anticipate this ultimate moment of contest would seem to be wisdom on the part of the United States, and especially so, if it could be possible to use the Philippines in such a way as not only to avoid the conflict ourselves but to transfer it to other shoulders; and especially wise would it be

if we could use the Philippines in such a way as to create a balance of power in the Pacific strong enough to make for peace in the Eastern world, and also to guarantee our possession of the Panama Canal by one of the great Powers of the world.

Perpetual peace is an iridescent dream beyond the sphere of statesmanship. But the maintenance of peace for the present, or for the immediate future, is the duty of the statesman.

The transfer of the Philippines to Germany after the present war would seem to solve the problem of the islands to the benefit of the United States, while insuring to the islands and their inhabitants an enlightened, an energetic, and a civilized government.

The present policy of ultimate withdrawal from the Philippines in favour of a portion of the present population of the islands, when they shall be fit to assume the responsibilities of government, promises no advantage to the United States, no advantage to the people of the islands, and furnishes no guarantee of the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific. Indeed, wretched misgovernment, sanguinary conflicts, and the ultimate annexation of the islands by Japan as a welcome relief from useless bloodshed is the future of the Philippines should we withdraw in favour of a section of the population of the islands. And should we be so foolish as to accompany our act

of withdrawal with a guarantee of the independence of the islands, we should certainly be led into war with Japan, *because* the islands could not be expected to maintain their independence, unaided by us, and Japan is at hand ready to take them over when they shall have become ripe for annexation. Japan in the Philippines is of no advantage to the United States. Her possession of the Philippines not only does not create a balance of power in the Pacific, but aggravates the present condition of affairs in that ocean. The possession of the islands by Japan means the virtual closing of their ports to our commerce, because we cannot compete with Japan in the commerce of the East whenever she resorts to the advantages of position, and to the occult advantages which she affords her commerce.

Whether our statesmen are clear-sighted enough to seize the opportunity which will be afforded at the close of the present war to retire from the islands in favour of Germany, it is impossible to say. But it is the logical solution of an almost impossible problem.

As to the Hawaiian Islands and Alaska, we must defend these possessions at all hazards and to the death. But to do so, the United States will need a large army and a large navy.

The present force in the Hawaiian Islands is barely enough to give warning to the world that they belong to the United States. As a war army

the force in the islands is a temptation, not a means of defence.

Let it be assumed that our enemy is one of the first-class Powers in alliance with Japan, or Japan herself.

How can it be supposed that 8195 men could defend the islands from Japanese attack? Ten times 8195 would scarcely be sufficient to insure the continued possession of the islands by the United States.

In war with Japan, or with Japan and her ally Great Britain, what fleet has the United States in the Pacific that could keep the seas against the fleets of those allies?

Alaska must be defended as an integral part of the United States. The loss of Alaska would be a staggering blow to the power and the prestige of the United States. Its surrender should only be thought of at the end of a long, a bloody, and a disastrous war. Meanwhile let us ask each other the question whether we are satisfied to rest the defence of Alaska upon its present garrison of 862 men?

And if we shall be disturbed by the question, let us ask ourselves further whether we prefer the loss of Alaska to an enemy or preparation for its defence?

Upon the answer to those questions shall depend the solution of the problem of national defence.

National defence! The vastness, the grandeur of the subject should stir the blood of the most stolid of our citizens.

The United States at bay!

The United States, facing the defeat of its fleet, and the invasion of its territory, should awaken the most sluggish of our people to action.

And we may have to face the destruction of our fleet and the presence of an hostile army on our shores, unless we withdraw from the fool's paradise in which we are living, and face the future as our forefathers faced it when the guns of Great Britain were sounding in their ears.

But the conditions of the problem of the defence of the country have changed wonderfully in the past fifty years. Fifty years ago, even thirty years ago, we might complacently have rested upon the reserve power in our people as the stronghold of our defence. But today there is no occult stronghold; no defence but the defence of soldiers with guns in their hands, and cannon in abundance, and in a fleet ready to meet upon the ocean the fleets of any Power which shall array herself against the United States.

But where are our soldiers? Where our cannon? Where the great fleets that shall be strong enough to hold the seas against all enemies, and keep open communication with the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, and with Alaska?

The soldiers do not exist; the cannon and the

ships are still in the ores of the mountains, unmined and unconverted into the shapes of war.

They are yet to be created, yet to be called into existence.

In the very able report of Major-General Wotherspoon, chief of staff of the army, dated November 15, 1914, which report it is sincerely wished could be read by every one of our countrymen, the General says:

The army is 154 officers and 7533 enlisted men below its authorized strength.

Of the total present enlisted strength of the army 27.50 per cent., including recruits and recruiting parties, belongs to the noncombatant and non-effective class, and is not with the colours; 19.45 per cent. is in that branch whose special function is coast defence; and 58.05 per cent. belongs to the mobile forces (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, infantry).

Of the actual strength of the army from the latest returns, 1067 officers and 19,899 enlisted men (including recruits and men engaged in recruiting) belong to the staff, technical, and noncombatant branches of the army.

Seven hundred and forty-six officers and 17,201 enlisted men belong to the coast artillery and 2738 officers and 51,344 enlisted men belong to the mobile army (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry).

The total strength of the field or mobile forces in our army is therefore less than 52,000 enlisted men. If from this strength the noncombatants and non-effectives, belonging to the regimental, troop, battery,

and company organizations, such as the noncommissioned staff, musicians, cooks, scouts, etc., which aggregate 5376, are deducted, *the actual fighting strength of the army with the colours, and without deductions for officers and men sick, on furlough, detached service, etc., would be 2738 officers and 45,968 enlisted men.*

The enlisted men of the mobile army are distributed as follows:

In the United States proper...	30,481	
In our foreign possessions.....	20,863	51,344

Distributed as follows:

In the Philippines.....	7,212		
In the Hawaiian Islands.....	6,832		
In the Panama Canal Zone....	1,681		
In China.....	690		
In Alaska.....	431		
In Vera Cruz (since returned to the United States).....	3,434	20,280	
In Porto Rico Regiment.....	583	583	20,863

. . . . . .

As to the coast artillery branch of the army. . . . Its strength has no relationship to the strength of the mobile army other than that the strength of the latter must be adequate to protect the fortified positions from attack from the rear. . . .

The coast artillery defences in the United States proper are to be manned at the rate of fifty per cent.

of the gun and mortar defences by the coast artillery corps of the organized militia.

. . . . . .

The strength of the coast artillery is at present 566 officers and 13,108 enlisted men below the necessities as estimated by the chief of coast artillery in addition to the deficiencies in the coast artillery corps of the organized militia. *The total deficiencies in the coast artillery corps of the regular army and the organized militia are, therefore, 856 officers and 24,489 enlisted men.*

Naval armament in the last few years has rapidly developed, particularly in respect to the calibre of the guns, their ranges, and the rapidity with which fire from these can be delivered. At the present time the tendency is to place on the higher type of battleships guns as large as fifteen inches calibre. These guns, whilst carrying a projectile of less weight than those used with our direct fire type of seacoast guns, have, owing to the greater length of the guns and the higher powder pressure used, a very distinct advantage in range, their range exceeding that of our fourteen-inch guns from 2000 to 3000 yards.

. . . . . .

In other words, it is my opinion that careful consideration should be given, at least in the establishment of new defence districts, to the question of the calibre, length, and range of the seacoast guns, as well as to the question whether the turret system for the protection of the gun and its crew should not be adopted, *in order to put the land defences somewhat*

nearer on a parity with the naval guns which are liable to attack them. As a fleet of eight battleships of the most modern type can throw against a single turret 118 projectiles per minute, the danger that must arise from the possibility of fragments of these shells and the débris thrown up from their impact against the concrete parapets which protect the guns to the crews as well as to the delicate and complicated machinery which operates the guns, would indicate that overhead protection against such fragments should be provided in order to insure the most effective operation of the coast armament.

. . . . . .

There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition for these defences, the supply which the department has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately an hour's full and active operation of the guns in the United States proper and a two hours' full and active operation of the guns in oversea fortifications. According to the report of the chief of coast artillery, *the amount of ammunition now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about seventy-three per cent. of this requirement for the guns and fifty per cent. for the mortars.* The amount of explosive necessary to load and operate the mines now provided at our various coast defences for *one charge* is complete. The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and searchlights are of the most serious character. *As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defence areas, the remainder of the fire control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised.*

Turning again to the admirable report of the Secretary of War it may be permitted to quote therefrom as follows:

In continental United States we have a territory consisting of 3,026,789 square miles, with a population of 98,781,324. In Alaska we have 590,884 square miles, with a population of 64,356. Our other territorial responsibilities which must be considered are: The Panama Canal, where, although the population is small, we have an investment of $400,000,000 and the destruction of which waterway would be an international calamity; Hawaii, with 6449 square miles and a population of 191,909; Porto Rico, with 3606 square miles and a population of 1,118,012; the Philippines, with 127,800 square miles and a population of 7,635,426, together with certain other islands not necessary to be considered in this connection.

. . . . . .

Scarcely any unit in the army ever has its proper complement of officers, and the need for an increase of officers is urgent and imperative. *In continental United States we had in the mobile army on June 30, 1914, 1495 officers and 29,405 men.*

We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colours in time of war—*consisting of sixteen men.*

. . . . . .

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy would

progress so far on the way to success in six months (the shortest possible time allowed for the creation of a volunteer army), if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest.

From these vastly interesting and most important reports we gather the following startling facts:

That on June 30, 1914, the mobile force of the army in the United States was 1495 officers and 29,405 men, a total national defensive army of but *30,900* officers and men.

That in the Panama Canal Zone we had a garrison of less than 2000 officers and men, but to be increased ultimately to about 5000 men.

That fifty per cent. of the men of the gun and mortar requirement of the coast defences are to be furnished by the National Guard, and that the total deficiencies in the coast artillery corps of the regular army and the organized militia are 856 officers and 24,489 enlisted men.

That the 15-inch guns of foreign navies outclass the 14-inch guns of our coast defensive works, with a superiority of range of between 2000 and 3000 yards to that of the heaviest guns in our coast defences.

That proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defence areas, whereas in the remainder,

the fire control system and searchlight equipment are deficient or improvised.

Thus it will be seen that without danger to themselves a hostile fleet of dreadnoughts might lie in safety out of range of the heaviest guns of our works and destroy them at pleasure.

That theoretically our coast defences are supplied with ammunition for a battle of an hour's duration, but that in fact ammunition is provided for a bombardment of but about three quarters of an hour. At the end of an hour's combat the guns of our defensive works would be out of action for lack of ammunition.

To oppose the landing of an hostile army on our coast the United States could put in line of battle, provided every man of the mobile army could be brought to the front, 30,900 officers and men of the regular army.

I quite understand that theoretically the organized militia is supposed to number 8323 officers and 119,087 men, but it is not the belief of the Secretary of War that all of the National Guard would respond to the call to the colours in the event of war breaking out. How large a proportion of the National Guard would come to the colours is matter of estimation. By some 60% is considered to be a fair proportion of the men of the National Guard who would report for duty, whereas by others the estimation rises to 75%. Assuming the latter percentage, we should have

as a reinforcement of the 30,900 regulars about 95,000 men from the National Guard, more or less dependable in battle; or if the whole army and National Guard should be concentrated at a given point to meet an invading army, which is an unthinkable contingency, we should have with the colours an aggregate force of about 125,900 men.

But such a concentration would be a human impossibility. It would mean the abandonment of all other posts and sections of the country by the regular army to effect the complete concentration of its mobile strength of 30,000 men, and it would equally be impossible to effect such a complete concentration of the National Guard, because it would leave the rest of the country bare of ostensible military force to perfect the concentration. It might be possible to effect the concentration of the mobile force of the regular army by substituting portions of the National Guard to take the place of the regulars on the Mexican border, and elsewhere in the country, but such substitution would require a much larger force of militia than of the regulars withdrawn.

I doubt if it would be possible to concentrate at any given point a larger force of regulars and militia than 75,000 troops, with which to resist an invading army of a quarter of a million men.

I have read with close attention Colonel Roosevelt's book, *America and the World War;* Major-General Green's book, *The Present Military*

Situation in the United States, and the book (American translation) by Freiheer von Edelsheim of the German General Staff, *Operations upon the Sea—The Problems of Transporting Troops during War*, without illumination of the subject of how we are to meet such an invasion as Freiheer von Edelsheim indicates as entirely possible.

Colonel Roosevelt's book is written in a lofty spirit of righteousness, full of glittering generalities, but without a practical suggestion as to how the nation shall be prepared for war. He is like a great bell clanging in the night, sounding an alarm to the startled city.

General Green points out the danger of foreign invasion, expresses a great desire to see the suppressed parts of von Edelsheim's book, and recommends that the nation should support the Secretary of War, from whose admirable report I have quoted so liberally, in all of his suggestions for the increase of the strength of the army.

Von Edelsheim's book was a great surprise. Its reading was begun with avidity, but soon it was discovered that beyond some calculations as to the transport capacity of a portion of the German merchant marine, *there was nothing in the book which was not known, or nothing in it which at least should not be known to every soldier.*

Granted the defeat of our fleet, the question of the invasion of the United States under existing military conditions in the country is a perfectly

simple and a perfectly practical matter. It is merely a question of transportation.

With the superiority of gun-fire possessed by the dreadnought fleet of a possible enemy conceded by the chief of staff, Major-General Wotherspoon, and holding in memory the crushing and crumbling effect of the German fire upon the fortifications of Liége and Namur—concrete walls and steel turrets crumbling under this fire as if made of pastry—our whole coast is open to the fleet of such an enemy.

Major-General Green indicates the landing-place of the invading enemy on the storm-swept southern shore of Long Island, but I cannot see why the enemy should risk shipwreck on such an open coast when it would be perfectly possible for him to force the eastern entrance of Long Island Sound, and then have his choice of half a dozen harbours on the mainland, on the northern shore of Long Island Sound, in which to land under cover of the guns of the fleet, within easy striking distance of all of the railway connections of New York City east of the Hudson River.

Of course no soldier would dream of defending New York City except upon its sea front from an attack by the enemy's fleet, or at a distance of at least thirty or forty miles from its farthest suburb toward the enemy.

The duty of the army would be to resist as far as possible the landing of an enemy, and when he

had effected a landing to meet him in battle outside of the range of the guns of his fleet.

Assuming a disposition on the part of the enemy after forcing the eastern entrance of Long Island Sound to seize New York City, he would be able to choose his point of landing, and consequently to dictate the line of resistance of our army, which should be made behind an intrenched line of defence.

In looking over the tables of organization and the Field Service Regulations, edition of 1914, issued by the War Department, I find no especial provision for pioneers except with the cavalry, although there is provision for engineers. No army would need an efficient force of pioneers more than our army engaged in resisting an enemy in possession of Long Island Sound, and no country possesses a larger or a better class from which to draw men for a body of pioneers than the United States, from the negro population of the South. A study of the pioneer corps of Sherman's army is recommended and, as the result of such study, it is thought that the difference between pioneers and engineers will be perceived, which will be suggestive and useful in future military operations in front of an enemy, especially in front of a superior enemy, landed from an enemy's fleet under the circumstances indicated above.

The first line of national defence is the fleet.

In this book the fleet has been spoken of as the first line of defence for our harbours and our coasts. It must not be understood, however, that such a suggestion contemplates the destruction of the fleet organization, and the segregation of the ships of the fleet among the various ports and harbours of the country.

Nothing could be farther from the thought. It is believed that the safety of the nation from foreign invasion, unless there shall be created an army of sufficient size and efficiency to serve as a warning to any possible enemy, depends upon the fleet; that the safety of the Panama Canal from attack by invasion depends upon the creation of a distinct and powerful fleet of sufficient strength to dominate the Caribbean Sea; and that the continued possession of the Hawaiian Islands, of Alaska, and the safety of the Pacific coast, depends upon a powerful Pacific fleet, as strong as the full fleet of any one of the Pacific powers.

The problem of national defence is a naval as well as a military problem.

To insure exemption from invasion, to hold the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and Alaska, and to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, we must increase our fleet to such proportions as to be as strong as Germany in the Atlantic and in the Caribbean Sea, and as strong as Japan in the Pacific.

Nothing less than that will meet the conditions of the naval problem.

Nothing less than the creation of an army strong enough to serve as a menace even to the military empire of Germany, will be sufficient to meet the conditions of the military problem.

The almost painful position of Great Britain as a military Power in the present war should be a warning to us to meet the conditions of national defence as they now present themselves to us.

Great Britain was utterly unprepared for such a war as she has entered upon, with a small regular army scattered over the earth and with an inefficient militia or territorial army, as her second line of defence. On the breaking out of the war she began the creation of a large volunteer army, which, according to Lord Kitchener, was to be ready for the field in May of this year. May came, but her army was not then ready for the field. July has passed, and nearly a year after the breaking out of the war, Lord Landsowne, speaking in the House of Lords, says that the British army on the continent amounts to "approximately 420,000 to 440,000 men," including those in France and those engaged in the attack on the forts defending the Dardanelles.

In France the front of the Allies extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Swiss frontier, and yet of that long front, on the maintenance of which depends the safety of Dunkirk and Calais, and the freedom from invasion of England, the British troops hold but forty miles.

England has held to the volunteer system of recruiting her army, and manifestly the system has broken down. For a long while she depended on the ordinary out-turn of munitions of war for her supplies, and here also her system of production has broken down. A year of the great war has passed and England is still in the throes of preparation for war. She is supposed to have in England a million volunteers, but she does not send them to France where her fate is being decided. Presumably she does not yet consider them to be soldiers. She is short of guns, short of munitions of war, short of soldiers. Should Dunkirk and Calais fall into the hands of Germany the invasion of England may become a possibility.

Should we become involved in war is it possible to believe that we should be able to make a better showing than England has made?

Manifestly not.

Therefore her unsuccessful undertaking in this war should be thoughtfully considered by us as not only a warning, but as pointing the way to the necessity of perfecting a system of national defence which shall put us beyond the danger of invasion and defeat.

As an American by over two hundred and fifty years' descent, the author believes in his country and in his countrymen. He believes that they have been made, and that they can be made again, as good soldiers as the people of any country in the

world. He would urge upon his fellow countrymen to be warned by the situation of Great Britain; to be awake to the necessity for preparation against war lest they shall have to suffer the biting mortification, the blinding and crushing wretchedness of defeat.

Prepared we can face the world with confidence and with a high heart.

It is to point the way—the only way—to safety and success through thorough preparation that this book is written.

CHAPTER II

WEST POINT: ITS EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION

FIFTY years ago, or at the close of the War of the Rebellion, and while I was still in the army, I advocated an enlargement of the corps of cadets, and the reorganization of the West Point Military Academy, so that the Academy should be prepared to graduate all the officers that the regular army should need, and in addition should graduate, each year, a certain number of half-term men, or men who should have spent two years at the Military Academy, and who, leaving the academy at their graduation, and passing into the great body of the people, should be ready to officer the volunteer army which our military system seemed then to demand should be created on the breaking out of war when war should come. My idea was not alone to officer the regular army exclusively with graduates of the Military Academy, but also each year to send out into the body of the people a number of young men who had had the advantage of two years' study and instruction

at West Point, as a reserve of officers for the army or the volunteers in the event of war.

Although I discussed the subject with the enthusiasm of youth and with the judgment formed by service in the volunteer army during the great war, I spoke to dull ears. The country had had enough of war and of talk presaging war. The officers of the army with whom I discussed the subject were indifferent; and both people and army, satisfied with the prowess of the volunteers, were content to rest the future of the country in their hands.

When it is remembered that we were separated by three thousand miles of ocean from a European enemy; that Japan had not then emerged as a modern Power from the state of Eastern lethargy which had held her for centuries; that the steel battleship and the modern submarine had not then been invented, and that a three-thousand-ton commercial steamer was the wonder of the seas; that the railway was only then becoming the power in transportation which it has since become; that electricity had not been adapted by modern invention as since has been done, except in respect to the telegraph, to the needs of man in peace and in war; that the telephone had not been invented; that 12-inch and 15-inch guns and mortars had not entered the realm of speculation, and that the motor-car was not even an affair of dreams, it need not excite wonder that the public and the

army were not prepared to consider so great an increase in the corps of cadets at West Point, as I then advocated, as a preparation for war. The ocean was our great defence from attack, and on this defence the nation was prepared to rest.

Ninety-six per cent. of the army of the United States in the War of the Rebellion were volunteers, and at Antietam and Gettysburg, in the Wilderness, in the siege of Richmond, and in the final campaign which ended with the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, the troops of the regular army and the volunteers fought side by side, the one as valiantly as the other. Many volunteer batteries of field artillery were as fine as the finest batteries of the regular army. Such corps as the 15th, 16th, and 17th, Grant's and Sherman's veterans, and such an army as the Army of the Cumberland with Thomas at its head, with scarcely an exception made up of volunteers, were as fine bodies of troops in the latter part of 1862 and thenceforward to the end of the war, as the troops of the regular army were during the great war or are today. The gallant Army of the Potomac speaks for itself in history.

Why, with such a record made by the volunteer army, should the country doubt its safety under the protection of volunteers, steadied by the small and efficient body of regulars constituting the permanent military establishment?

It is no wonder, as I look back over the period

of fifty years, that I spoke to dull ears; no wonder that I could awaken no enthusiasm in soldier or civilian for a large increase in the corps of cadets, not only large enough to supply entirely the needs of the regular army for officers, but also large enough to graduate each year a surplus of officers who should be ready to give their trained service to the volunteer troops on the breaking out of war.

In that long ago, I advocated the increase of the corps of cadets at the Military Academy to a body of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred men, and estimated that not only would the demand for officers of the regular army be amply supplied, but that there would be graduated and distributed throughout the people a body of men who had had two years of military training at the Academy, who would develop and maintain the military spirit in the people, and who would be ready to organize at once the volunteer army should the nation unhappily fall into war.

The lesson, which, above all other lessons of the great war, impressed itself upon my mind was the length of time which it took to convert citizens, ever so eager, into soldiers; and as a corollary, the imperative necessity for a large body of officers, at the breaking out of war, to get the volunteers into shape.

No one is readier than I am to recognize the value *as soldiers of my fellow volunteers when they had become soldiers.* But when in the enthusiasm

of patriotism they volunteered they were not soldiers, nor were their officers, who marched at their head, officers except in name.

Long months of weary work were required in the first place to create officers out of the volunteer material at hand, and longer weary months to change the volunteers of the ranks into soldiers.

No one can teach another what he does not himself know.

And the volunteer officers had first to be created before they in turn could create soldiers from their volunteer comrades of the army.

In war the orders actually issued to troops are few and simple, and it was supposed at the outbreak of the great war that when the soldier knew the manual of arms, and could march in column or go into line of battle with ease, that he was fit for battle and for the campaign.

The troops which fought the battle of Bull Run knew the manual of arms and could and did march to the battlefield, and could and did form line of battle, and could and did advance to the charge, following bravely the lead of their officers.

But they were not soldiers nor were they a mob as they were called after the battle, and as they have since recently been called by regular officers who have had no experience of battle to guide their judgment.

They were simply men in the first stage of becoming soldiers.

In addition to drill, to readiness to obey the word of command, to discipline, there is needed the spirit of the soldier, which is *morale.*

After Bull Run the troops entered upon the period of self-creation and of growth into soldiers. Boards were organized throughout the army to examine officers of volunteers as to their fitness for service. Colonels and second lieutenants were called before these boards and were thoroughly examined as to their fitness to hold their commissions. Many officers left the army because they could not pass their examinations, and many others resigned rather than face the examining board.

Promotions were made throughout the army as the result of examinations for fitness, and a spirit of emulation and of appreciation was developed in the troops. Drills were held with regularity and pertinacity. Discipline developed and grew in strength and fineness. And morale, that intangible force, that spirit of the soldier, that something which develops in the soldier that faith in himself, in his comrade, in his commanding officer, which co-ordinates the effort of the company, of the regiment and of the army, and which makes the soldier and the army capable of sustained and coherent action in victory or in defeat, on the long march, in the encampment, in battle, was born.

It may be asked, why, during this period in

which we were engaged in creating an army, the South did not advance on Washington and end the war in a burst of triumph?

The answer is that they, too, were engaged in creating their army out of the same elements as ourselves—volunteers fresh from the plough, from the counting-room, from the college, from the market-place. It took the South as long to create the infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia—"as fine an infantry as ever marched"—as it took us to create the infantry of the Army of the Potomac, *just as fine an infantry as the infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia.*

This schooling of the armies of the great war, those of the United States and those of the South, took about a year. And it may be taken as proven by the experience of war that it takes a year to create a soldier. That it takes a year to weld soldiers into the masses that make an army, and that unless there are officers ready at hand to take command of the volunteers of an army at the outbreak of war, it takes at least a year to make a dependable officer as well as dependable soldiers, and dependable armies out of such officers and soldiers.

In other words—if a possible enemy will assure us that we shall have a full year of time after the declaration of war in which to create our army before he will make his attack upon us, we may continue our dependence on volunteers for the national defence, otherwise not!

But what enemy, himself prepared to strike, will accord us a year in which to prepare for war? We are not living in Utopia; 1915 is not the year of a fool's paradise.

Therefore it is necessary that we shall turn from the past system of raising and training armies to the newer, the better, and the more democratic system which it is the object of this book to advocate.

My plan of 1866 for the enlargement and development of West Point is my plan of 1915, modified and developed by the intervening growth of the country, and of the marvellous growth in the offensive strength of the navies and the armies of the great Powers of the world.

The ocean no longer presents a barrier to invasion. The struggle for the supremacy of the seas now being waged introduces problems for the United States undreamed of fifty years ago. What was sound judgment in 1866 is sounder judgment in 1915. What was wisdom and prevision in 1866 is absolute necessity in 1915 unless the nation is prepared to suffer defeat at the hands of the first great Power which may attack us.

I can see no reason why the United States should be drawn into the present European War. It is manifestly neither to the interest of the Allies —Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia—nor to the interest of Germany and Austria to excite the hostility of the United States to the extent of war.

As an ally of the Allies we could render immense service to their cause, and it can be easily understood why they should wish us to go to war with Germany. Equally we could add greatly to the offensive strength of Germany and Austria in the war by the invasion and annexation of Canada, should the attack of Great Britain on our commerce drive us into war with her and her Allies.

Looking at the matter purely and solely from the standpoint of the United States, I can see no conditions making for war with one or the other of the contending groups of nations. Diplomacy should be able to arrange for and to insure the satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions, or of all questions which may hereafter arise between the belligerents and ourselves.

At present our relations with Germany are somewhat strained, but our contentions in respect to the freedom of neutral commerce are those for which Germany has stood in the past, and our demand in respect thereto is limited to the simple statement of our rights under international law, and the assertion that those rights shall be respected. It is impossible to think that Germany can see a sufficient benefit to her war plans in the use of submarines to risk the advent of the United States into the war as an ally of Great Britain, France, and Russia.

And on the other hand, it cannot be thought to be possible that Great Britain in the effort to

limit the food supplies of Germany, supplies which Germany does not need for her support, or to limit the export of cotton to Germany and to the neutral nations, because it is an element in the production of gun-cotton, should proceed to such length as to compel us to declare war against herself and her allies in defence of neutral rights and the freedom of the seas.

It is the work of diplomacy to find a living ground between the two contesting groups of nations so that our rights shall be preserved and peace be maintained.

When diplomacy has the sure ground to stand upon that neither the Allies nor Germany and Austria have any reason to wish to go to war with us, it seems to be beyond the range of reason to anticipate that war with either of those groups of warring nations should occur.

It is not therefore because I apprehend immediate war that I am in this book reviving the plans of fifty years ago.

This book is written in the hope of introducing an element of common-sense into the discussion of the question of national defence, of marshalling the lessons of the past to the profit of the present and the advantage of the future. We have fought one great war with volunteers the conversion of whom into soldiers consumed the first year of the war, and frankly I think it the height of folly to allow the nation to remain longer in the fools'

paradise of dependence on volunteers, when the conditions of modern war confirm the proposition that the nation which is prepared for war, when war breaks out, is the inevitable victor in the struggle.

I believe, as I have said above, that volunteers, *converted into soldiers*, are as good soldiers as regulars. What the officers of the regular army are not sufficiently clear-sighted to perceive, or frank enough to admit, is that volunteers of two and three years' service in time of war are as much regulars, so far as efficiency is concerned, as themselves.

But notwithstanding this belief in the efficiency of volunteers as soldiers *when they shall have become soldiers*, I am opposed to the further dependence of the nation on the volunteer system of raising and maintaining armies.

The volunteer system has become obsolete. Dependence upon a volunteer army will result, and can only result, in the defeat of the nation in the first war in which she shall engage with a first-class Power, because such first-class Power would be prepared for war and we should not be prepared for war.

This is demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, in the condition of Great Britain in the present great European War. The war has been going on for a year, and yet Lord Kitchener's great volunteer army is only just now coming into the

field. Much of it is still on the training-grounds of England. A large part of the regular army of England, which was sent to the continent at the breaking out of the war, has ceased to exist. England is maintaining her position in the war behind the guns of her allies. The French and the Russian soldiers are doing the greater part of the fighting while Lord Kitchener in England is creating an army of volunteers which in time he hopes to have in fit shape to put into battle.

When we fight we shall probably have to fight without dependable allies. We shall have no French army and no Russian army to battle for time while we are engaged behind their guns in creating and disciplining a volunteer army, as Great Britain has been doing for the past year.

Wherefore it is necessary that we should abandon the volunteer system of creating our armies, and rely upon the creation of a large regular army divided between the active army, and the reserve army, which shall be at the command of the President to be called to the colours the moment war threatens the nation.

And such a fundamental reorganization of the military system of the nation imperatively demands a vast increase in the number of officers for the command of the troops of the active and the reserve armies, both armies to constitute the regular army of the United States.

The army of the United States must be strong

enough, when mobilized for war, to meet at the coast any army of invasion sought to be landed by an enemy, and to defeat his army, capturing or driving it into the ocean.

Not only must the United States be strong enough to put such an invincible army upon the Atlantic coast, but also upon the northern frontier and upon the Pacific coast, so that our country may be made impregnable to attack either from Europe or Asia, or from an allied attack of a European and an Asiatic nation, should such an alliance be brought into action against us.

Also must the army of the United States be strong enough not only to hold Hawaii and the Panama Canal, but also to hold Alaska.

To command such an army will require a large body of officers who should be educated officers, and it is to supply such a body of educated officers that I advocate the enlargement and reorganization of the Military Academy.

The present capacity of the Military Academy is seven hundred cadets. *The number of cadets should be increased at once to a force of thirty-six hundred young men*, which would give a full brigade of three full regiments of twelve companies each—each regiment to consist of three battalions of four companies each.

One of the material advantages of such an increase in the corps of cadets would be that the cadets themselves, and the officers in command,

would have the opportunity of seeing and being a part of a large body of troops, which would be subject to brigade drills.

And by considering, for purposes of drill and manœuvres, each battalion a regiment, and each regiment a brigade, there could be introduced divisional drill and manœuvres which would be of incalculable advantage to the cadets, and especially to the officers commanding in the divisional manœuvres.

It may be said that the barracks at West Point are full to about their capacity of seven hundred men. But this suggestion presupposes that the cadets can only be housed in stone palaces. Barracks and classrooms for the increased corps of cadets can be constructed rapidly of wood, and made quite as comfortable as is necessary for the accommodation of the full complement of thirty-six hundred cadets.

It may be said that the plain at West Point is too small to accommodate a brigade of thirty-six hundred cadets. So much the better. Let the parade and drill ground be over the hills and valleys adjacent to the present grounds of the Military Academy, thus introducing at the Academy actual war conditions for formation and drill.

I have thought much as to the method of selection of cadets for the enlarged Military Academy, and as to the standard of examination for admis-

sion to the Academy, and have come to the deliberate opinion that the standard of admission to the Academy should be maintained at its present high level. The country does not want a low grade of officer, but a high grade of officer for its army. Nor need this standard for admission to the Academy be a serious hindrance to the supply of cadets if the method of appointment be broadened so as to be open to the whole country.

But no matter how broad the competition for cadetships shall be made, the examinations for admission to the Academy should be stricter, if anything, than they are at present. Admission to the Academy on certificate from schools or colleges, or from any other source, should be abolished.

If the examinations for admission be strict, and only the fit be admitted, there will be fewer found incompetent to continue the course of studies in the Academy than is the case under the present forms and conditions of admission, and consequently the proportion of graduates of the Academy will be much larger than at present.

To insure a uniform and impartial system of examination for admission to the Military Academy—and much of these remarks apply to the Naval Academy as well—I recommend that all examinations for cadetships shall be confided to the Civil Service Commission with enlarged powers.

The Academic Board should establish the

conditions of examination, and the Civil Service Commission, expanded to become the Examining Board for the civil and military services of the United States, should hold the examinations territorially throughout the United States. The territorial distribution of cadetships as at present established, speaking broadly, should be maintained, as the army of the United States represents, and should represent, the people of the United States, and consequently the cadetships, with certain limited reservations, should be distributed according to population throughout the country. But while thus creating the corps of cadets, and bringing to the Academy the representatives of all sections of the country, it should be understood as a condition of examination that each applicant for a cadetship, upon presenting himself for examination, should take the oath of allegiance to the United States in which he shall swear fealty *alone* to the United States, abjuring any subordinate or foreign allegiance, jurisdiction, or citizenship, and pledging his life and his devotion to the defence of the United States against all enemies whatsoever, whether domestic or foreign.

All appointments to cadetships should be by competitive examination, and no cadet should be admitted to the Academy except after success in such competitive examination. All young men of good character, whose parents are citizens of the United States, should be eligible to enter the

competition for cadetships. The sons of officers of the army should have the privilege of appearing before any examining board in the country for examination for admission to the Military Academy, but they should stand the test of competition in such examination for cadetships.

The Civil Service Commission should, for the purposes of examination for admission to the Military Academy, be assisted by either members of the Academic Board or by representatives of the Academic Board, and the physical examination of each applicant should be made by medical officers of the army and should precede the mental examination for cadetships. No one should be admitted to the Academy except he be the holder of a certificate from the Civil Service Commission to the effect that he had passed his examination for admission at a public and competitive examination. The Examining Board or Commission should hold every competitor for a cadetship to strict compliance with the conditions and requirements of the standard of admission established by the Academic Board, and no one should receive his certificate of admission to the Academy who had not fully and fairly passed the examination according to such standard of admission.

The broadest and completest possible competition coupled with the strictest examination for admission to the Military Academy, in which the applicant for admission shall not only have passed

a competitive examination, but shall also have passed satisfactorily the examination according to the standard of admission established by the Academic Board, should be maintained. It is believed that such a system, which could not be influenced by undue pressure of any sort, would result in the selection of cadets of as high a condition of mentality as possible, higher than the present restricted system of selection of cadets can possibly secure for the Academy. Indeed it is believed that one of the reasons that such a large proportion of cadets fail to graduate into the army as officers is, that the system of restricted selection at present prevailing does not insure to the Academy a sufficient number of high-class cadets, competent to meet the requirements of the scheme of studies maintained at the Academy.

As the object of these examinations is to insure a corps of cadets at its full maximum strength, which should be *thirty-six hundred men*, the examining boards should be required to file with their list of accepted candidates for admission to the Academy a list of alternates, who shall have passed their examinations satisfactorily, from which list all vacancies in the annual allotment for the Academy should be filled, and if for any reason any cadet should fall out during the first two or three months of the school year a cadet to fill his place should be taken.

Objection may be made by the unthinking to

the proposed strength of the corps of cadets. It may be said, why concentrate in one school thirty-six hundred cadets? Why not create in different sections of the country smaller schools on the plan of West Point to turn out the same number of graduates?

The answer is that the great need of the army is to accustom its officers to see and to be a part of, to grow into the consciousness of being a part of, a large body of troops.

If some of the battles of the War of the Rebellion are studied it will become apparent that the commanding officers of divisions, on several notable occasions, did not properly estimate the extent of ground which their commands could occupy, such failure in apprehension resulting in serious losses, and this failure may be traced to the stunting effect upon their minds and upon their imaginations of their experience with small bodies of troops in the old army, stunting effects from which their later experience with larger volunteer commands was unable to free them. Notably this was the case at Antietam.

I have long thought it would be well worth the expense to send to Europe each year as large a number of officers of the army as would be received by foreign Powers—each married officer to be required to leave his wife at home in the United States—to attend the usual autumn manœuvres in order that they should have the opportunity of

seeing large bodies of troops in battle formation during the manœuvres, so that their imaginations should be stimulated to a conception of the relationship of large bodies of troops to the terrain in which they are operating, and to accustom them to the sight of large bodies of troops in motion, which would reveal to them the actualities of their profession.

In our small army no chance for such observation is afforded except, to a very limited degree, at present upon the Mexican border; and before the War of the Rebellion in our then still smaller army, a brigade was an impossible actuality, an almost startling conception of the imagination. The result was that on the breaking out of the great war our regular officers had almost as much to learn about armies, and their constitution and being, as the officers of the volunteers. Of course they had studied and thought about large armies, and how they looked and acted and fought, but as to the realization of their dreams, they had to wait until they were created brigadier-generals and major-generals, and put in command of brigades and divisions of the volunteer army, when they learned, for the first time, these lessons of war, often at a serious cost to the troops under their command.

A large brigade of cadets at West Point, a brigade which for tactical purposes could be expanded into a division, would not only be of

advantage to the officers in command but also of great awakening influence upon the minds of the cadets themselves. They would get used to military numbers in the impressionable period of their lives, when impressions made upon the mind are ineradicable.

Also it is thought that the unity of command, the unity of instruction and of association, would produce better results in a single academy among a large body of cadets, than if the same body of cadets should be broken up and divided among four or five different schools, under different commanding officers, and under different inspiration.

The only point upon which objection to a large West Point—*a West Point of thirty-six hundred cadets*—could rest, is that the broken character of the country surrounding the Military Academy would not afford the necessary parade ground. But on the other hand, this broken country could be made an element of instruction of the utmost value to the future officers of the army. Battle-fields are not usually level parade grounds. The broken country in which West Point lies could serve admirably as a field of manœuvre for the cadets. Of course the government would have to increase the territory comprehended within the area of the Military Reservation to accommodate the corps of cadets with sufficient manœuvre ground.

So far as the requirements for admission to the Academy are concerned, while the standard of admission should be maintained at the present high level, the range of examination might be limited to the advantage of greater thoroughness in the examination. What the examination should be directed to produce is a candidate for cadetship with a clear, strong, well-disciplined mind, acquainted with the studies introductory to those to be pursued at the Academy, and with a general knowledge of the history and geography of our country, and of the history and geography of the great nations of the modern world. They should not be required to familiarize themselves with ancient history nor with controversial subjects of our own military history before appearing for examination for admission to the Academy. It is difficult to understand of what value a knowledge of the Delian League could be to a candidate for examination for a cadetship except to familiarize him with the fact of the influence of sea power on the development of a nation, or why a candidate for a cadetship should be required to form and express an opinion as to the effect of the battle of Cold Harbor upon Grant's campaign against Lee.

As to the effect of the battle of Cold Harbor on Grant's campaign, a true answer to the question would not, I fancy, satisfy the mind of the examiner who suggested it. The answer to this question is that the battle of Cold Harbor had no effect

whatsoever on the campaign. The battle of Cold Harbor was fought on the 3d of June, 1864, and on June 5th we find Grant writing from Cold Harbor to Halleck, that he proposed to advance to the James and cross the river with the whole of his army, a continuation of his advance against Lee by the left flank, which began on the Rappahannock and which ended at Appomattox. Grant says in his *Memoirs:* "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made." In view of this statement by General Grant it may be assumed that the assault at Cold Harbor was either a mistake, or was badly conducted. But after all, it was merely an incident of the campaign. If it was a mistake, it was one of those mistakes which might have crushed a small man, but which, in the case of a great man like Grant, was swallowed up in victory. The only mistake that Grant made at Cold Harbor, in my judgment, was that he did not concentrate his artillery, and smother Lee's intrenchments with the fire of his guns in anticipation of the advance of the infantry to the charge.

One might as well ask what influence the battle of Aspern-Essling had upon the campaign of Wagram? Napoleon was defeated at Aspern-Essling by the Archduke Charles, and barely escaped with his army across the north arm of the Danube. But his intellect blazed forth in defeat, and he called reinforcements to his standard from every quarter. One may almost hear the tramp

of the army of Italy, under the command of the Viceroy, marching across the Alps to the rescue of the Emperor.

After his concentration had been completed, Napoleon threw twenty-four bridges across the Danube and advanced upon the Archduke Charles, finding him at Wagram. The battle of Wagram was a great triumph for French arms, and Napoleon crowned himself with victory.

Any practical plan for the reorganization of the army must consider first the question of officers, and having in mind the lesson of the great war that it takes a year to make a soldier, and consequently a much longer time to make a dependable officer, and still longer to acquaint that officer with the technique of the profession, it may be readily seen that it is not the part of wisdom to fill the army with officers direct from civil life when by increasing the capacity of West Point it may be possible to supply the army with trained officers from the National Military Academy.

I advocate a large West Point, *a West Point of thirty-six hundred cadets*, because I believe that such a strong corps of cadets is needed to furnish officers for the enlarged regular army, and also to provide officers for the reserve army which should be constituted as a part of the regular army.

At present the officers of the regular army who are graduates of the Military Academy, are but about forty-four per cent. of the whole number of

officers of the army. Such a small percentage of graduates in a period of profound peace is not only wrong in theory but wrong in practice.

The demand for officers for the enlarged regular army, should the strength of the army be brought up to two hundred thousand men, would aggregate about four thousand officers. To admit at once to the army such a large body of civilians as officers would be a calamity, and would postpone the fitness of the army for action for at least a couple of years, if not indeed impair its efficiency for many years to come. How much better it would be to delay the increase of the army to its full proposed strength until there could be created, through graduation from the Military Academy, a measurably sufficient number of officers to command the enlarged army; or to increase the army gradually as an enlarged West Point should be able to graduate officers for the army.

Nor do I believe that anything would be lost by such delay, as I do not think that there is danger of immediate war.

If the curse of excessive details of officers for special duty should be stamped out, the Secretary of War would find it easy to restore immediately to their commands several hundred officers now on detached duty, without the least bad effect upon the service or upon the business of the country. Then, if the present regiments and batteries of the regular army should be filled to

full war strength, and be maintained at full war strength, the apparent demand for new officers as stated by the Secretary in his last annual report, would be greatly reduced if not entirely done away with. It is thought that the demand for officers for the active regular army and the reserve army, as I shall outline these organizations in the next chapter, will be sufficient for a number of years to consume all of the graduates from the enlarged West Point. The subject of excessive details will also be more fully discussed in the following chapter.

The plan for the enlargement of West Point which I advocate, *is based upon the theory that the general term of instruction for all cadets shall be two years*, and that thereafter, those who are found upon examination to be especially fitted to continue in the army as officers of the active army, shall enter upon a post-graduate term of two years' study and instruction at the Military Academy. This plan will give to the army a highly educated body of officers, and will give to the reserve army and to the country a body of officers who have had two years' instruction at the Academy, and who have been regularly graduated therefrom as qualified officers of the army.

The corps of cadets, enlarged to the number of thirty-six hundred men, should receive the same instruction—military and academic—during their term of two years' service at the Academy, no

distinction, except that of class record, being made between those to be graduated at the end of the term of two years, and those to be given the opportunity of taking the post-graduate course for service in the active army; except that a study of the character of the cadets should weigh in the final selection of cadets for the post-graduate course. But upon the final examination at the end of the two-year term of study, and based upon such examination, and upon the record of the *character* of the cadets proposed to be kept by the officers of the Academy, the selection should be made of those who should be retained at the Academy to take the post-graduate course of two additional years of study for graduation as officers of the active army.

The War Department should estimate the number of officers needed for the active army during each succeeding term of two years, and the number of cadets to be selected for the post-graduate course should be determined by this estimation of the needs of the army for officers.

Of course the selection of the cadets to be continued at the Academy for the post-graduate term should be made as impartially as possible, the object of the government being to secure not only a sufficient number of officers to fully officer the active army, but also to reserve to the active army the cream of the cadet corps.

This idea of reducing the general term of study

and instruction at the Military Academy to two years, with provision for a special post-graduate course of study and instruction for those cadets who are finally to be graduated as officers of the active army is the soul of my plan for the reorganization and enlargement of West Point. Classroom standing must of course count for much in making these selections for the post-graduate course, but on the other hand, something more must enter into the determination of the problem: *That something being an estimation of character.*

The determination of character, until the supreme test of opportunity and trial in war is applied, is very difficult, and yet character is the heart and soul of the soldier. It is the one determining feature which separates the efficient from the inefficient officer.

During the first two-year term, the whole body of cadets will be striving for the honour of selection for the second or post-graduate course of study and instruction, and for final graduation as officers of the active army.

The uncertainty whether they are to be officers of the active or of the reserve army will act as a stimulus upon the whole school: and the further uncertainty as to whether a large or a small number of cadets will be demanded by the exigencies of the service for continuance at the Academy to take the post-graduate course of study and instruction will stimulate the cadets, not

only in their studies but in their military conduct, and this stimulus will develop character.

In no profession is character so imperative an attribute as in the army. It is the one most important, the one determinative personal influence in developing the soldier. It differentiates with merciless accuracy the efficient from the inefficient officer—and it marks the wide difference between the efficient few and the two or three great soldiers who stand out in a blaze of glory from among the millions of men under arms.

A man may be a profound mathematician, an admirable tactician; he may know in theory the principles of the art of war; he may understand the theory of strategy; he may be an excellent engineer and a brave man, and yet lacking character he may be a complete failure as a soldier.

It is the object of the Military Academy to train young men to become soldiers. To train young men so that in after military life they may *be* soldiers, not the mere semblance of soldiers. To equip them so that when the opportunity offers itself in war, they will be equal to the opportunity; equal to the efficient performance of the tasks imposed upon them in war no matter how great those tasks may be.

The success or failure of the work of the Academy is determined by the character manifested by its graduates. The ultimate determination of the character of the soldier only comes, and can only

come in war and through the tests of war; and it is for this reason that the peace reputations of officers often count for so little when subjected to the rude and the severe tests of war.

Until these supreme tests are applied we cannot know whether an officer is deserving of the great title of soldier or not.

We may think that we know, and we may be able to judge to a certain extent, as to the character of the cadet at the Military Academy, and afterward of the officer in the life of the army, but it is after all an approximation.

And yet such an approximation must be attempted to be made at the Military Academy. In determining who among the corps of cadets are to be allowed to take the post-graduate course for final graduation as officers of the army, the question of character must be considered. Character develops itself in so many different ways that it is difficult to determine whether a student possesses it or not, and yet I fancy that instructors trained to observation, may reach an approximation of more or less value which should be of use in determining who shall be selected for the post-graduate course.

A record of the character of each cadet should be kept, and such record should present as clear an estimate of the character of each cadet as can be formed by the officers and professors under whose observation he may have passed. The substance

of this estimate of character should be considered, side by side, with the record of the class standing of the cadet in determining whether he should be graduated, and should leave the Academy at the end of the two-year term, or whether he should be allowed to take the post-graduate course of two additional years of study at the Academy.

The history of armies bears eloquent testimony not only to the value of character, but as to the lamentable failure of officers lacking in character.

The present Generalissimo of the French Army, General Joffre, made himself notable before the war by arbitrarily retiring a number of general officers who had failed to display promptness and efficiency, or in other words, character, on the peaceful fields of the autumn manœuvres. And since the opening of the present war in Europe, upward of fifty general officers of the French army have been relieved from their commands and placed on the retired list for inefficiency. They may have been, or some of them may have been, successful graduates of St. Cyr, and yet in the supreme test of war they failed.

So also was it in our great war. Many general officers, graduates of the Military Academy, were found to be, judged by the criterion of war, unfit for service in the field in command of troops in the advanced rank in the volunteer army to which they had been appointed. Many were continued in their commands longer than they should have

been because of their old army reputations, or because of their cadet standing at the Military Academy, and yet the inexorable judgment of war condemned them as unfit.

If a closer estimate of character be made at West Point and afterward in the army, it may be predicted that fewer failures among our general officers in war will occur.

It may be conceded that there is some sort of estimate of character sought to be formed under present conditions at West Point, but I think it may be stated that in no case is such estimation of character allowed to weigh heavily against class-room standing in determining graduation.

It is recognized how difficult it is to make such an estimate of character, and with what watchful care it must be attempted. And yet it should be seriously attempted to be made in the interest of the service, because reputation in the army in time of peace, or until the supreme test of war is applied, guarantees little, and yet such reputation is necessarily the basis of the assignment of officers of the army to high command on the breaking out of war.

Our armies, during the great war, were at times badly commanded by officers of high army reputation in time of peace, and the danger is that our armies of the future may be badly commanded by the same class of officers, unless some surer estimation of character be formed, first at the

Military Academy, and, after graduation, in the army.

Who would have predicted at the opening of the great war that Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas would head the list of the army as great soldiers in war?

We were taught to put faith at the breaking out of the war, and during the early part of the war, in McClellan, McDowell, Burnside, Buell, Hooker, Halleck, Pope, and many other officers of the regular army, only to find, in the test of war, that they were broken reeds, worthless for the great commands that they held. All of these generals lacked character, and lacking character they failed. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas possessed character and succeeded, covering themselves and the army with glory.

Yet as difficult as it may be to estimate character at the Military Academy the effort to do so should be made, because the country needs for its army the best officers that the Military Academy can furnish. The creation of an enlarged West Point will give the officers and professors of the Academy a wide range of selection among the cadets for the post-graduate course, and consequently great care and discrimination in selection should be exercised in order that those to take the post-graduate course should excel not only in the records of the classroom, but also in the reports of the officers of the Academy on character.

The increase in the corps of cadets to thirty-six hundred men, and the reduction of the term of study and instruction at the Military Academy to two years, with a post-graduate term of study and instruction of two years additional for the cadets designated for final graduation as officers of the army, will make serious modifications necessary in the curriculum and in the method of instruction.

The course of study and instruction should be simplified and yet broadened in the two-year term, so that there should be concentrated into this period the studies directed particularly to the education and development of soldiers.

The course of study during the first year should include the following studies, the English language, for the development of a direct and clear style of military expression, both in speech and writing, and all cadets should be required to write a good hand, so that orders and reports may be read easily and without mistake; mathematics, military engineering and surveying, including reconnoitring and field work; infantry drill, including marches and camp duties; machine-gun drill; hygiene, including that of camps and moving columns of troops, instruction to be given by medical officers of the army; riding, and aviation. There should be attached to the Academy a complete outfit of aëroplanes and hydroplanes, and cadets should be required to make two or three ascensions a year, and to prepare and submit reports of their obser-

vations while in the air as a part of their study of reconnoitring. The instruction in military engineering should be coupled with practical illustrations in the field, including the construction of field works.

Study marches of several hours' duration should be made at least three times a month under war conditions. The column should be stripped as for battle, the men should carry one day's cooked rations in their haversacks, and the column should be followed by several auto-ambulances and by two or three unloaded auto-ammunition waggons, to give the semblance of war to the manœuvre. The march should be conducted as if in an enemy's country, but without cavalry and artillery, but with a corps of pioneers, to be organized from the corps of cadets.

During the season of the year when troops can camp out without danger to the health of the cadets, the command should occasionally be absent from the Academy during these marches for a period of twenty-four hours, on which marches shelter tents should be carried, and the cadets should go under canvas during the night of their field manœuvres. During these marches the column should consist of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

I quite understand that it may be said that such absence from the Academy would interfere with the continuity of study of the cadets, but in the

first place, I do not believe that such would be the result, as these marches should be considered to be the practical application of the theories taught in the classroom, and in the second place, it must be remembered that the object of instruction is to make practical soldiers in two years, good captains and majors; and to produce such soldiers the cadets should have the opportunity of learning what a regiment is, and how it looks in the field; how a brigade looks, how it moves, how it goes into action, how it intrenches, how it encamps. These instruction marches should be preceded or followed by lectures by the officers in command to their respective regiments, upon the features of the march and of the encampment. In two years the Academy, under this system of instruction, should be able to make an officer competent to take command, on his graduation, of a company or of a battalion of infantry, or of a battery of artillery, or of a squadron of cavalry, and such field instruction is deemed to be necessary to produce such an officer. The present course of instruction at the Academy is thought to be too academic; too much of the nature of classroom and parade-ground instruction.

The second year's course should include in addition to mathematics, ordnance and gunnery; the art of war; military chemistry and electricity; military surveying, including the construction of light railways; military engineering, including

bridge-building, work with the pontoons, construction of trenches and field fortifications, and instruction in the manufacture and laying of mines; and instruction in cavalry and light artillery tactics, and the use of machine guns in co-operation with cavalry and artillery as well as in co-operation with infantry.

Instruction should also be given in military administration, including the service of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, now consolidated as the General Supply Service of the army.

So far as machine guns are concerned, I have come to the deliberate judgment that they should be organized into separate and distinct batteries, under their own battery officers, and that these batteries, where a sufficient number of them are associated together, should be grouped into battalions under machine-gun battalion officers. These machine-gun organizations should be distinct from regimental organizations whether of infantry or cavalry, but that when associated with infantry and cavalry, batteries of machine guns should be under the command of the brigade commander with whose troops they should be acting.

The only modification that I should make in this form of command is in respect to machine guns with artillery, in which case, when the artillery is in battalion formation, the machine-gun batteries

acting with the artillery should be under the command of the artillery battalion commander. I believe in the permanent association, *not incorporation but association*, of machine-gun batteries with battalions of light artillery, so that the artillery should have the direct support of their fire in action.

It is quite true that I have never seen machine guns in action, but in this respect very few of the officers of the regular army have the advantage of me. It is therefore allowable for one writing on military subjects to theorize upon the subject of the use, and the organization for use, of machine guns.

Above everything, mobility should be the aim of army organization; mobility and the concentration of fire. The system of distributing the machine guns among infantry regiments to be handled by machine-gun squads drawn from infantry regiments, is, I am convinced, a serious mistake; wrong both in theory and in practice. If used in such formation in battle there would be produced a sputtering fire along a long range of front, whereas if concentrated in battery organization, and under the direct command of brigade commanders, the fire of the machine guns could be concentrated when necessary on a limited front, and, so concentrated, produce a withering and destructive fire.

And I advocate the association of machine guns in battery formation with field artillery to be

under the command of the artillery commander, because the artillery will then have its own support among its guns; the fire of the machine guns being much more effective than the fire of a corresponding amount of infantry in support of the guns. The same argument holds with reference to the association of machine guns with cavalry. As artillery, under my scheme of army organization, is considered to be army corps not divisional troops, and under the command of the corps commander, the moment he should need machine guns for his firing line in battle, he could, should the machine guns associated with the artillery be not in action, order them to the front.

The transportation of machine guns has not yet been worked out satisfactorily. As to whether machine guns should be transported on auto trucks made for the purpose, which should advance within easy range of the firing line, or whether they should be transported on motorcycles, each motorcycle having the capacity not only to carry a gun but also an extra man, I hold my judgment in suspense, except that I think the machine guns to be associated with infantry should be transported on auto trucks, and the machine guns to be associated with artillery should be transported on motorcycles, the motorcycles being manned by the men of the battery, and, on approaching the firing line, the guns to be dismounted from the motorcycles and moved to the front, every fifth man remaining

in charge of the motorcycles, as was the practice during the great war when cavalry was dismounted for action on foot, every fifth man being left in charge of the horses.

And further, I think that machine guns accompanying cavalry should be transported on motorcycles, because motorcycles can go wherever cavalry can go, and the fire of machine guns would add greatly to the power of cavalry, dismounted, to hold advanced positions until the infantry could get up. In the case of artillery, the fire of the machine guns can measurably keep down the fire of, and drive back, infantry advancing to attack field guns when in action in the open. I quite understand that in modern war it is the object to conceal artillery in action, and that the guns are placed well to the rear of the infantry, and yet it will happen that artillery must expose itself in beating back an advance of the enemy, and if it can carry its own supports into action, as would be the case should batteries of machine guns be associated with artillery, the danger of its occupation of exposed positions would be greatly reduced; meanwhile the machine guns associated with the artillery would be subject to the orders of the corps commander for use upon any part of the line of battle when not in action with the artillery.

The graduation at the end of the two-year course of study at the Military Academy should be postponed until the 1st of September of each year, and

the month of August of each year should be spent in the field under actual war conditions. The instructional work of the command should consist of drills and manœuvres with the three arms of the service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and with machine guns; and it should also include service with the pontoons, the repair and construction of roads and bridges, and the formation of encampments.

As this month's service is to be the last work of the two-year men the corps of cadets should be handled as in war. The transportation should be cut to war limits, the men should make and break camp, should march and go into battle formation, should ford shallow streams and lay pontoon bridges across broader and deeper streams under cover of artillery fire, and on crossing streams their advance should throw up bridge heads to cover the crossing of the balance of the troops.

During this month of manœuvres the cadets should be in brigade and tactical divisional formation, and they should march and manœuvre as a brigade and as a division. There should be at least one battery of artillery and at least one squadron of cavalry attached to the corps, and the corps should have its pioneer corps, its pontoon train, and its auto-supply train. The service troops with the corps of cadets should be supplied by the army.

Any assembly of the three arms of the service,

infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with pioneers and a pontoon train, and with service troops, forming an independent command under the flag of one commanding officer, no matter how large or how small the command may be, is an army.

Consequently for all the purposes of the manœuvres during the month of August, so long as the command shall be an independent command, the corps of cadets with cavalry and artillery may be regarded as an army, and the lessons of an army may be learned from its marches and manœuvres.

The command of the corps of cadets, constituting a brigade, should be held by a brigadier-general, or by an officer holding that rank during assignment, who should select all of his staff officers from among the cadets. Should it be possible for the concluding period of fifteen days of the August manœuvres to associate the corps of cadets with large bodies of the regular army, the corps should at once be converted into a brigade of two regiments of cavalry and into a regiment of artillery, regular troops being dismounted to supply horses and battery mounts for the corps, and during these latter days of August the corps of cadets should manœuvre with the body of regular troops with whom they should be associated as cavalry and artillery.

It is believed that if these changes be carried out at West Point the government will have at the end of the two years, roughly speaking, thirty-

six hundred enthusiastic young men fit to officer its army. But assuming for sake of argument that half of the proposed corps of thirty-six hundred young men should be held at the Academy to take the post-graduate course of instruction, there would still be left eighteen hundred young officers for the active and the reserve army.

But until the reorganized army should be filled up with officers I should suspend the post-graduate course, and graduate at the end of each year for immediate entry into the army, every cadet who should have taken the full two-year course and who should pass the final examinations. When, however, the active army should be full of officers, then the post-graduate course should be instituted, and the number of post-graduate students required for the army should be determined by the War Office in advance of the annual graduation, and the selections for the post-graduate course should be made to conform to the requirements of the army.

The balance of the corps should then be graduated as officers of the reserve army until the complement of reserve officers should be full, when the surplus every year thereafter should be honourably mustered out of the service with a year's pay of a second lieutenant of infantry, passing from the Academy into the current of everyday life, but registered to serve the country as officers on a call to the colours at any time within ten years from their date of graduation.

Fifty years ago, when I first thought out this plan for the reorganization of the Military Academy, our army was a small army, and the number of annual vacancies among the officers of the army to be filled by graduates of the Military Academy was small. Nevertheless I then advocated a Military Academy of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred men, because I knew that the military education and service of a two-year course at the Academy would, in time, give the country a vast number of men trained for the army, from among whom the government could draw its officers in time of war to command the volunteers, and so be saved the risk and danger of the long period of preparation for war, after war should have begun.

And then, I confess, there was fixed in my mind the thought that the occupations, the struggles, the uncertainties, and the triumphs of civil life would in many instances broaden and keep in fine condition the minds, and develop the characters, of many of these two-year graduates of the Academy, so that should war break out, the nation would not only have officers for its army of volunteers, but possible generals of high capacity for its commanding officers. The control of great resources, the conduct of great affairs, with the ever present weight of responsibility in civil life, develops character as no length of service in the army in time of peace can possibly do, because of

the lack of the stimulus of responsibility *for results* demanded in civil life.

Assuming a military education of two years at the Military Academy as the basis, and such a life as that led by many of those who during the past fifty years have conquered the wilderness, carrying our railway lines from the valley of the Mississippi across the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, who have founded and developed our vast manufacturing power, and have created our vast system of finance, was it unreasonable to suppose that when called to the colours these men would have brought to the service of the nation in war all the wealth of genius and of character which had been developed and had been displayed by them in the activities of civil life?

It would be a most interesting psychological study to investigate the influence of the failures of Grant and Sherman in civil life upon their military characters. Upon Grant manifestly the influence was a broadening one. Upon Sherman the influence was also broadening, but unconsciously so, owing to the intense personal consciousness of the man. Sherman was far from being so great a man as Grant, and consequently this influence was not so marked in his case. The inferiority of Sherman to Grant is manifested in many ways, but especially in their battles.

Such was my dream of fifty years ago, as to the enlargement and reorganization of the Military

Academy, and such is the conviction of my old age. Had this dream been realized in the past the utterly unnecessary spectacle of the introduction of so large a number of civilians into the regular army at the time of the creation of our coast artillery corps, and upon the breaking out of the war with Spain, would have been avoided. Indeed there was little excuse for such appointments on account of the Spanish War, because the government had it in its power arbitrarily to have graduated the First, Second, and Third Classes at West Point into the army as second lieutenants, which would measurably have supplied the then demand for officers. The bulk of these young men would have served at West Point at least two years before entering the army as second lieutenants, and would have made better officers on that account than the young men appointed to the army from civil life who, as a class, knew nothing of the army or of their duties as army officers.

It may be noted here that I have made a distinction between the volunteers of the great war and appointees from civil life to the army since the war. The distinction lies in the fact that the volunteers of the War of the Rebellion learned their trade of war in war; that the best school of instruction for war is war; that three or four years' service in the army in time of war furnishes a much better education for war than three or four years spent on the banks of the Hudson in time of

peace. I have said elsewhere that the 15th, 16th, and 17th Army Corps, composed of volunteers, toward the end of 1862 and thenceforward to the end of the war, were as good soldiers as the soldiers of the regular army, and yet I now advocate the appointment only of graduates of the Military Academy as officers of the regular army. The reason for this discrimination in favour of graduates of the Military Academy is that we have, fortunately, no war in which to educate officers for the army, and that without such education in the school of experience in actual war, there is no school in which it is so likely that good officers can be trained for the army as at the Military Academy at West Point. The Spanish War was too brief a war to serve as a school for officers. Indeed it was only toward the end of that war that the regular army began "to find itself." The dulling influence of so many years of peace prior to the war with Spain had gotten the army entirely out of touch with the conditions of actual war.

Apropos of the proposed two-year course of instruction at the Military Academy, I cannot forget that one of the best division commanders of the Western Army, Major-General J. M. Corse, whom I knew personally, had served two years at the Military Academy. Why he left West Point I never knew; I never took the trouble to inquire. It was sufficient to know that he was a fine soldier,

an infinitely finer soldier than many general officers who were graduates of the Military Academy. Removing to the West before the war, where he was subject to the developing influences of the demands of civil life, the war found him in Iowa. He volunteered, and his West Point service of two years secured for him command rank. His own merit did the rest.

The post-graduate course is intended to complete the military education of the selected cadets who are to receive final graduation into the army as officers. Although the introduction of the two-year course would dislocate some of the studies of the present curriculum, advancing, let us say, the study of the art of war to the second year from the fourth year in the present course, it is not thought that any unhappy effect on the students need be apprehended, since the cadets with one, or one year and a half of service and instruction at the Academy, are quite as ready to take up the study of the art of war as they would be in their fourth year of instruction at the Academy.

It is not intended, however, to devote any time to the consideration of the course of study for the term of post-graduate instruction. If the plan of increasing the number of cadets and breaking the present course of instruction into two distinct periods be adopted, *First*, a two-year period of study, carrying graduation from the Academy, and *Second*, a post-graduate course for the further

instruction of cadets selected for final graduation as officers of the army; the arrangement of the studies of the post-graduate course of instruction may safely be left to the Academic Board. If, on the other hand, nothing is to be done in reference to the suggestions of this book, it is not worth while to waste time or thought in the preparation of a plan of post-graduate studies.

But as to the organization of the Academy I deem it advisable that certain changes should be made whether the present system be maintained or not.

Making an argument in favour of longer tours of duty for officer instructors at the Academy, Colonel Townsley, Superintendent of the Military Academy, says in his Annual Report dated June 30, 1914:

> While I do not claim that these figures are mathematically exact, they are very close to it, and give an honest representation of the difficulties we encounter in the selection of desirable officers as instructors under this detached service law. The result is that we are compelled to ask for officers as instructors who without this detached service law would not have been considered for such duty. These officers when detailed have done their very best, and yet the results have not been up to the standard heretofore attained, and an exhaustive amount of work *in instructing these instructors*, that is beyond all reason, has been put upon the heads of the Academic Departments. The

ill effect upon discipline of having instructors not naturally well equipped cannot even be estimated, and in this lies a most serious and bad effect of the detached service law upon the cadets at the Academy. Instructors who graduated low in their classes and who are not temperamentally constituted to be good instructors are now necessarily required to instruct the keen cadets standing high in their studies, and who are ready to take every advantage of an instructor's errors or peculiarities. The result is unsatisfactory not only as regards instruction but in its effect upon discipline.

This natural protest as Superintendent against the injustice of compelling the Academy to accept the services of instructors not qualified for the duty of instruction, is, in reality, a remarkably strong argument against the selection of officers of the army for such duties.

The practice of drawing instructors for service at the Military Academy from among the officers of the army grew up when the army was much smaller than it is now, and when its responsibilities were much less than they have since become, and also when the temptations of detached service were not so great as they now are.

The curse of the army today is "detached service." The Secretary of War at the last session of Congress asked for an addition of one thousand officers to the service, such increase in the corps of officers being largely rendered necessary,

in the judgment of the Secretary, by the great number of officers on detached service.

I think that the system of instruction at the Military Academy, except in purely military matters, should be changed so that the instructors should be civilians.

The officers of the army detailed for military duty at the Academy should comprehend the Superintendent, who should rank as brigadier-general during his residence, and who should be the superior and commanding officer at the Academy, a commandant of cadets who should rank as brigadier-general while holding that assignment, and three officers with the assigned rank of colonel to command the three regiments of cadets, the Adjutant of the Academy, the Quartermaster, the Chief Medical Officer, the instructors in field work, engineering, in ordnance and gunnery, in aviation and in signalling, and such other officers as shall be found to be absolutely necessary for purely military work and instruction.

The commanding officers of battalions of infantry, batteries of artillery, and squadrons of cavalry should be drawn from cadets pursuing the post-graduate course of studies; the theory being that all graduates of the first, or two-year term, are fitted, or at least should be fitted, to command at once on graduation a battalion of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. If they are not so fitted there will then be found to

have been some error in the plan of their instruction, because, if a good regimental commander of volunteers can be created in two years' service in the field, surely a graduate of the Military Academy, with all the advantages of two years' study and instruction at the Academy, and with the chance of command which should be given to him for purposes of experience, should be competent to command a battalion of infantry, a battery of artillery, or a squadron of cavalry. All staff officers of the Superintendent except the Adjutant of the Academy, and all staff officers of the Commandant of Cadets should be drawn from the post-graduate corps of cadets, their service as staff officers being considered to be a material part of their military education. But all company officers should be selected from the whole corps of cadets according to merit, and I have sufficient confidence in the high class of the cadets produced by competitive examination to believe that the corps, as a whole, will be found able to furnish all officers below the grade of battalion commanders needed to officer the corps of cadets.

So far as the rank of lieutenant-colonel is concerned, I do not think it necessary to fill that rank, as I regard the office as of little use in a regiment of infantry or a regiment of cavalry since the introduction of the three-battalion system, or its equivalent. It is possible that it might be well to retain the rank in a regiment of artillery so as to

furnish officers of command rank to serve as chiefs of artillery; either the lieutenant-colonel commanding the regiment in absence of the colonel on staff duty, or *vice versa*.

If a semblance of military rank and authority be deemed to be necessary in the classrooms, the instructors at the Academy could be organized into a corps to be designated as the Instructional Corps of the Army, with assimilated rank, and with the right to wear a uniform and to carry a sword. But these gentlemen should not be drawn from the army but from civil life. Should any officer of the army, however, wish to enter this corps he should be compelled to resign his commission in the army. It is unreasonable that officers educated to be soldiers should be required to serve, or should seek details from their commands to serve as instructors at the Military Academy. The craze for detached service is sapping the vitality of the army, and wherever it can be shown that detached service is unnecessary, steps should be taken to do away with the abuse. It may be said that qualified officer instructors make the best instructors, but this may be doubted when it is considered that no officer could expect to be detailed for a longer period than four years, and when it is further considered that the country is full of colleges and universities whose professors rank high as instructors.

I think a permanent corps of instructors, drawn

from civil life, could be organized for the Military Academy against whom the charge of inefficiency made by Colonel Townsley against some of the military instructors at the Academy could not lie.

The instruction of the young men of the country has called into existence a special class of men who have devoted their lives to the cause of education. The bulk of these gentlemen have deliberately chosen their profession from a love of teaching. I asked recently one of the professors of the George Washington University, himself an authority on explosives, why he had chosen his profession? He replied with a smile which illumined his whole face, "Because I love teaching. I love my profession."

There is not a shadow of doubt on my mind that both the army and the Military Academy would be benefited by the substitution of a corps of civilian instructors in place of the military instructors now assigned to duty at the Academy. The army would receive back its officers whom it needs in its ranks, and the Academy would have a permanent corps of selected instructors entirely competent to perform the duties of the classroom.

The detail of officers of the army as instructors is the most expensive system of instruction in the country when the pay and allowances of the officers are taken into consideration, but this objection would not be urged against the system were there no other objection to it. But the need of the

army for officers with the colours, and the need of the Academy for competent instructors, speak eloquently against the system. The system of officer instructors should be superseded, as out of date, by a corps of civilian instructors to be chosen after full and thorough examination for fitness.

The same remarks apply to the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Here also we find officers of the navy on duty, text-book in hand, working in the classroom while the navy is clamouring for more sea officers. I do not think that detached service is so much of an abuse in the navy as it is in the army, and yet it would not be matter of surprise if it should be found that there are officers of the navy on duty in the Navy Department, doing work which could be better done by some of the old clerks of the Department.

There should be assigned to duty at the Military Academy a certain number of sergeants from the army as drill masters, whose duty it should be to take the cadets in hand the moment of their arrival at the Academy, and put them through a course of drill in the school of the soldier, squad drill, etc. These sergeants should be allowed to demonstrate their fitness for this work, and if found fit, they should be given the opportunity to transfer from their regiments to permanent duty at the Military Academy to serve there as drill masters, retaining their grade in the service, but to be dropped from the line of the army and to be

designated as drill masters at the Military Academy, their places in their regiments to be filled by promotion from the ranks.

It has been recommended that the date of graduation should be advanced to the first of September, and that the month of August be spent in the field in brigade and tactical divisional formation. But it is recognized that the cadets just arriving at the Academy would be too green for such work, and therefore it is recommended that all cadets entering the Academy should be required to report June 15th of each year, and be at once put in camp. The drill sergeants should then take them in hand for fifteen days, and on the first of July they should be organized into companies and be drilled in such formation throughout the month of July. By the first of August they would be ready to be incorporated in battalions. It is roughly estimated that each year's quota of new cadets would be about one thousand men, or the equivalent of about three battalions of infantry. These new cadets should be distributed among the three regiments of the corps according to the judgment of the commandant of cadets, either in squads or companies. I think, however, it would be better for them to be incorporated directly and personally with the existing battalions, so as to become, from the outset of their career, thoroughly assimilated with the corps.

Nothing is said upon the subject of discipline

because it is believed that the discipline of the Military Academy is excellent; and nothing is said as to the spirit of the Military Academy because that is believed to be admirable.

Given two men of equal ability, equal character, and equal attainments one of whom is a graduate of the Military Academy and the other a civilian appointee in the army, and it should be possible to assume that the graduate of the Military Academy will be the better soldier.

But the impossible should not be expected. The Academy cannot make a soldier unless the military quality be in the cadet. He may have capacity enough to graduate and yet not be a soldier. In the army he may prove a fairly good subaltern, a fairly good captain, or a fairly good major, and yet not be a soldier in the large sense of the term. He may even *know* what should be done, but at the crisis not have the character to *do what should be done*, in which case he would not be a soldier.

But with all these reservations I favour an army officered by graduates of the Military Academy. I believe that the best results may be expected from an army so officered. I believe, generally speaking, that prompter action in an emergency may be expected from an army so officered.

I have no illusions, however, as to West Point or West Pointers. I have known personally a number of graduates of the Military Academy, and have served in the army with graduates of the

Academy, and I have a high regard for the Academy and for her graduates. That we should, however, accept every graduate as a good soldier simply because he had spent four years of his life at school at West Point, is an absurdity; an absurdity in which West Pointers, however, have too often fallen into the habit of demanding belief by the country. In making this demand West Point is injuring her cause, because the history of the great war is full of the blunders and failures of regular officers, graduates of the Military Academy. General Carter in his book, *The American Army*, gives a list of graduates of the Academy who commanded armies, army corps, and divisions, during the great war, concluding his list with the remark: "Of their non-graduates brothers-in-arms of the old regular army none were in command of armies, only Sumner commanded a corps and Kearney and Mower commanded divisions."

Does not the gallant General know that it would have been almost an impossibility for a non-graduate officer of the army, under the West Point influence which controlled the War Department throughout the great war, to have reached the command of an army corps or an army?

Analyse this list, given by General Carter, and it becomes painfully apparent that many of these gentlemen were given commands for which they were utterly unfit. Does any one doubt that Kearney and Mower were infinitely better soldiers than

some of the army commanders and half of the corps commanders given in General Carter's list as graduates of the Academy?

I did not know Kearney, but it was the general belief of the army at the period of his untimely death, that on account of his ability as a soldier he was destined to achieve high command; possibly the command of the Army of the Potomac; so keen were his military perceptions and so firm his character. Mower I knew personally. He was the incarnation of military vigour. He was a soldier who inspired his men; a leader whom his men followed with the devotion of admiration.

Does not the gallant General know that but few of Napoleon's marshals were educated soldiers, except that they were graduates of that best of all schools for the making of soldiers, the school of war?

In many instances volunteer officers, seasoned and developed by several years of war, were better soldiers, and showed a keener sense of the spirit of discipline, than some of their West Point associates in the army, even where the latter had had the same advantage of service in the field in war.

As to the higher qualities of the soldier, those qualities which reach to the height of generalship, I say without the slightest shadow of doubt in my judgment that Major-General John A. Logan of the volunteers, *as a battle commander*, outranked

the whole Regular Army except Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, and Meade, after whom I place him—sixth in the list of officers of the American army in the great war.

Logan's battle of Atlanta—for it was his battle, fought by the Army of the Tennessee under his command—stamps him as a great soldier.

Had Logan fought the battle of Atlanta under the eye of the great Napoleon the sun of another day could not have arisen before he would have been a Marshal of France.

There was not an officer or a man in the Army of the Tennessee who did not expect that Logan would be retained in command of the army after the battle of Atlanta, which command came to him on the field of battle, upon the death of McPherson at the very opening of the engagement; but General Sherman decided otherwise. I think this judgment of Sherman, denying the command of the Army of the Tennessee to Logan after the battle of Atlanta, was due to the narrowing influence of the West Point training on his mind; and a narrowing influence undoubtedly it has upon a certain character of mind. He could not realize that a man could learn as much *of war* from three or four years' training *in* war as from three or four years' schooling in boyhood on the banks of the Hudson, during a period of peace. And yet no one grew more rapidly than Sherman during the great war. The Sherman of Bull Run

was a neophyte; the Sherman of the South Carolina campaign was a great soldier.

It is greatly to General Howard's credit that he recognized the right of Logan, won on the field of battle, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, calling General Sherman's attention to the fact, and only on an impatient exclamation from Sherman, consenting himself, to accept the command of the army.

I have read pretty much all that Sherman has written about the supersession of Logan, and have come to the conclusion that what he has written upon the subject is a painful and unsatisfactory excuse for an indefensible act.

For both General Howard and General Logan, as gallant soldiers as ever wore swords, and with whom I had the honour to serve in the field, I have the utmost respect. I owe to General Howard the opportunity of my military life through his recommendation of me to General Osterhaus as Adjutant-General of the 15th Army Corps. I hold their memories in the tenderest recollection, and it is the pride of my life that they honoured me with their confidence. In placing Logan in the highest class of soldiers I disclaim any reflection upon the soldierly qualities of General Howard. I speak of Logan as I should speak of Grant or Sherman or Sheridan or Thomas, as a man apart, without any personal or professional reflection upon any other officer of the army,

merely assigning to him his place in history according to my appreciation of his merits and his services to the army and to the nation.

General Logan was offered a brigadier-generalship in the Regular Army at the close of the great war, which he wisely declined. His temperament was unsuited to the detail work of the army in time of peace. His sphere of activity was the army in time of war. He had the true sense of command. He exacted obedience and action from his subordinates, but was absolutely free from fussiness, that fault of some general officers which makes them meddle with the conduct of affairs by their subordinates. He never interfered in the execution of his orders, but allowing his subordinates a free hand, demanded strict compliance with the orders given. He always expected and demanded success. He had an almost unerring judgment for position. He knew by instinct what soldiers could do. He had character, which made him a soldier in the fullest acceptation of the term. He had many of the qualities of Masséna, Marshal of France, Duke of Rivoli, and Prince of Essling, one of Napoleon's greatest marshals. Logan's genius for war blazed forth the brightest when everything seemed to be going wrong and success depended upon him personally. Then his undaunted spirit filled the whole field, and he tore victory from approaching defeat.

No one has a higher appreciation of the volun-

teer soldier, seasoned by service in war, than I have. No one glories more than I do in the valour, the unfailing readiness for duty, the steadiness in battle, the brilliant feats of arms of the volunteers, and no pride should be higher in life than the pride in having been an officer of volunteers in the great war.

When they were well commanded these volunteer troops proved themselves to be invincible soldiers. But it is the saddest commentary upon the great war that they were so often badly, inefficiently, ignorantly commanded, and that such failures in high command were too often the failures of regular officers, graduates of the Military Academy, who were utterly unfit for the command of armies, or divisions, or even brigades, to which they were assigned largely because of their reputation in the old army.

This is not an indictment of the Regular Army or of the Military Academy, but is simply a protest against the inferences created by such remarks as those quoted above from General Carter's book, *The American Army*. The same unfitness of regular officers for command often presents itself in all wars. It is today making itself felt in the French army, as is manifested by the arbitrary retirement from their commands for incapacity of a number of French general officers. Doubtless the same unfitness is making itself apparent in all the armies engaged in the war, although we know

little or nothing of such manifestations. We do know, however, that after the battle of the Marne, General Count von Moltke was relieved from duty as Chief of Staff of the German army, and that other general officers of that army subsided into obscurity.

But notwithstanding my high appreciation of volunteers *when they have become soldiers by training in war*, I am satisfied that the best results are to be obtained by the employment of educated soldiers, and especially do I advocate their education to the highest point, and as a part of that education, the application of all possible tests to determine and develop character as far as character can be determined in time of peace. No matter how patriotic, how earnest, how loyal volunteers may be, *they have to learn their business after war breaks out*, which handicaps them so seriously, that the nation should no longer incur the risk of dependence upon them in the first line of battle.

The conditions of war have so strikingly changed in the past fifty years, as I have heretofore shown; that, as we are unlikely to find an enemy so unprepared as we were at the breaking out of the great war, and are today, I consider it our duty to change our methods of creating and maintaining armies to meet the changed conditions of war.

Now war bursts upon the world as from a thunder-cloud which has been rolled up by the

great south wind. It comes with the suddenness of lightning accompanying the thunderings of heaven.

A nation unprepared for war must bow its head to the storm and offer its neck for the yoke of conquest.

I would have my country fully prepared to meet the first burst of war when it shall come. Ready not only with men and munitions, but with officers who shall have received the fittest possible education and preparation for war.

It is because I am convinced that the best preparation which can be made by any country for war is the creation of a great body of officers who shall have received in youth the best military education and instruction which can be given to them, that I advocate the enlargement of the Military Academy, and the breaking into two great divisions of the course of study and instruction of the cadets at the Academy; one term of two years leading to graduation and to positions as officers of the reserve army, and the second term of two years given to post-graduate study and instruction, with final graduation as officers of the active army.

There is need for immediate action to insure the prompt inauguration of the system which I propose, and to allow it to become operative for some years before the graduates of the Military Academy, under it, shall be called upon to face the test of war.

I can see no reason why we should allow ourselves to be drawn into the present war which is devastating Europe. Nor do I think that there is any immediate danger of embroilment with Mexico; but even should we find it necessary to intervene in Mexico, I should regard it as a great mistake, almost rising to the magnitude of a crime, to increase the regular army merely to meet the contingency of intervention. The estimates of the military requirements for intervention which have been given to the press are dreams. To meet any Mexican demand upon our army I should advocate the filling of the regular army to full war strength, and the calling to the colours, as volunteers, of a sufficient number of the organized National Guard. If the army should be filled to full war strength and the National Guard should furnish from fifty thousand to sixty thousand volunteers, the army would be fully strong enough to meet and suppress any opposition to intervention that the disaffected elements in Mexico should be able to offer, and to restore and to maintain peace in that distracted country.

I think that we may count upon six or eight years of peace after the conclusion of the present war in Europe, in which period we shall be amply able to inaugurate the system of an enlarged Military Academy at West Point, and the creation of the reserve army, which will be the subject discussed in the next chapter.

Should my judgment be correct in this prevision, it will readily be perceived that by the time war shall come the Military Academy will have graduated a sufficient number of officers to officer not only our regular army, which should be increased to about two hundred or two hundred and fifty thousand men, *pari passu* with the graduation of officers from the Military Academy, but also measurably to officer the reserve army; so that when war shall come the army would be substantially officered by graduates of West Point.

The responsibility of conducting the war would then rest upon the shoulders of the graduates of the Military Academy, and the glory of victory would be theirs.

Preparation for the next war should be undertaken upon a well-developed plan, deliberately, and without flurry or emotion. We, as a people, should look the future calmly in the face. We should see clearly the reasons for preparation for war, and comprehend, with equal clearness and calmness of mind, the steps to be taken to prepare the country for war.

I think that war will come from the territorial and commercial ambitions of one or the other of the combinations of warring nations of Europe and Asia.

Should the war end in the defeat of Germany she will be stripped of her colonies, and after the passage of a few years of recuperation from the

effects of the war, she will look about the world for colonies to replace those lost in the war.

In South America she has already a thriving commercial colony under the Brazilian flag. This colony has been fostered in ways essentially German, even to the sending of school-books by the German Government to the Germans in southern Brazil for use in their schools. Uruguay and Paraguay adjoin southern Brazil, and should this region be annexed by Germany she would be amply compensated for the loss of her African colonies.

There is but one nation to stand across the pathway of such aggression on the part of Germany: the United States.

Are we prepared to say to Germany that she shall not annex southern Brazil and Uruguay and Paraguay?

If so, we must be prepared for war with Germany, and prepared to fight Germany, without allies, to a finish.

Such a war will require not only a large navy but a large army, because, should our navy be overcome, Germany would proceed at once to the invasion of the United States as the speediest method of ending the war by the triumph of her arms. The United States defeated in such a war, would mean not only that German ambitions in South America would be completely gratified, but that we should be forced to pay a war indemnity to Germany of many thousand million dollars.

Unless we are prepared to surrender, on challenge, the Philippine Islands to Japan, we may find ourselves some years in the future at war with that Power. I have said that Japan looks upon us as her *locum tenens* in the islands, but this period of peaceful possession will undoubtedly come to an end sometime within the next ten or twelve years, should we then be, as we now are, a weak military and naval power.

I doubt very much that Great Britain could be induced by Japan to join her in an attack upon the United States, even with the possession of the Panama Canal held before her eyes as the prize of victory, and consequently I disagree with those who think that we shall find Great Britain among our future enemies. We lie between three and four thousand miles on her flank, and England should know that a war between Great Britain and the United States can end in but one way, in the triumph of the United States and in the disintegration of the British Empire.

Because, however, I do not think that we shall be exposed to the horrors of war for eight or ten years, is no reason that we should not prepare for war now.

I think it very fortunate that we may look forward to at least eight years of peace, because in that time we may so well and so strongly prepare the country for war that war may not then come.

If we should be prepared, nations with ambitions to gratify will then count the cost. They will set down in the account the possible gains and the probable losses, and if they think that the United States is strong enough to defend herself, and also to defend her ideas, they will refrain from attacking her. If, however, when the time comes for the gratification of their ambitions, the United States is as weak a naval and a military power as she is today, she will be attacked, and the result of the war need not be in doubt.

I would have my country fully prepared for war not only because I believe that fit preparation is an assurance against war, but also because, should war come, that it will be the surest way to victory; and victory should be the only termination of war that the United States should allow herself to contemplate.

In these eight or ten years of prospective peace which I see before the United States, we should inaugurate the changes in the organization and system of the Military Academy which I have recommended, and gradually increase the regular army as the Military Academy should be able to graduate officers for the command of the new troops, and after the active army shall have been increased to the proposed strength, the creation of the reserve army should be undertaken, as I point out in the next chapter, with the end in view that we should be ready to put into the field, the mo-

ment war breaks out, an army of one million men officered, as far as possible, by graduates of the Military Academy.

Herein lies the significance of the title of this book, *West Point in Our Next War*.

CHAPTER III

THE ONLY WAY TO CREATE AND TO MAINTAIN AN ARMY

THE Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, deserves the respect and thanks of the country for his earnest efforts to bring to the attention of the people the necessity for "reasonable preparation for war" on the part of the United States. And in his official report to the President, to which I have already referred, he shows that he knows the situation of utter unreadiness of the country for war should war, unhappily, be forced upon the nation.

Knowing so well as he does how utterly unready the United States is for war, it is to be regretted that he should have allowed his judgment to be warped to the advocacy of measures ineffective to produce the result which he sees so clearly should be produced, the preparation of the United States to meet war from whatever quarter it may come.

In *The Independent*, of August 16, 1915, Mr. Garrison says:

And at the most, a comparatively small increase in that permanent force (the regular army) *is all that is necessary to enable it to perform its all-important function—that of training a citizen soldiery.* For it must not be forgotten that the one great lesson of all our wars is that they must be carried to a conclusion by citizen soldiers and those citizens must be *trained.* To thrust untrained citizens into the field is nothing short of death by government order.

Men who have studied this subject with care think that a well trained body of four or five hundred thousand citizen soldiers, immediately available, together with our permanent force in the regular and militia establishments, will give us reasonable guarantees against hostile invasion of our territory. In reaching this conclusion due weight must be given to the co-operation of our navy *and our land coast defences. The latter*—with the reasonable improvements necessary to keep up with the progress of invention—will amply protect all important harbours, all exposed centres of population and industry, all terminals of railroads giving access to the interior. *The former* will make it very difficult but not impossible to land on other parts of the coast. But it is fairly safe to say that no enemy is likely to attempt to land unless our fleet should be driven from the sea. Reasonable preparation practically consists in being ready to meet this latter contingency, and to meet it a force of this size is believed to be necessary.

There is much to commend in this language but it will not do to trust to it as a program for

national defence. There is far too much of the *non sequitur* in the argument to warrant its confident acceptance.

What does the Honourable Secretary mean by saying,

> a well trained body of four or five hundred thousand citizen soldiers, immediately available, together with our permanent force in the regular and militia establishments, will give us reasonable guarantee against hostile invasion of our territory?

Does he mean a volunteer army enlisted and maintained in time of peace, and kept under arms in time of peace, or at least ready to answer the call to arms when the nation shall be forced into war? Or does he mean by "a well trained body of four or five hundred thousand citizen soldiers" some other kind of soldiers, a kind known possibly to the esoteric consciousness of the General Staff but utterly unknown in the history of our wars?

Nor is it possible to agree with the Secretary that "at the most a comparatively small increase in that permanent force [the regular army] is all that is necessary to enable it to perform *its all-important function—that of training a citizen soldiery.*"

Indeed, I do not think even he, upon close thought upon the subject, will be prepared to hold that it is the "all-important function" of the permanent force to train a citizen soldiery.

Nor is it quite clear exactly what the Secretary means by the remark:

In reaching this conclusion due weight must be given to the co-operation of our navy *and our land coast defences*. The latter—with the reasonable improvements necessary to keep up with the progress of invention—*will* amply protect all important harbours, *all exposed centres of population and industry, all terminals of railroads giving access to the interior.*

So long as our navy holds command of the seas fronting our shores, invasion of the United States is impossible except across our northern or Canadian border, Great Britain then being our enemy, or across our southern or Mexican border. Should our navy, however, be driven from the sea, the invasion of our country is one of the simplest of military problems in which our *land coast defences* would count for little or nothing as a defence against such invasion. Conceding that our "land coast defences" are strong on their sea fronts, they are weak and open at the rear, or practically so, and need, in every case, a mobile army for their defence. There is not the slightest necessity that an invading army, whose fleet holds the sea, should attack one of our fortified harbours to effect a landing on our coast; and once firmly established on our coast, of what earthly use would our "land coast defences" be in protecting the "exposed centres of population" and in protecting "all ter-

minals of railroads giving access to the interior" from attack by the army of the enemy? As to the present terminals of the railroads giving access to the interior, they would be useless to an enemy, because he would make the *point* which he might hold upon any one of these railroads *his terminal*, serving as such so much of the line of railroad toward the interior of the country as he might control. But should he need possession of one of the existing coast terminals of such railroad, being once safely ashore, he would simply seize such terminal by an attack in the rear unless his advance against such port should be defeated by our mobile army.

In concluding this branch of the subject let us hear Major-General Carter upon the subject of our *land coast defences*. The gallant General says in his book, *The American Army:*

> In fixing upon the proportions of cavalry to infantry it should be remembered that in any war of magnitude, *involving invasion, a considerable part of the infantry would not be embraced in the mobile army, but assigned to the land defence of seacoast fortifications.*

Here we have a confutation of the Honourable Secretary's supposition of the part which "our land coast defences" would play in protecting "*all harbours, all exposed centres of population and industry, all terminals of railroads giving access to the interior.*"

According to General Carter these seacoast fortifications, or our "land coast defences" as the Secretary calls them, will need the protection of infantry to defend them from land attack by an invading enemy, instead of being able, as the Secretary says, to extend protection to "all exposed centres of population and industry and all terminals of railroads giving access to the interior."

While agreeing with General Carter as to the vulnerability of our seacoast fortifications to land attack, I do not agree with him, on military grounds, that "a considerable part of the infantry would not be embraced in the mobile army, *but assigned to the land defence of the seacoast fortifications.*"

If war has demonstrated anything, it has demonstrated the folly of shutting up troops behind stationary fortifications with the object of holding such fortified positions against attack by a superior mobile enemy, and the converse of this proposition may be taken as having been also demonstrated by war, that the best possible means of defence of strategic positions is a mobile army, and consequently, the best possible means of defending our "land coast defences" from land attack is a mobile army acting against the enemy.

I have therefore always held that an open frontier, protected by a mobile army of sufficient size, is a safer frontier than one defended by great permanent fortifications requiring large bodies of troops for their defence, and I make this statement

notwithstanding the heavily fortified eastern frontier of France, because it is not these fortifications which are holding in check the German army but the mobile army of France about, and even beyond them, in close touch with the Germans.

But not to be hypercritical, what the Honourable Secretary probably means is that he advocates the creation, in time of peace, of a volunteer army of between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand men in addition to the regular army and the National Guard, which army should be thoroughly trained so that the men might be considered to be soldiers; and the maintenance of this volunteer army of between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand men throughout the long years of peace, ready to be called to the colours the moment war should break out.

This is probably the conception of the General Staff; it is certainly the conception of Major-General Carter, and is the argument of his recent book *The American Army*, which I have read with interest and pleasure. But it is the idea of visionaries, of those who have lived their lives in the side eddies of life, far from the sweeping currents of activity and endeavour in which civilians live and struggle, and in which they often go down, but in which they are forced, by circumstances, to look at things as they are, not as they would have them to be.

It is singular that I, a former officer of volun-

teers, should say that this idea of creating and maintaining, in time of peace, a volunteer army of between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand men is impossible of realization, whereas General Carter, an officer of the regular army, maintains not only that it is possible, but presents the suggestion as the very heart of his plan for creating and maintaining a defensive force in the United States, in time of peace, equipped and ready for war whenever war shall break out.

It would be quite as easy to establish and maintain a rose garden at the North Pole as to create and maintain such a volunteer army in time of peace.

The failure of the recruiting service of the Regular Army in time of peace to do much more than supply the army with recruits to take the places of the men who are discharged from the service, or who desert, should not only be a warning to the officers of the regular army to refrain from dreams as to the creation of paper armies in peace with which to defend the country in war, but also should carry proof to so clear and trained an intellect as that of the Secretary of War of the utter impossibility, either of creating and maintaining in time of peace a volunteer army of between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand men, or of instructing such a force of men under the conditions of organization of a volunteer army, so that they should become well trained

soldiers ready for the field on the breaking out of war.

The element of training must be considered in the discussion of volunteer armies. One of the chief lessons of the War of the Rebellion is that it takes a year to create a dependable army. I do not mean to say that men gathered together in regiments and brigades almost directly from their homes have not made a gallant fight when thrust into battle. But notwithstanding their gallantry and their success they were not soldiers: they had not developed that coherency of organization; that calmness under relentless fire; that readiness to obey intelligently any order given to them; in a word, they had not developed *morale, which is the soul of soldiers*, and which makes them almost as dangerous in defeat as in victory.

Should we be called upon to resist invasion we shall not meet volunteers of the same amount of training as our own volunteer troops, but the veteran troops of a great military power: soldiers, many of whom had been tried by battle, led by officers who had received their education in the school of actual war. Facing such an enemy, patriotism, no doubt, will animate our soldiers, but we should not forget that a foreign flag has once already flown over the capital of our country after the defeat of our army of "citizen soldiers," who could not stand the shock of the enemy's attack, and who left the field to be maintained by

the meagre force of sailors and marines under the command of the gallant Barney.

If our enemy, should it unhappily occur that we should have an enemy, will graciously give us a year after he declares war upon us in which to prepare for the conflict, and in which period of time to create and discipline our volunteer army, before he opens his attack, I should agree with the Honourable Secretary of War that we might rely upon a volunteer army for our defence. But outside of opera bouffe, no such gracious enemy could be found within the broad confines of the world.

Time is the essence of opportunity in war, and the opportunity to strike as soon after the declaration of war as possible is seized upon by all sensible Powers. It should not be forgotten that even before the declaration of war against Russia the Japanese attacked and captured several Russian men-of-war.

As to the value of *time in war* the present conflict in Europe is eloquent.

The war opened August 1, 1914, by the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, Austria having declared war against Serbia on July 28, three days earlier. On August 2d Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. On August 3d she violated the neutrality of Belgium, and on August 4th the German troops attempted to take Liége by storm.

England declared herself at war with Germany from the night of August 4th.

August 8th German troops penetrated between some of the encircling forts, taking possession of the city of Liége; and bringing up their heaviest artillery, they concentrated their fire upon the forts which still held out, crumbling their steel and concrete turrets and casemates into dust and distorted masses of iron. Then pouring vast masses of troops into Belgium, the Germans brushed aside the gallant little Belgian army of about 400,000 men, taking possession of Brussels on August 20th, and receiving the surrender of the army of Namur on August 22d, after destroying its fortifications by concentrated artillery fire; Huy, the third defensive fortification on the line of the Meuse, having previously surrendered. Twenty days after the Germans appeared before Liége the north-eastern frontier of France was open to them.

Tardy England, clinging to the system of voluntary enlistment in raising armies, sent her small regular army to the continent in August, 1914, and set to work to raise a great volunteer army, Lord Kitchener publicly stating that the war would not begin until May, 1915, when he hoped to put his volunteers, trained and disciplined meanwhile, into the field. May has come and gone, and we are now, as I write these lines, in the middle of September, 1915, over one year from

the date of England's declaration of war, and her new army, apparently, is scarcely yet ready to join her allies on the continent; or, according to some accounts, is just now being sent across the Channel. The army which England sent to France in August and September, 1914, has practically ceased to exist. The English army in France has been re-enforced by troops withdrawn from garrisons and by Indian troops, and by Colonial contingents from Canada and from the Antipodes.

On the 27th of July, 1915, the Premier, Mr. Asquith, announced to Parliament that the total losses of the English army to date were 321,889 killed, wounded, and missing.

A telegram from London dated September 14, 1915, gives the losses of the British army up to August 21, 1915, as 381,983 men. The dispatch is as follows:

London, Sept. 14.—Official announcement was made today in the House of Commons that the total of British war casualties up to August 21 was 381,983 officers and men killed, wounded, or missing.

Detailed figures of the casualties are announced as follows:

Killed and died of wounds: Officers, 4965; other ranks, 70,992.

Wounded: Officers, 9973; other ranks, 241,086.

Missing: Officers, 1501; other ranks, 53,466.

These figures refer to the army alone.

The last previous statement of the total of British

casualties was made by Premier Asquith on June 9. It gave a total of 258,069 up to May 31. The losses from that time up to August 21 are therefore shown to have been 123,914, a daily average of about 1500. In the two months before the end of May, the period covered in the preceding announcement, the losses averaged roughly about 2000 a day.

In other words, the British army has lost in killed and wounded up to August 21, 1915, almost the full number of officers and men deemed by the Honourable the Secretary of War, and presumably by the General Staff, to be a sufficient force to assure the United States a "reasonable guarantee" of safety from war and invasion! And this loss is but the beginning of the toll of death which the war will demand from England before it comes to an end.

I have made this reference to England because she still holds to the antiquated system of raising and maintaining an army by voluntary enlistment. We have seen how inadequate it has proved in her case, and the inference is a natural one that had it not been for the protection of her allies and the supposed superiority of her fleet, she would have been invaded by Germany, with all that that implies.

It may be considered to be one of the sources of delight of the War Department to draw up plans for paper armies. Such plans are always interest-

ing, and are worked out in a thoroughly theoretic fashion, but they lack the possibility of success because they start with a wrong premise.

They assume that in time of peace there are four, five, or six hundred thousand men ready to enlist at a moment's notice in a volunteer army, to be commanded by regular officers, for a term of service ranging from two to five years. These plans usually call for the organization of the volunteer army on the battalion system, three battalions with the colours, and a skeleton battalion, to serve as the depot battalion, in which recruits should be continuously enlisted and prepared for service, and when needed, be transferred to the active battalions to make good the wear and tear of the service.

Major-General Carter's plan is substantially to territorialize both the regular army and the suggested volunteer army, the regiments of each army to maintain depots within the limits of their territorial divisions, which depots shall become the regimental homes of the regiments. It is the theory of his plan that at these depots recruits shall constantly present themselves, in time of peace as well as in time of war, for enlistment and instruction, and that when so enlisted they shall constitute a skeleton, or recruiting company or battalion, from which source the troops with the colours shall be receiving a constant stream of recruits, well drilled and ready to take their places

in the ranks of the active or field battalions of the regiment. Or should the depot company or battalion prove to have been very successful in securing and drilling recruits, that it should exchange places with one of the service battalions, which in turn should become the depot battalion.

The territorial divisions of General Carter's proposed volunteer army are to conform to the boundaries of the Congressional districts in each State, each Congressional district to furnish one regiment to the volunteer army.

To state this plan in General Carter's own words the following extract is taken from his book *The American Army.*

With the reorganization of the regular regiments provided for, we may then consider the greater army of federal volunteers. There are 435 Congressional districts, to each of which it is proposed to assign one ten-company infantry regiment of federal volunteers, comprising nine companies of 150 men each, which, with the machine-gun platoon, regimental detachment, and depot company, will aggregate about 1500 men. *This would give theoretically a body of 652,500 volunteer infantry enlisted in peace, with an enlistment contract providing for two years' service in peace,* and, in the event of war, its automatic extension for three years or during the war, if less than three years, *and be it understood, this is not a standing army, for it is not contemplated to withdraw the federal volunteers from their customary vocations any more than the organized militia*

is now withdrawn but to systematize their training and provide officers of approved merit to lead them in active service.

I object to General Carter's plan broadly on the ground that it is visionary in the extreme and utterly impracticable of successful accomplishment; and I object specifically to so much of his plan as proposes the territorialization of the regular army and of the volunteer peace army on the ground of public policy; and also I object to the name he has invented, "Federal Volunteers," for the volunteer peace army which he proposes shall be created.

The War of the Rebellion was fought to a finish on one principal issue—viz., *Is the United States a nation or a confederacy? And the result of the war established the fact that the United States is a nation.*

Why then abandon the term "National" for "Federal" in reference to the proposed Peace Army of Volunteers?

Nothing should be done, even by choice of words, to cast a shadow of doubt upon the fact that the United States is a nation indivisible and indissoluble except by a successful rebellion.

The great war in this country between 1861–1865 was a rebellion undertaken for the destruction of the nation. Had it been successful it would have become a revolution, and would so be

regarded in history. It failed, and it was, and is in history, a rebellion. This historical statement is necessary to the further objection to General Carter's plan for the territorialization of the regular, and the proposed volunteer peace army, on the ground of public policy.

I regard this plan of territorializing the army, regular and volunteer, as opposed to public policy because it proposes the sectionalization of the army, and the creation of a Massachusetts Army, a South Carolina Army, a New York Army, a Mississippi Army, an Ohio Army, instead of an Army of the United States.

In a word, this plan proposes the creation of a military force with local instead of national sentiments and associations. Such an army, drawing its forces directly and by distinct organization from the Congressional districts into which the several States are organized, would carry local prejudices and local ambitions into the service of the United States where they do not belong. Such local and sectional interests and sentiments might lead to disagreement among the constituent elements of the army, which in turn might lead to disorganization under the influence of demagogues and evil-wishers of the United States, should any such plot hereafter the destruction of the nation by force of arms.

Fancy the influence of such a system of territorialization upon the army in 1861. Not only

would there have been, as there was, a secession of officers from the army, but the army itself would have been divided by regiments and batteries into loyal and disloyal sections; whereas under the national system of recruitment of the army in 1861 the disloyalty was personal and individual, being confined to the officers almost exclusively, whereas the rank and file of the army were loyal to the national colours.

This objection on the ground of public policy to General Carter's plan of territorialization should be sufficient to condemn it. But there is even another and practical objection to it to be found in the habit of gerrymandering Congressional districts into purely political districts, which may be relied upon to return representatives to Congress in defiance of general public sentiment, by the grouping of counties or parts of counties into Congressional districts politically true to the party in power in the State. It is conceivable that either the territorial home or depot of regiments of the army would have to be movable, almost on wheels, so as "to go with their Congressional districts," or else that some districts would be found to be without a regiment or a regimental depot, whereas some other districts would be found to have the depots of several regiments within their borders.

This plan of raising in peace a great volunteer army of 652,500 men, and of holding together

such a volunteer army throughout years of peace, I consider to be absolutely impossible of accomplishment because it is based upon a false premise: upon the false premise that there are 652,500 men in the country ready to enlist in the army, regular or volunteer, in time of peace.

I think the history of the country demonstrates, and the labour and scant success in recruiting the present regular army especially demonstrates, that only in times of national crisis can citizens be relied upon to volunteer for service in the army with any degree of freedom. Their patriotism and love of country must be appealed to, and they must be made to see that their services are necessary to the protection of the life of the nation. And the method of raising volunteer armies is also opposed to the success of General Carter's plan, because the history of volunteer enlistment demonstrates that the young men of communities follow the lead of those to whom they have been accustomed to look for advice and counsel in the varying phases of life. These leading men of communities constitute the real volunteer recruiting agents for the army, and they expect to receive and usually do receive the highest rank in the volunteer companies and regiments which they raise. It is no part of the argument to say that they are not fitted for these positions of rank which come to them as the result of their successful recruiting endeavours. Nor do I contend that

they are fitted for the commands that are given to them. As a matter of argument I quite agree with General Carter when he says:

> It is recognized by all military men that the creation of any force worthy of the name of army demands trained officers.

And further:

> As the Federal volunteer regiments are organized the number of field officers and captains and non-commissioned staff officers of the corresponding branches of the Regular Service should be increased in order to supply the skeleton personnel of regulars necessary with each volunteer regiment,

if it be granted that the superior officers of volunteers are to be drawn from the regular army.

But as a practical proposition, however, the gallant General's suggestion of officering the peace volunteers with officers of the regular army, if attempted to be carried out, would entirely defeat the plan of raising in time of peace a large volunteer army. These colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains, to be drawn from the regular army, whom it is proposed to place at the head of the volunteers, will have no relationship with the people from among whom it is proposed that the volunteer regiments shall be recruited, and as recruiting officers they would prove dismal failures.

The argument is often made by officers of the army against the maintenance of the separate military posts of no strategic value which are still occupied by the army throughout the country, on the ground that they greatly increase the expense of the army. Secretaries of war have become eloquent in denouncing the maintenance of such detached posts at the instance of members of Congress in the interest of their constituents. But how, after such statements, would it be possible for a secretary of war to face Congress and demand the creation of 435 additional independent posts or regimental depots, to accommodate the volunteer army proposed by General Carter, together with the necessary number of separate posts or depots for the accommodation of the regiments of the regular army under the Carter plan?

The expense of these regimental depots with their grounds, their quarters for the regimental and company officers necessarily stationed with the depot companies or battalions, their barracks for the men, etc., would puff out the army budget to such Falstaffian proportions that it would require all the good nature of Prince Hal to make the proposition acceptable to the Congress.

I believe that General Carter's plan, the plan of the War Department as indicated by the Secretary of War, or any plan from any other source which calls for the creation of a great volunteer

army in peace to be illogical, impracticable, wrong in theory, and impossible of accomplishment. In time of peace utterly impossible of accomplishment, and in time of war utterly impracticable so far as the creation of a dependable army is concerned, for want of time in which to convert the volunteers into soldiers, with which to meet the armies of any one of the great Powers landed on our coasts within a month or two after the declaration of war.

That is the condition of war which we must face: The landing of an enemy on our coast within one or two months after the declaration of war. Of course if our navy can hold the seas and defeat the navy of our enemy, and that enemy is not Great Britain, our country will be spared the danger of invasion. But with the vast stretches of coasts to observe and protect; with the demand upon our navy that it shall hold control of not only the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, but also of the Pacific Ocean to guarantee the possession of the Hawaiian Islands, and of the Northern Pacific to cover Alaska; with all these demands upon our fleet, how is it to be expected, unless our navy shall be so vastly increased in strength as to make it superior on the eastern and on the western oceans to the navies of our probable enemies, that the navy can defeat the fleets of our enemies? How can it be expected that our navy anyway near its present

strength can hold command of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea?

If the navy loses control of those seas and oceans, the invasion of our country will follow as surely as day follows night.

Convinced as I am upon this subject, believing with the whole strength of my mind that the plan which I submit is the only plan for the creation and the maintenance of an army which shall be of immediate use on the breaking out of war, I submit it to my countrymen with the prayer that they may give it due consideration.

The proper valuation of time is the essential condition of success in modern war. The proper estimation of the value of time in warfare is one of the secrets of the successes of Napoleon. The campaign of Ulm beautifully illustrates this proper valuation of time in military movements.

But the valuation of time finds expression in respect to modern wars, before war begins, through the perfection of preparation for war; and when war is declared, in the prompt mobilization of armies, and the rapid advance upon the frontier, or upon the selected objective of the predetermined plan of operations by the army first ready for action.

In the war of 1870 France was taken unaware and consequently was unready. But Germany, foreseeing the war, had been preparing for its

outbreak for years, and was ready for mobilization the moment war should be declared. The war of 1870 between France and Germany we now see to have been inevitable. The succession to the Spanish crown was merely the provocative of the war, as the Serbian attack upon the Austrian Archduke was merely the provocative of the present war in Europe. Had these incidents been lacking, some other incidents, equally unimportant, would have arisen, or have been created, to sustain the declaration of war.

The war of 1870 was practically settled in the first six weeks of the war.

The present war in Europe presents many of the same characteristics. Whether the Allies will be able to overcome the advantages already gained by Germany is something which the future can alone decide. But up to the present moment the success of the war has been with the Germans, owing almost entirely to their appreciation of the value of time in war. They prepared for the war thoroughly, patiently, and most intelligently. Russia was approximately ready, but not nearly so ready for war as Germany. France was partially prepared for war—but England was wholly unprepared for war except on the side of her diplomacy. But England usually wars through her diplomacy, which gains her allies to do the most of the early fighting.

Not only is time an essential condition of success

in modern war, but it is the essential condition of success in preparation for war. It takes years of work and the utmost care and thought adequately to prepare a nation for war.

To be prepared for war is to be ready for war the moment war breaks out; not two months, or six months, or a year after war breaks out.

Judged by this standard the United States is utterly unprepared for war. Its army "is essentially a peace army." Nor will any of the plans of the War Department of which we have any knowledge, nor any of the plans submitted unofficially by officers of the army, put the United States into a condition of preparation for war.

The chief reason that the plans of the War Department, and of the officers of the army who have outlined plans of preparation for war, will not put the nation into a condition of preparation for war is, that in all of these plans the chief dependence is placed on a volunteer army to be created either in time of peace, which is utterly impracticable, or after war has broken out, which is utterly absurd.

As I have said before, if our enemy will graciously grant us a year from the date of the declaration of war in which to prepare our army for war, we can, in that period of time, create a volunteer army which can be depended on.

But all modern wars open with a burst of activity by one or the other of the combatants, usually

on the part of both of the combatants, success going to the army which is readiest to assume the offensive.

The unreadiness of the British army, and the dependence by Great Britain on volunteers, should be a warning to us. A year has rolled round since the present war broke out and the British army is not yet ready for the field. Nor, judging from the reports which are allowed to reach us, has the British army reached the numbers deemed to be necessary to the maintenance of her position as a great Power in war.

What then should we do to prepare our country to meet the eventualities of war?

Let us bravely face the truth that the time has passed for the employment of volunteers in war. Let us put aside frankly all thought of raising a volunteer army either in peace or war, and place our reliance upon a standing army to be divided between an active army and a reserve army; both constituting the regular army of the United States.

Let us give up the present fruitless method of recruitment of the regular army, *and accept the necessary and the inevitable policy of conscription*, which rests upon the principle of the natural obligation of every citizen to serve his country in peace or in war, for the creation and the maintenance of our active and our reserve armies.

Conscription is the most democratic, the fairest, the most equal, and the only logical method of raising and maintaining modern armies. Our experience, and the experience of England, with the voluntary system of recruitment of armies bears out this statement conclusively.

It is not only the best way of maintaining an army in time of war, through a steady stream of recruits passing from the great central depots to the colours, *but it is the only, absolutely the only, way to create and to maintain an army in time of peace, ready to take the field the moment war shall break out.*

Of course, in saying that it is the only way of raising and maintaining an army in time of peace, ready to take the field when war shall break out, I do not refer to our present army, because in no large, or true, or modern war sense have we an army. We have a group of highly honourable gentlemen at the head of a handful of troops, but when it is recalled that the losses of the British army in the present war up to August 21, 1915, have been 381,983 officers and men as stated officially in the House of Commons on September 14, 1915, or considerably over twelve times the strength of the mobile army of the United States within the continental area of the United States, it is not too much to say that not only have we not even an army suited to the requirements of peace, but judged by the standards of modern war, we

are absolutely without an army, an offensive or defensive army, in the true war sense of the term.

I have spoken only of the losses of the British army because the British Government, at this moment, still holds to the system of creating and maintaining an army by voluntary enlistment. Should the relationship of our army to the losses in this war sustained by the armies of the great continental Powers be considered, the absurdity of our army as a fighting force would be even more apparent. In battles of the present war which have scarcely commanded a larger space than a few headlines and a few lines of text in the press, more men have been killed and wounded and taken prisoners than constitute our whole mobile army within the continental area of the United States.

Comparison presupposes a condition of measurable equality, or a condition at least approaching equality. But there is no basis of equality between the army of the United States and the armies of the great continental Powers engaged in the present war, and consequently a comparison of the strength of the mobile army of the United States with the losses sustained by these great armies is an impossibility. A contrast is all that may be allowed us.

Conscription is the only method of creating and maintaining an army at all times ready for war,

because it is the only method which recognizes the element of time.

The argument in favour of conscription rests upon prevision, upon the acknowledgment by the government of the element of uncertainty in the future, and upon the recognition by the government of the relationship of our foreign interests and obligations to the interests, ambitions, and obligations of the other great Powers. No modern nation can shut herself up within herself, and remain aloof from the activities of the world. The contests of ambition and of selfish interest are as keen among nations as among individuals. The activities of the world lead to conflict, sometimes peaceful conflict, often to the conflict of arms.

Conscription provides the way for the creation of an army in time of peace of ample proportions to meet the conditions of modern war.

Conscription draws its allotment of recruits from the people at large without favour, and without the consideration of personal interest. Every man, be he rich, or be he poor, be he cultured or uncultured, owes the same allegiance to the nation, and should take his chances in reference to military service, those chances being determined by the impartial drawings of the conscription.

Conscription draws more equally and more evenly upon the manhood of the nation than the system of voluntary enlistment.

At the outbreak of war under voluntary enlistment, and under the stimulus of patriotism, the best of the youth of the nation offer themselves voluntarily to the service of their country. This puts an unequal and unjust burden upon the higher and the better element of the country; a burden which should be spread generally over the young manhood of the nation.

Conscription, acting with the calmness of blindness, takes by chance those it needs for the service of the country. Rich and poor, the highly educated and the most ignorant, stand upon the same broad plane of duty and citizenship, and under conscription are liable to be drawn for the service of their country in the army and navy of the nation.

The preparatory training in the army for all recruits should be the same. Merit alone should differentiate between the representatives of the classes called by conscription to the colours. There should always be held open the opportunity for advancement to the deserving in the ranks. It should not be forgotten that it was said that every recruit who joined the army of the Great Emperor carried the baton of a Field Marshal of France in his knapsack.

What system of creating an army could be more democratic? What system of supplying the losses occurring in the army in time of war could be more equal in its application to the citizenship of the country?

Do we wish to see our country open to attack which we have no power to resist, or do we wish our country to be ready and prepared to resist attack whenever and from whatever quarter it may come?

In a New York paper of August 25, 1915, a New York lawyer, who is reported to have been born in the United States, and who is represented to be an officer in one of the anti-American organizations of German sympathizers, is reported to have said, *that he would not volunteer for service in a war between Germany and the United States*, adding:

> I think Germany's submarine policy is absolutely justified. I think Germany has a right to sink every vessel, *neutral* or otherwise, which carries ammunition to the Allies. If the vessel carries neutral non-combatants, not without warning, of course, but after the warning, blow them to hell, every damn ship of them.
>
> International law, bosh! Who gives a rap about international law? Germany doesn't. Germany is making international law.

Such utterances show unfaithfulness and potential treason to the country of his birth. We had the same kind of people as this man to deal with during the War of the Rebellion, and we put them in Fort Lafayette, and sometimes we shot them.

Should this man be conscripted, one of two

things would surely happen should the nation be unhappily at war with Germany: he would either be compelled to fight Germany or else he would be shot. My own impression is that he would decide to fight Germany rather than be shot in the back with his face to the wall.

Conscription would be an excellent thing to discipline such people who disown their own country in favour of a foreign and possibly hostile Power.

I believe firmly in the unifying influence of conscription upon the country at large, both sectionally considered, and in reference to the large immigration into the country of people antagonistic to each other and to ourselves in blood, in customs, and in standards of belief.

It has been said that the United States is the melting pot of the world. That as we receive into our citizenship the Slav, the Greek, the German, the Italian, the Englishman, the Irishman, the Scotchman, the Scandinavian, the man from the East both far and near, so must we assimilate the representatives of those races to ourselves, to our thought, and to our theory and system of government. We must completely change the direction of their feelings and hopes from their old-world relationships to an assimilation with our hopes and our aspirations. Without in the least disturbing their old-world memories, we must control the sweep and current of their present thought so

that the new allegiance which they have assumed shall be a real allegiance of heart, of mind, and of body; an allegiance which shall displace all other ideas of allegiance, and which shall supplant all other national influences and obligations.

If the representatives of these various races who have come to this country voluntarily and to better their condition, and with the idea of making it their home, and the home of their children, should be compelled to go before the conscription officers on the chance of being drawn for service in the army and the navy, they would be forced to realize the existence and the presence of the power of the United States, something that they do not now clearly comprehend; and those of them who should be drawn for service in the army or the navy, finding alongside of them in the ranks Americans of the old lineage, would insensibly, as they learn to salute the flag of the country, endeavour to become as American as their comrades by their side.

Instead of promoting sectionalism in the country as General Carter's plan of territorializing the regular army, and of raising an army of territorialized volunteers would undoubtedly do, conscription would work along the lines of association in destroying what is left of sectionalism in the country. The men of the North and of the South, of the East and the West, would find themselves serving shoulder to shoulder under the flag of their

country, and while learning to know and to appreciate each other, they would at last apprehend how utterly provincial and absurd are the vanities of sectionalism, how broad and grand is the idea of nationalism, how pure and holy is the love of country.

I have refrained from discussing the Australian and the Swiss military systems because they propose the creation of something in the nature of volunteer armies, and I have come deliberately to the conclusion that volunteer armies have no longer a place in modern warfare.

In reference to the Australian system, it is not seen how it could be inaugurated in our country without an amendment to the Constitution, giving to the national government a certain but definite control over the school systems of the respective States, because this system would come into operation in respect to all of the school children of twelve years of age in the country. As to the Swiss system it amounts to a levy *en masse* within certain age limits, and such an extreme measure is utterly unnecessary in our vast country. In a small country like Switzerland, surrounded by possible enemies, such a system of universal military service is not only commendable but necessary. But in the United States, under conscription, the army and the navy could readily be supplied with recruits, and the reserve army be created as a part of the regular army, with so small a tax

on the manhood of the nation as scarcely to be appreciable.

Nor have I deemed it necessary to discuss at length the plan proposed by the Secretary of War in his report of November 15, 1914, as to the creation of a reserve.

The Secretary says:

> I am firmly convinced that if we can use the standing army *as a school* through which to pass men who come into it, with the knowledge that if they are proficient they can be discharged at any time after a year or eighteen months, we will begin at once to build up the necessary reserve, and will, for the first time in the military history of this country, have something approximating a balanced organization.

I am as firmly convinced of the error of this plan as the Secretary appears to be convinced in its favour. The mistake which the Secretary makes is in considering the army a school. *It is not a school*, and should not be so considered, but is, or at least should be, a living, coherent force, highly drilled and disciplined, for the accomplishment of definite objects and purposes, the defence of the country in war being the chief one of these objects of its organization. To attempt to make it a school for the graduation of reservists, is to divert it from its main and original purpose and to convert it into a dumping ground for crude material out of which possible soldiers may be

made at some future time. Nothing will tend so readily and so completely to disorganize the army as to constitute it a school for reservists.

No officer, under the Secretary's plan, would ever know how dependable the troops under his command were. His time and thought would be taken up with the constant and ever-recurring duty of licking new men into shape for service; then to see them, the moment they should approach the condition of being soldiers, removed from his command and transferred to that, under the Secretary's plan, intangible body, the reserves.

The army, under this idea that it is a school for the training of reserves, would never be able to feel itself to be the real thing. The new recruit in the ranks would be alongside of the one-year or one-year-and-a-half man, just about to be transferred to the reserves. There would be no system or order in the ranks; no solidity in the troops. A regiment is only so strong as its weakest part. Instead of the one-year men stiffening up the recruits, the recruits would tend to weaken the older men in the ranks. The effectiveness of the one-year men would be lessened by the ignorance of the recruits. The tone of the army would be lowered toward the plane of the most ignorant in the ranks.

The plan of the honourable Secretary of War would sacrifice the army to the reserves; with the result that he would in the end have neither a good

army nor a good reserve. Expediency is very well in its place, but in the creation of an army it is manifestly out of place. What the country needs is not an army which shall be a school for the graduation of reservists, but a coherent, well disciplined, compact, and dependable army; an army ready for any military service whatsoever that it may be called upon to perform.

I am entirely opposed to short enlistments for the army, and I am opposed to the transfer of men from the active army to the reserves under any circumstances whatsoever during the period of their enlistment, as subversive of the efficiency of the army. The men in the ranks should be offered every reasonable inducement to re-enlist on the expiration of their term of service, instead of being turned loose into the reserves after a year or two of service in the army, as the Secretary of War recommends.

Nor have I allowed myself to discuss the militia, or the military camps which are now so fashionable. Naturally I do not regard the militia as possessing the steadiness to be considered to be a part of the first line of defence, and as to the military camps, instead of attempting to make soldiers their chief work should be to show the young men in training that no soldier can be made in a month. If the young men who shall attend these encampments shall come away with a knowledge of how little they know of military matters, and

how much less they really know than they thought they knew when they reported for instruction, the camps will have served a useful purpose. In exciting a more general interest in the army than has previously existed the military camps will undoubtedly be useful. But I foresee an end to them when the present war excitement subsides, as subside it must in the next year or two, unless we should be unhappily and unnecessarily drawn into the circle of the present European war.

The active regular army should be considered to be the right arm of the nation. How strong that right arm should be is, perhaps, matter for discussion, but I think the judgment of those entitled to express an opinion upon the subject may be narrowed down to an army of two hundred thousand or two hundred and fifty thousand men.

If the principle of conscription be adopted, I do not think it matters very much whether the size of the active army be two hundred thousand men or two hundred and fifty thousand men, as should the former number be assumed, the extra fifty thousand men, not in the active army, could easily be taken up by the reserve army, which reserve army should be a constituent part of the regular army, and should be so organized that on the breaking out of war it could be mobilized at once, and take its place in the first line of defence.

The object to be accomplished should be the creation of a military strength for the first line of defence of one million men; the active army to consist of two hundred thousand men, and the reserve army to consist of eight hundred thousand men; the active army and the reserve army constituting the regular army of the United States.

The men of the active army should be conscripted for a term of five years' continuous service with the colours.

The men of the reserve army should be conscripted for a term of five years, one year with the colours and four years at their homes, with two weeks' service each year with the colours for training.

The conscription for the year should be required to supply:

1. The demand of the navy and the marine corps.
2. The demand of the active army.
3. The demand of the reserve army.

There should be two hundred thousand men always with the colours of the active army, and the regiments of the active army should always be kept at full war strength.

For the same reason that I do not believe in constituting the army a school for the reserves, I do not believe in having a stated peace strength and a stated war strength for the active army. *The strength of the active army should be always full war*

strength. The army will then be always at its best. The proportion of full-term men will be so preponderant that the year's recruits to take the place of the men to be discharged at the end of their five years' term of service will be submerged in the mass of full-term men. And at the end of the term of service of all men of the active army, they should be encouraged to re-enlist for another term of five years, reducing by so many re-enlistments the demand of the active army upon the drawings for conscripts for the year. I believe in the *vieille moustache.*

Assuming the strength of the active army to be two hundred thousand men, and the term of service five years, there will be required, theoretically, each year forty thousand conscripts to supply the places in the ranks of one fifth of the enlisted men of the active army whose term of service would then expire. But it is not likely that this number of conscripts will be required, because the re-enlistment of men whose terms then expire will reduce the number of conscripts required to keep the army at full war strength, unless the desertions during the year should outnumber the re-enlistments.

But whatever the demand of the active army, the navy, and the marine corps for men to keep them at full war strength may be, it must be supplied by the conscription for the year, because, not only is it relatively more economical to maintain

these services at full war strength, but it is also more desirable, because it affords the best opportunity for the maintenance of the army, the navy, and the marine corps at their highest condition of efficiency: efficiency in the two services being the aim, or at least it should be the aim, of the military authorities of the nation.

The annual demand upon the drawings of the conscription for men for the army, the navy, and the marine corps should be determined by the government before the drawings take place, and the proclamation ordering the drawings should state the number of men to be taken by the government from the year's allotment.

The drawings should be held under the supervision of the War and Navy Departments but by a regularly constituted staff of civilians. The government cannot afford to increase the proportion of absentee officers of the army and navy in number sufficient to administer the conscription.

Officers educated for the army should not be allowed to perform duties outside of the army, or within the War Department, which can just as well be performed by civilians. This is a proposition as broad as the army itself, because it bears upon the efficiency of the army, and if it be accepted as the principle regulating details, it would restore a number of officers, now absentees, to their commands.

Assuming the requirement of the army to be

about 110,000 men to complete its strength to 200,000 men, and the requirement of the navy and the marine corps to be 25,000 men, we find that the two services would require to fill them to full war strength about 135,000 men.

To officer the new regiments of the active army will require about 4000 additional officers. The difficulty will be to provide all at once these new officers. Of course a great many officers now on detached duty should at once be relieved and ordered to their regiments, and as the organization of the regiments of the army for full war strength is complete in officers, it will only be necessary to return the officers now on detached service to their commands to make it possible to fill up the existing regiments with enlisted men to full war strength.

According to the report of the Adjutant-General August 22, 1914,

there were 4701 commissioned officers on the active list of the army, of whom 1220, including 64 chaplains, were general officers or officers of the staff corps and departments, 810 belonged to the cavalry, 266 to the field artillery, 758 to the coast artillery corps, and 1647 to the infantry.

It will thus be seen that 1220 officers, or over 25 per cent. of the officers of the army, were members of the staff corps, or were serving on staff duty, in August, 1914, which would seem to be a

sufficient number of "staff officers" for an active army of 200,000 men, as detached and unimportant posts should be abolished, and the army in the United States be concentrated in great training camps like that of Aldershot, England.

The Adjutant-General of the army further says: "Of the 3431 line officers, 2770 were present for duty, 86 on leave, 45 sick, 578 on detached duty, and 2 in arrest."

In addition to 1220 staff officers, 578 line officers were on detached duty, or a total of 1798 officers of the army out of a total of 4701 officers were serving in various capacities other than directly in command of or with troops. A bewildering proportion having regard to the size of the army, and proving that the craze for detached service is the curse of the army.

To correct this disproportion of officers on detached service the army war college, the army service schools at Fort Leavenworth, the school of musketry at Fort Sill, should be closed temporarily, or until West Point can graduate a sufficient number of officers for the army, and the officers on duty at these schools, together with all of the student officers, should be sent to their regiments. All officers on the active list of the army serving as instructors at civil educational institutions, or serving with the militia, or as the superintendent of the State, War, and Navy Department building, and the officer serv-

ing with the Red Cross, if on the active list, should be relieved from such duty and ordered to their commands. Should any of these officers be staff officers, such as the engineer officer in charge of the War Department building, their relief from such duty would re-enforce their corps for the performance of its regular duty with the increased army. As the new system would do away with the recruiting service, officers on recruiting service could in time be relieved and returned to their regiments.

It would seem to be the case that there are more officers serving in the War Department today than were on duty in the War Department in 1864 with an army of over a million of men, when, for about six weeks, I was on duty in the office of the Inspector-General of the army. I do not speak confidently on this point, but I think I may say, that relatively to the size of the army, there are more officers on duty today in the War Department than were on duty in the Department in 1864, with a great deal less work for the officers to do now than then.

As to the General Staff, I think that all of the officers on duty in this new staff organization, serving as chiefs of staff at the headquarters of military divisions, and with commanding generals in the field, should be relieved and ordered to their commands, and the adjutant-generals of such military divisions, and commands in the field, by

orders from the War Department, should be assigned to duty as chiefs of staff.

As Adjutant-General of the 15th Army Corps in the field during the great war, I think I may speak with some right to be heard upon this subject. I had seen something of chiefs of staff, and consequently held the opinion, before joining the 15th Army Corps, that the adjutant-general of every command should be the chief of staff of that command, because he, from his position at headquarters, was naturally the centre of information and the source from which all orders should emanate; and also because it tends to promote confusion at headquarters should any officer of higher rank than he on the staff be intervened between himself and the general commanding, who, under all circumstances, should receive information at first hand from his adjutant-general, and not have it filtered through another officer standing between the general commanding and the adjutant-general, interfering, unintentionally of course, with the confidential relations which should exist between these two officers.

My experience as Adjutant-General of the 15th Army Corps confirmed me in this judgment, and further, I became convinced that either the chief of staff or the adjutant-general was out of place, or rather, that they were in each other's way at headquarters.

On reporting for duty as Adjutant-General of

the 15th Army Corps I found that a gallant gentleman, an officer of the army, the Inspector-General of the Corps, had been announced in orders as chief of staff of the Corps. But I also found, I must say with a certain measure of relief, that this gentleman was far too ill a man to attend to the duties of his office as chief of staff except in an entirely perfunctory manner. Therefore, treating him with the utmost courtesy, because I learned to have the fullest respect for him personally, I gradually assumed the duties of chief of staff of the Corps, and established extra-official relations with the chief quartermaster, chief commissary, medical director, chief of artillery, and the other heads of the staff departments, who gave me cheerfully all the information concerning their departments which it was necessary and desirable that I should have. The utmost harmony prevailed at headquarters. The General's orders were promptly issued and cheerfully obeyed. I held in my possession the orders for the campaign from Military Division and Army headquarters, and drew all the orders for the movement of the Corps in accordance with the command of the General.

I really do not see, in looking back over fifty years, how it would have been possible for me to have conducted the affairs of the Adjutant-General's department had the chief of staff of the Corps been well enough to attend properly to his duties.

I feel confident that there would have been friction, had he been able to attend to the duties of his office, and that the public service would have suffered in consequence. There is not enough work at headquarters for a chief of staff and an adjutant-general, assuming both to be intelligent, active, energetic officers. One must twirl his thumbs to the north in the morning and to the south in the afternoon to keep himself occupied, if the other be earnest in the performance of his duties. Wherefore, I am convinced as there is not enough work or occupation for these two officers if both attempt to do the work that is to be done, that the two offices should be centred in the one person at headquarters who, by prescription, is best fitted to perform the functions of the two offices, the adjutant-general of the command. If the rush of detail work should at any time become too pressing on the adjutant-general he can always order an officer of junior rank to his assistance. When I became Adjutant-General of the Army of the Tennessee I had three officers, on duty in my office, whose work I supervised and directed, but who were my subordinates. Nothing will illustrate more thoroughly what I mean by saying that there is not room enough nor work enough at headquarters for an adjutant-general and a chief of staff, than a copy of an order given by Major-General Carter in his book *The American Army*, on the sanitation of the camps of

his Manœuvre Division, under date, San Antonio, Texas, March 11, 1911. This order is signed by the chief of staff by command of Major-General Carter.

It is an important, well-drawn, and interesting-order, *but it belongs exclusively to that class of orders which should be issued by the adjutant-general*, by the order of the general commanding, and this order should not have been issued by the chief of staff. To find something to do, the chief of staff had to invade the field of work which by prescription belonged, and belongs, to the adjutant-general.

Therefore, I think that a certain number of gentlemen on duty with the General Staff could be relieved from such duty, and ordered to their commands, without detriment to the efficient conduct of the affairs of the army.

It is quite as unfortunate to over-officer as it is to under-officer a command. The over-officering of a command leads inevitably to laziness and slothfulness in the performance of duty.

I do not propose to discuss the question whether the command of the army should be held by an officer designated as the commanding general of the army or as the chief of staff of the army. It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that the chief of staff of the army actually exercises more of the powers of command than the former commanding generals of the army ever dreamt of asking for, although he issues his orders by command

of the Secretary of War, a civilian. This is the European system put in practice, with the Secretary of War in titular command of the army in the place of the sovereign. The system probably works well in practice because the chief of staff is practically, as he was intended to be by those officers who designed the new system, the commanding general of the army, with all the powers of a general-in-chief, cloak the same as he may by apparent deference to the orders of his civilian chief.

By recalling to the active list all officers who were allowed to retire voluntarily after a certain length of service, provided they be physically fit for active service and have not reached the retiring age, the law under which such retirements take place to be repealed; and by assigning surplus staff officers to duties now performed by line officers, such as those with the Isthmian Commission, if there be such now on duty with the Commission; and by recalling all military attachés except those serving with the warring armies in Europe, together with compliance with the above recommendations, it is believed that nearly all of the officers from the line now on detached service may be restored to their commands.

West Point can be called upon for about 450 young officers by the arbitrary graduation of the first, second, and third classes at the Academy. This would at once add to the army a group of

young officers, all of whom had received at least one year's instruction at the Military Academy, and many of whom had served two and three years at the Academy.

Under my theory of appointment of officers of the army, I say without hesitation, that the young man who has had one year's instruction at the Military Academy is better fitted for appointment to a second lieutenancy in the army than a young man from civil life, or from one of the so-called military schools of the country. Therefore I think that every cadet who has had the advantage of one year's instruction at the Military Academy should be graduated for service as an officer of the enlarged army, until the quota of officers of the line shall be filled. But such arbitrary graduation of cadets into the army should not excuse them from study. A course in study and reading should be prescribed by the Academic Board to be followed by the cadets who may be arbitrarily graduated into the army, which they should agree upon honour to pursue, and a species of examinations through correspondence should be instituted by the Academic Board to keep the young men, so advanced to be officers of the army, up to their work.

Since the adoption of the three battalion system of organization for the army lieutenant-colonelcies of the line have become obsolete. Therefore the rank of lieutenant-colonel should be abolished

throughout the line of the army except in the case of the artillery, and the present lieutenant-colonels should be promoted to be the colonels of the new regiments required to be organized to bring the active army up to the proposed standard of two hundred thousand men, and also of the regiments of the proposed reserve army.

From all of these sources I think it will be possible for the War Department to reclaim or secure at least six or seven hundred officers already in the army or serving as cadets at West Point, to officer the recruits and the new troops to be added to the active army.

My book is written at the present time in the hope of assisting in awakening the mind of the country to the danger of unreadiness on the part of the United States in respect to the present war in Europe, and to the not improbable war which may be forced upon us within a few years after the conclusion of this war, as a result of the restless ambition and the pressing demand for compensation, by one or more of the nations at present at war, on account of the vast losses incurred by them in the war.

But frankly, I do not apprehend immediate war, and I am writing toward the end of the month of September, 1915.

All of our apparent disagreements with Germany in respect to the operations of her submarine fleet are susceptible of settlement by diplomacy, and

should be so settled. Neither Germany nor the United States wants to go to war with the other at the present time. Neither nation has anything to gain by war and everything to lose. A calm, strong, and honourable diplomacy can find a way for the preservation of peace through the maintenance of the principle of the freedom of the seas for neutral commerce, a principle which Great Britain has offended against through her Orders in Council in quite as marked a manner, although not in so spectacular a manner, as Germany with her submarines, and the necessity for the recognition of this principle of the freedom of the seas for neutral commerce should be urged upon Great Britain quite as firmly as upon Germany.

Believing in the maintenance of peace, I should be glad to have the country move slowly in carrying out this plan for the reorganization of the army and its increase to 200,000 men, with the additional provision for the creation of a reserve army of 800,000 men, by first increasing West Point to the proposed strength of 3600 cadets, so as to enable the Military Academy to graduate officers for both the active and the reserve army. Nor do I think the country would lose anything by such thoughtful delay, because the necessary laws could be carefully drawn covering the whole field of reorganization, the various steps in progress being duly provided for in the enactment.

But I realize that such a methodical progress in

the reorganization of the army is almost beyond the hope of realization. When Congress shall come together in session the clamour will be for immediate action, and I confess frankly that I fear that the army will be deluged with new officers fresh from civil life.

Therefore, while earnestly recommending legislation covering the whole scope of the plan for the expansion of the Military Academy at West Point to accommodate 3600 cadets, and for *the gradual* reorganization of the active army to the strength of 200,000 men, I feel that steps should be taken to guard, as far as possible, against the bad effect of hurried legislation in respect to reorganization, and the consequent lowering effect, professionally, upon the officer class of the army by the appointment of a vast number of civilians to command the new levies.

To meet this danger, of a hurried reorganization of the army, especially as I can see no reason why we should be drawn into the present European war, I should suggest the gradual increase of the active army by ten regiments of infantry a year, for the period of five years, thus increasing the army in the period of five years by fifty new regiments of infantry, and by the immediate filling up of the coast artillery to its full war strength.

Believing as I do that the supply of machine guns for the army is absurdly inadequate, and that the method of drawing the machine-gun squads

from regiments already in service, while retaining these squads as a part of such regiments, is wrong in theory and utterly inefficient in practice, I recommend the immediate organization of seventy machine-gun batteries, each battery to consist of sixteen machine guns, and to be commanded by a captain and two lieutenants and to be manned by 160 men. The organization of seventy batteries of machine guns will allow a battery to each regiment of infantry and cavalry, and two batteries to each regiment of artillery. This assignment of batteries of machine guns is purely arbitrary, and in actual war the number of machine guns would have to be materially increased. The system of machine-gun batteries, with sixteen guns to each battery, is so much better than the present army system that it may be considered to be almost revolutionary in effect.

By divorcing the machine guns entirely from the regiments to which they are now attached, the mobility of the regiments will be greatly increased. By grouping the machine guns into batteries, and by organizing the batteries into demi-brigades consisting of two or three batteries for service with an infantry brigade, as such brigade shall consist of two or three regiments of infantry, and of two batteries for service with a cavalry brigade, and their association with the infantry and cavalry brigades of the army under the command of the brigade commanders, the best organ-

ization of machine-gun fire will be obtained, and the greatest mobility of the machine guns will be secured. The batteries of machine guns to serve with the field artillery should be organized into demi-brigades of two batteries to each regiment of field artillery, each battery of machine guns to be associated with a battalion of field artillery, and to be under the command of the artillery battalion commander.

It is believed, as has been heretofore stated in this book, that the association of a demi-brigade of two batteries of machine guns with each regiment of field artillery will furnish greater support to the guns when in action, so far as fire support is concerned, than infantry can give, because of the concentration, the rapidity, and the scope of fire of the machine guns; and this remark is made in the full consciousness that modern tactics provide for the concealment of artillery in action wherever possible.

In addition to the above conservative recommendations for the reorganization of West Point and of the army, the establishment of the reserve army should be begun by the conscription of 200,000 men the first year, to be followed each year thereafter by a similar call for conscripts of 200,000 men until there should be created a reserve army of 800,000 men, and then to be followed each year thereafter by the conscription of 160,000 men, or of such number of men as may

be required to meet the discharge from the army of one fifth of the reserve army at the end of its five-year term of service, and to fill the places in the army left vacant by desertion, death, and other casualties of the service. Full allowance should be made for these casualties of the service such as desertion, death, etc., and for this purpose it is recommended that 10,000 men be specifically drafted to fill vacancies in the ranks so created; and that each year in preparing the proclamation for the conscription allowance should be made for such casualties. In war the reserves will be called to the colours, and will themselves furnish the recruits to take the place in the ranks of the active army of the killed, wounded, and captured, which should, however, be estimated for in the call ordering the conscription. The number of men needed for the army in time of war should be determined by the government, on the breaking out of war, and the call should be based upon such demand so determined, whether that demand shall seem to be for the full reserve of 800,000 men or for a much larger number of men than the reserve army can at once furnish. The object of conscription being to supply the army with the necessary number of men, the call for troops to be raised by conscription should be for the number of men believed to be necessary to fill the army, both active and reserve, to the needed strength for war.

These requirements will probably call for a conscription the first year under the new system of 310,000 men as follows:

A.	To bring the regiments of the army now in service to war strength	31,500 men
B.	To provide the ten new regiments of infantry, the year's allotment	18,360 men
C.	To fill the corps of coast artillery to full strength	13,108 men
D.	To man 70 batteries of machine guns, 16 machine guns to a battery and 10 men to a gun, 160 men and 3 officers to a battery	11,200 men
E.	To make allowance for casualties in the army	10,000 men
	The year's demand for the active army	84,168 men
F.	To furnish recruits for the navy and the marine corps	25,000 men
		109,168 men
G.	To effect the organization of the reserve army	200,000 men
		309,168 men

Or a proposed draft the first year of conscription of 310,000 men.

These estimates are submitted for the purpose of showing the operation of the plan of conscription. Should conscription be adopted by the

government as the means of recruiting and maintaining the army and navy, it will be the duty of the General Staff to work out detailed estimates for the conscription. This remark applies to all of the estimates submitted in this book.

The demand for officers for the ten new regiments of infantry should be supplied as follows:

Ten lieutenant-colonels of the present army to be promoted to be colonels of the ten new regiments, and the rank of lieutenant-colonel to be abolished throughout the line of the army as obsolete, except in the case of the field artillery, after provision shall have been made for the present incumbents.

The other officers of the ten new regiments to the number of 390 to be drawn, 30 majors and 120 captains, from the line of the present army, and the 240 lieutenants to be furnished by the immediate and arbitrary graduation of a sufficient number of cadets from the first, second, and third classes at the Military Academy.

The 566 officers required to bring the coast artillery corps to full war strength should be drawn from the officers of the army, those now on detached service supplying the place of those drawn from the line of the army for the coast artillery, and from the surplus cadets of the Military Academy, to be arbitrarily graduated from the first, second, and third classes; and from the non-commissioned officers of the army. These sources

of supply will, it is believed, be found to be sufficient to officer this branch of the army. But should it occur that these sources of supply of officers should be insufficient, then recourse must be had to the graduates of the various military schools of the country, to the colleges maintaining military instruction, and to the officers of the National Guard, selections to be made by competitive examination; full consideration to be given, however, in making appointments to the records of the officers of the National Guard.

Notification of such appointments, by competitive examination to be given broadly to the country.

It may be safely estimated that the three classes which it is proposed shall be arbitrarily graduated from the Military Academy under its present organization, will aggregate 450 young men, which will provide for the 240 lieutenants required by the ten new regiments of infantry, and will furnish 210 young officers to take the place numerically of a similar number of officers drawn from the army to supply officers for the ten new regiments of infantry above the rank of lieutenant, and certain of the officers of the machine-gun batteries to be mobilized for service with the active army.

This arrangement of officers will tend to carry out the conditions of this plan, as far as possible, for supplying the active army with officers who

shall have been graduated at the Military Academy, and will result in all of the officers of the ten new regiments of infantry being drawn from the army and the Military Academy.

The non-commissioned officers for the ten new regiments of infantry should be drawn from the present army, a corresponding number of conscripts drawn for those new regiments being turned over to the old regiments to fill the vacancies so made in the ranks.

If the small and unnecessary posts throughout the country be abandoned, and so much of the army as may not be required for frontier duty, together with the reserve army, be distributed in camps of instruction like that of Aldershot, it is believed that the present allotment of staff officers will be entirely able to take care of the needs of the increased army, active and reserve, although it is quite probable that they will have to work much harder than they find it necessary to do at present.

The colonels of regiments and the adjutants of regiments of the reserve army should be drawn from the officers of the regular or active army or from the Military Academy.

The balance of the officers of the reserve army, in the neighbourhood of four thousand, should be drawn as far as possible from the non-commissioned officers of the army, and from the country at large, until the Military Academy shall be able to supply

the reserve army with officers from the two-year graduates. Competitive examinations, and recourse to the army, the military schools, the colleges maintaining military instruction, the National Guard, and to the bright young men of the country should bring to the colours a class next best to that produced by the Military Academy. From these young men the officers of the reserve army should be selected.

As the reserve army should be primarily an army under instruction, but notwithstanding this fact intended to be an integral part of the regular army, there is no need of cumbering the army with a large number of general officers and their staffs. The colonels of the reserve army can act as brigade commanders. When the brigades are grouped in divisions for tactical instruction, colonels can also act as division commanders if necessary, although in respect to the command of the divisions of the reserve army, it may be well to have them commanded by brigadier-generals of the army.

As instruction is primarily the duty of the officers of the reserve army, when the troops are sufficiently advanced for brigade and division manœuvres, these should be held under the orders of the commanding officer of each of the large camps of instruction in connection with so much of the active army as may be camped with the reserve army. These combined manœuvres will afford such an excellent opportunity for the study

of *numbers* by officers of the active army, that it is thought that they should be held under the command of a major-general of the army, and that all officers of the army who can be spared from other duties should be invited to be present at the manœuvres and be attached to the staff of the Commanding General. As the work of creating the reserve army progresses, the autumn manœuvres should expand to comprehend the operations of the troops belonging to several of the camps of instruction, in time reaching the proportions of an active army on a war basis, as proposed in the following chapter. In these monœuvres, as stated above, the corps of cadets of the Military Academy should participate, the corps being organized as a Brigade of Cavalry, and a Regiment of Artillery.

The second year's conscripts, taking the place of those released after one year's course of instruction in the instruction camps, will be under the command and instruction of substantially the same officers who gave instruction to the men of the first year's service. The officers of the troops in the instruction camps will be regarded as officers of the reserve army, except that they should be subject to transfer at any time to the active army by order of the Secretary of War.

As to the method of selection of the permanent officers of the reserve army, permanent at least until discharged at the end of their five-year term of service; that is to say of the officers of that

section of the reserve army discharged from the camps of instruction after one year's service and training, but with four years of service yet to render on call to the colours by the President in time of war; they should be chosen by competitive examination from among, *first*, a class of soldiers to be known and designated as the one-year volunteers, and *second*, generally from the men themselves, until such time as the Military Academy shall be able to graduate enough two-year men to fill the demand for officers of the reserve army.

The class of one-year volunteers in the reserve army should be composed of young men who volunteer for service in the reserve army, but who may not have been drawn for service at the conscription, on the condition that they should stand first in the competition for officers of the reserve army after their service of one year in the ranks of the reserves had been had.

This process of officering the reserve army would be put in practice each year to officer the troops of the reserve army who have completed their first year's service in the camps of instruction. It is believed that in time the Military Academy at West Point will be able to graduate not only a sufficient number of officers for the active army, but also for a part at least of the officers for the reserve army, and until such time arrives the appointment of officers for the reserve army should be made as above.

To encourage the entrance into the reserve army of a superior class of young men, a system of one-year volunteer service, somewhat similar to the one-year volunteer service of the German army, should be introduced, such service leading to commissions in the reserve army. And for the same purpose of raising the character of the officers of the reserve army, selected men from the active army should be transferred to the reserve army, there to be considered to rank with the one-year volunteers as candidates for commissions in the reserve army, after passing, of course, the necessary examinations for promotion as officers in the reserve army.

The active army should yield up to the reserve army a certain number of non-commissioned officers for duty as drill sergeants, whose place in the ranks of the active army should be filled by transfers from the reserve army, it being the condition of the conscription, that all drawn for service in the army should serve for the period of five years with the colours, the differentiation into troops of the reserve army only to take place when and after the ranks of the active army shall have been filled to war strength.

I favour the creation of an active army of two hundred thousand men, the rank and file to be called to the colours by conscription. I have only modified the plan of creating an active army of two hundred thousand men at once, because of

the impossibility of getting a sufficient number of trained and educated officers at the beginning of the execution of the plan to carry it into effect in its entirety.

But upon one point there should not be the slightest doubt, viz., that the reserve army, being the support of the active army, should always be ready to yield up men to re-enforce the active army depleted in battle, or by the exigencies of service. The regiments of the active army should always be kept at full war strength. The conscription should be for the term of five years, and should be based upon the principle of maintaining an army of one million men, two hundred thousand of whom should constitute the active army, and eight hundred thousand of whom should constitute the reserve army. The conscription of each year should be based upon the maintenance of an army of one million men, with sufficient allowance for all losses from whatsoever cause they may occur. The instruction camps of the reserve army should be the depots for the replenishing of the strength of the active army. Whether the reserve army should be classified into an active or passive reserve, that is to say, whether, when the year's allotment under conscription reports for duty at the instruction camp it should be divided into a depot reserve for the active army, and an organized reserve army, I scarcely think worth considering at the present moment, because it will require

several years in which to fully develop the system, and experience will teach the best method of coordinating the troops of the reserve army. I think the proper method of arranging for the ready flow of recruits to the regiments of the active army from the camps of instruction is, that in the proclamation calling out the contingent for the year the number of men to be assigned to the active army should be stated, and the number of probable recruits needed by the active army in that year to fill losses and vacancies should also be st ted, and the aggregate of these two lists of recruits should be called for service in the active army for the period of five years; the balance of the call being for the reserve army.

The camps of instruction should be the general army depots for recruits, not regimental depots be it understood, but the general army depots whence recruits for the different commands of the service should be drawn.

The camps of instruction should be located throughout the country. One large camp should be established in New England; one in New York; one in Pennsylvania; one at the Chickamauga Military Park, in Georgia; one in either Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois; one at Fort Leavenworth, if the reservation be yet intact; one at Fort Riley; one at Fort Sill, and one or two camps on the Pacific Coast. This plan of distribution would locate the instruction camps throughout the country in regard to

population, provisions, railway communication, manufacturing resources, etc. The government should be expected to buy sufficiently large areas to accommodate these instruction camps with camp sites, parade grounds, and manœuvre grounds for the troops.

The President and his military advisers, should necessity seem to demand the immediate creation of an active army of two hundred thousand men, or of one million men, could, after suitable legislation has been had, order a draft for two hundred thousand men or for one million men as the case might be, for the active army and for the reserve army, the reserve army in case of war to be mobilized for its place in the first line of defence. The President would have to face the objection to such a mobilization that the War Department could not provide efficient officers for such a large army, active and reserve. But that is our present misfortune, and will be our trouble until the Military Academy shall be enlarged as I suggest.

After the first year of the enlargement of the Military Academy and the establishment of the two-year course, the Academy will be able to furnish a considerable number of graduates, approaching in number the demand of the active army for officers, and by the end of the second or third year, the Military Academy will not only be able to supply the demand for officers from the

active army with two-year graduates, but also will be ready to begin the graduation of officers for the reserve army.

The above estimates of the military requirements of this plan are given as illustrations. In the matter of the batteries of machine guns I may have overestimated or underestimated the number of men to be assigned to each gun. It has seemed to me, however, that an allowance of ten men to each machine gun is ample, and that an ample allowance for casualties in action has also been made.

I have used the tables of organization, edition of 1914, of the United States army as the basis of my calculations for the new regiments of infantry proposed to be organized. I do not say, however, that these estimates cannot be improved upon.

What I contend for is the enlargement of the Military Academy to accommodate a cadet corps of at least thirty-six hundred men, and the adoption of the principle of conscription as the means of filling up the active army and creating the reserve army.

I contend that the first need of the army is an ample supply of well educated and instructed officers.

I contend that the day of volunteer armies has passed. As an officer of volunteers of the great war I state this belief with sincere sadness, but with unalterable confidence in the soundness of my judgment. Believing in the soundness of this

opinion I should be false in my duty to my country if I failed to utter it.

The conditions of modern war have so changed that what did very well fifty years ago will not do today.

The slow process of creating volunteer armies renders volunteers impossible as a force for modern war.

Remember that Germany declared war against Russia on August 1st. That she violated the neutrality of Luxemburg on August 2d, that she invaded Belgium August 3d, that she opened her assault on Liége on August 4th, that by August 20th Brussels, the capital of Belgium, was in her hands, and that by August 22d, Huy and Namur, whose fortifications had been destroyed by her high-power guns, were in her possession, and that within twenty days from her first assault upon Liége, the north-eastern frontier of France was open to her, the gallant little army of Belgium having been brushed from her path.

How with such a record before us can we cling to the system of raising armies by voluntary enlistment?

England has relied upon a volunteer army, and yet today, one year and over from the declaration of war by Germany, she is not ready. Even now, while I write, she is discussing the question of conscription. She must have more troops than the voluntary system of enlistment will give her,

and she is slowly but surely turning to conscription as her only relief.

Shall we not profit by her sad plight?

Shall we not take warning from the rapid advance of ready Germany into and through Belgium?

I hold that conscription is the only way that a modern army can be created and maintained.

I ask with my whole heart that my countrymen will be warned, and that they will firmly and with calmness adopt the modern method of creating and maintaining armies—conscription.

Through conscription we may hope to be ready when the sad day shall come, as surely it will come, that our country will be attacked by a foreign enemy. Without conscription we shall then be as unready as we are now unready to resist attack. Vast resources unmobilized are a source of weakness rather than a source of strength.

If ready, as we should be, when the sad day of war shall come, we can face our enemy with resolution, and await the outcome of war with calmness in the confidence of victory.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY FOR WAR

THERE is no natural or invariable unit of organization and administration for an army. The attempt to establish such a unit is an arbitrary act: quite as arbitrary as the determination of the strength of a company of infantry. Opinions differ upon the latter point, Lieutenant-General Bates holding "that the enlisted strength of a company of infantry should not be greater than 104," and adds, "I believe this is as large a body as a captain, not mounted, can control, and I think the commander of a company of infantry should not be mounted." That is to say, General Bates thinks that the strength of a company of infantry should be about the strength of a company of infantry at the breaking out of the great war, whereas the strength of a company of infantry of the German army is 225 men, the captain being a mounted officer. The war strength of a company of infantry of the United States army is at present three officers and 142 enlisted men.

Here we have three separate authorities, all supposed to be excellent, each differing from the other as to the very corner-stone of military organization and administration, the strength of a company of infantry.

I prefer the basis of strength of a company of infantry given by General Bates to either that of the German system or to that of the tables of organization issued by the General Staff of the army, not only because I agree with General Bates as to "104 men being as large a body as a captain, not mounted, can control," but also because the expansion of a company of infantry to 145 officers and men throws out of line all of our hitherto accepted estimates for the organization of regiments, brigades, divisions, army corps, and armies. A company of 104 men will develop throughout these organisms in a most harmonious manner, whereas a company of 145 officers and men under the plan of the General Staff, which combines the three arms of the service in a divisional organization, if carried along the line of progression, will develop such large bodies of troops by the time the organization of an army corps or an army is reached as to produce immobility.

The Division, as now established in the army of the United States, is evidently intended to supplant the army corps in the military system, whereas the army corps, born of the great war, superseded the all-inclusive division because experience

demonstrated its usefulness. This change was made as the result of observation and experience in the field during the war, which observation and experience had a broadening influence upon the minds of the officers then at the head of the army. These officers, and I am speaking of the officers of the regular army, grew in intelligence and in broad-mindedness as the war progressed; and, as they realized the necessity of the utmost mobility in armies, they modified the organization of armies to correspond with their enlarged perception.

Fifty years have passed, and we find some of the officers of the army wandering back to the twilight days just before the breaking out of the great war, when armies were things of dreams and military organization a matter of theory.

There was little time for, and less patience with, theory *after* the war began. Experience, daily experience, guided judgment, and the division, as it was constituted at the breaking out of the war, was gradually modified, and the organization of the army corps was introduced between the division and the army, becoming a component part of the army organization, because it was found that the army corps lent itself to a more harmonious association of the three arms of the service in an army, produced greater mobility, and consequently greater efficiency, than could be secured from the divisional system of organization.

That the officers of the army of the present day

should be led away from the military system devised and adopted by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, and Meade, and by such staff officers as Townsend, Seth Williams, Fry, Vincent, and Breck, would be unaccountable, but for the fact that new times make men restive of the instruction of experience, and dissatisfied with whatsoever has been demonstrated, a temper of mind which finds relief in change merely because it is change, forgetful of the fact that change, mere change, does not necessarily mean improvement.

My object in presenting these views as to the organization of an army is to lend practical aid to the work of preparing the army of the United States for war. I find myself somewhat hampered in presenting my views by the increase in the strength of a company of infantry from about 100 to 145 officers and men, and by the consequent increase in strength of the regiment, the brigade, and the division, as given in the tables of organization of the army.

I do not favour a company of infantry of 145 officers and men, but agree with Lieutenant-General Bates in preferring a company of 104 officers and men. Nevertheless, I have decided to use the standard war strength of a regiment of infantry as given in the 1914 tables of organization of the General Staff for the calculations of this chapter, *not because it is the best*, but simply because it is my wish to render a practical service in aid of

army reorganization, without, however, sacrificing too much of the principle of army organization in which I believe, and which I advocate.

I have always believed in a brigade of three regiments of infantry of from 3000 to 3500 officers and men. But for the purposes of this proposition, I have decided to use a brigade of infantry consisting of *two regiments* of standard strength, each regiment to consist of (51) officers and 1836 enlisted men, total war strength 1887 officers and men, or an infantry brigade of 3774 officers and men. To this strength of a brigade of infantry I propose should be added a demi-brigade of two machine-gun companies, aggregating thirty-two machine guns, and a company of pioneers, all to be under the command of the brigade commander. Whether a brigade shall consist of three moderate-sized regiments or of two large regiments, should be determined by the convenience of the system, and not by the *ipse dixit* of any officer or of any group of officers.

By reference to the Table "A," infantry division, of the tables of organization of the General Staff, it will be found that the General Staff has attached "one pioneer battalion of engineers" *to the division*, making them divisional troops.

I cannot agree with the proposition that "pioneers," as a distinct entity, are divisional troops. Experience in war teaches that they are essentially brigade troops.

Nor do I regard pioneers as forming, other than technically, a part of an engineer regiment. They are the axe-men and the shovel-men of an army. They can build and do build crib bridges, lay corduroy roads, throw up field works, but they should not be expected to lay pontoon bridges, to construct permanent works, or to head an assaulting column in a breach which engineers might, under certain circumstances, be required to do, nor are they expected to have the technical training of engineers. Indeed I should regard it as a waste of technical education to put engineers to do much of the work which pioneers should be required to do as their regular duty; and it was because of the supposed technical education and superiority of the engineer troops that, during the great war, we came to use pioneers, negro pioneers, instead of engineers, for all the rude work of a campaign such as corduroying, crib bridge-building, the throwing up of field works, etc.; although it is only proper to say that our volunteer infantry fully and freely joined with the pioneers in this crude engineering work of crib bridge-building, corduroying, and field works construction, so that I think I am quite within bounds in saying that every colonel of a volunteer regiment was, to this extent, an efficient practical engineer, often more practical than the engineers, graduates of the Academy, who were serving with troops.

In our negroes of the South we have the material

for the best pioneer troops in the world. Under white officers they work cheerfully, efficiently, and unstintingly, and seem to possess a natural aptitude for such work as they may be required to perform. I should, in the light of the experience furnished by the great war, unhesitatingly recommend the employment of the negroes of the South as pioneers for the army, the officers of pioneers to be white men. I may surprise some officers of the army by suggesting that the officers for these negro pioneer troops should be drawn from among the young civil engineers of the country, men regularly engaged in the work of railway construction, earth digging, drainage, roadbuilding, etc., because they get closer to their work than the officers of engineers of the army, and in this rough work would be much more efficient than they.

One of the greatest, and judged by its result the most successful piece of engineering work done during the great war was that of the rescue of Admiral Porter's fleet in the Red River. This work was conceived and carried through by Colonel Joseph Bailey of the Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, the men of whose regiment were chiefly lumbermen of the Wisconsin woods, where also Colonel Bailey had learned to become a practical engineer. Admiral Chadwick in his book, *The American Navy*, speaking of Porter's fleet and the Red River Expedition, says: "The building of the famous dam by Colonel Bailey of the volunteers,

and the successful passage thereby of the fleet into deeper water, is one of the great dramatic events of the war."

It is well known that Admiral Porter contemplated blowing up his ships when Colonel Bailey offered to extricate the fleet from its perilous position if the commanding General would order a sufficient number of soldiers to his assistance to enable him to work out his conception.

Bailey and the volunteer soldiers from the army, for the nonce converted into pioneers, did their work thoroughly and well, and Porter's fleet floated to safety in the deep water below the obstructions at the shoals of the Red River

The pioneers should be mobilized only when war breaks out or is imminent. In peace they would be a useless expense to the government.

As I do not believe in attaching machine guns to a regiment of infantry, because the mobility of the regiment is lessened, and its freedom of action hampered thereby, I have proposed elsewhere in this book, the organization of machine guns into batteries of sixteen machine guns to each battery, and the association of batteries of machine guns with brigades of infantry and cavalry, and with battalions of artillery.

I think the proportion of machine guns to the other troops should be a battery of machine guns to each regiment of infantry and cavalry and to each battalion of artillery.

Therefore, as the proposed brigade of infantry of this system is to consist of two regiments of infantry of the war strength of the tables of organization,—and here I may say with emphasis that the organization of a brigade is as arbitrary a matter as the constitution of a company of infantry,—I have attached to the brigade in this scheme of organization two batteries of machine guns of sixteen machine guns to each battery, or a demi-brigade strength of thirty-two machine guns, the batteries of machine guns to be under the direct command of the brigade commander, and to be manœuvred as a part of his brigade. This system of putting together machine guns in battery organization I commend to the consideration of those interested in army reorganization. The fire of a brigade of two regiments of infantry and of thirty-two machine guns, directed by the brigade commander, will be much more effective than the fire of the same number of troops and machine guns under any other conditions of organization.

A division of troops should consist of three infantry brigades constituted as above; and here I find myself fixed in my opposition to the plan of organization of a division of troops as provided for by the General Staff in the 1914 tables of organization.

To associate infantry, cavalry, and artillery with engineer troops in a divisional organization

is, in my judgment, offensive to the fundamental condition of military efficiency, mobility.

A division is too small a unit for the association of the three arms of the service. The cavalry would be hampered in its freedom of movement, which is its very being. Tied so closely to infantry it would become almost useless. The war in 1861 was begun with substantially such divisions as the General Staff now propose as the basis of organization of the army; but experience demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt or question that such an organization was impossible of successful operation in war.

An army corps, consisting of three divisions of infantry, was also found to be too small a military unit of organization for the inclusion of cavalry, unless the army corps should be acting independently, when, of course, cavalry would be associated with the corps, and be placed under the command of the corps commander, *but not as a part of the corps.*

It seems almost like going back into the graves of the past to discuss this question: *a question settled in war for war.* And yet here we have it again in full force as though it was an original proposition, and not a proposition settled definitely for all time as *wrong* by the experience of war.

Speaking of the German cavalry in the Franco-German war of 1870, General Sheridan says, in his most interesting *Memoirs:*

Such of it as was not attached to the infantry was organized in divisions, and operated in accordance with the old idea of covering the front and flanks of the army, a duty which it thoroughly performed. But thus directed it was in no sense an independent corps and hence cannot be said to have accomplished anything in the campaign, or have had a weight or influence at all proportionate to its strength. The method of its employment seemed to me a mistake; for, numerically superior to the French cavalry, had it been massed and manœuvred independently of the infantry, it could easily have broken up the French communications, and done much other work of weighty influence in the prosecution of the war.

And General Sheridan concludes his remarks upon the Franco-German War with the following pertinent and important words:

Of course I found a great deal to interest and instruct me, yet nowadays war is pretty much the same everywhere, and this one offered no marked exceptions to my previous experiences.

The cavalry of an army should be concentrated in one command, a division or an army corps, as its strength should determine, and be under the command of a division or corps commander, and should manœuvre and fight independently of, *but in co-ordination with* the infantry of the army, in accordance with the orders of the commanding general of the army.

It is needless waste of energy for the officers of the General Staff to work out schemes of organization and of use for the cavalry of the army. The whole range of thought as to the best use of cavalry was covered in the great war, and the officers of the army of the present day have only to study the lessons of the great war as to the use of cavalry to understand the whole subject. The history of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, from the time of its being tied to infantry in 1861, as the General Staff now proposes to tie cavalry to infantry, to the closing campaign of the war which ended in the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, will teach not only what should be done, but also what should be avoided, and should not be done with cavalry.

Take General Grant's last, and the most brilliant campaign of the war, for illustration, the brief campaign from March 29 to April 9, 1865, when Grant opened the campaign by attacking and destroying Lee's right at Five Forks, through the use of his cavalry and infantry in co-ordinated attack upon the enemy; when he successfully assaulted Lee's works in front of Petersburg with Wright's and Park's Corps, compelling the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg; and then when through the pursuit of the retreating Army of Northern Virginia, attacking by the left flank, with his cavalry always in the advance, always ready to engage the enemy and to hold him in

check until the infantry could get up; through the battle and victory of Sailors' Creek, and the numerous engagements which preceded and followed that battle; and finally in halting the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, the best and most scientific use of cavalry can be found so fully and completely illustrated as to conclude the discussion of the organization and employment of cavalry, because, unless organized as the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was *then* organized, it could not have been used so efficiently and successfully as Sheridan, under Grant's orders, then used it.

Let us suppose for a moment that there had been assigned to each division of infantry of the army such a proportion of the cavalry of the army as the General Staff now proposes, in their tables of organization and in the field service regulations, shall be so assigned, and then let us ask of what earthly use such cavalry, so tied to infantry, would have been in the series of actions in this campaign, and in the pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia?

Is it not clear to any soldier who allows himself to think with a free mind upon the subject, that not only would the cavalry so associated with the infantry in battle have been of no use, but that it would have been absolutely out of place and in the way? And especially in the pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia after Lee had evacuated

Richmond, is it not clear to any soldier that, had there been divisional cavalry as now provided for by the tables of organization of the General Staff, such cavalry would have been in the way of the marching infantry, and not only of no use, but absolutely a clog upon the army, cumbering the roads, occupying roads needed by the infantry, and interfering with, and interrupting the rapid pursuit of the enemy, a pursuit which, being by the flank, had to be, by its very nature, more rapid in movement than the retreat of the enemy?

So far as this brief campaign is concerned, not only is it a school for the use of cavalry, but it is one of the finest campaigns in history, and one which every officer of the army who has a higher ambition than a place upon the retired list, should study faithfully and critically. He will find here in active use every principle of the art of war—strategy going hand in hand with sound tactics.

The strategy of the campaign will be illustrated by this incident which I quote from General Grant's *Memoirs*. General Grant and General Meade met in Petersburg immediately after the evacuation of that place had begun, and had before them an engineer officer of the enemy who had surrendered, and who reported that General Lee had prepared an intrenched camp into which he proposed to withdraw from Richmond, and where he intended to fight the last battle of the war. Meade believed this man, whereas Grant believed

him to have been sent into his lines to deceive him as to Lee's proposed movements. The following conversation took place. General Grant says:

My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. *He suggested that if Lee was going that way we would follow him.* My reply was that we did not want to follow him: we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the Danville railroad at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. That we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg (Meade's plan), even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

Here we have in this brief incident, clearly marked, good and bad strategy. If Meade had been in supreme command Lee would undoubtedly have made good his retreat, have effected a junction with Johnston in the Carolinas, and have attacked Sherman advancing north toward the James, with every prospect of success. Fortunately Meade was not in command. Grant's

strategy was sound, was in accordance with his orders of March 29, 1865, and ended in supreme victory.

The handling of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac in this campaign was superb. But the organization of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was equally good. Fortunately divisional cavalry had disappeared from the Army of the Potomac over two years before this campaign took place, otherwise it might not have ended in victory.

Time was the essence of success in this campaign, and useless divisional cavalry would have clogged and impeded the march of the infantry of the army to such an extent that Lee would have outmarched Grant, instead of having been outmarched by him, and would have escaped instead of surrendering his army at Appomattox.

Change is not always improvement; and in the creation of divisional cavalry not only has no improvement been made, but the army has been thrown into the dismal swamp of abandoned and disused methods of organization condemned by the experience of war.

The question of the organization and distribution of the artillery of an army is not quite so simple a matter as that of the cavalry of an army. There is something, not much it is true, to be said in favour of the assignment of the artillery of an army to the divisions of an army, as divisional

troops, and yet I must be permitted to say that I do not approve of such a plan of army organization.

I believe firmly in the wisdom of the creation of army corps. I am satisfied that an army corps should consist of three divisions of infantry, with machine guns and pioneers, and that there should be in addition, as corps troops, a brigade or a division of artillery to each army corps, which, with the three infantry divisions, should constitute the army corps. I believe in the concentration of the artillery of an army corps into one artillery command, call it brigade or division of artillery, as you please, said brigade or division of artillery to occupy in the army corps the same individual position that an infantry division occupies; and be subject alone to the orders of the commanding general of the army corps.

This independent position of the artillery has the distinct advantage of increasing the mobility of the army corps and of the army. It restores at once to the infantry its freedom of action, and it enables the corps commander to concentrate and to direct the fire of his artillery as the exigencies of battle shall demand. Whereas, if the artillery be distributed among the divisions of the army, it will be found to be impossible to move the infantry of the division with the same celerity as would be the case should it be free altogether of artillery; and as to concentration and direction of fire, the

power to accomplish such results will be lessened should the artillery be distributed throughout the divisions of the army, if for no other reason, because of the distances to be overcome in bringing about the concentration of the guns, and also because division commanders are fond of their artillery, and are loath to give it up for the purpose of effecting a general concentration of fire.

The difficulty of protecting the artillery of the corps, if it be held separate from the infantry divisions of the corps, is apparent, but on the other hand, the army is always required to protect its reserve artillery, and if this can be done successfully, the corps artillery can equally well be protected. It is conceded, however, that artillery attached to a division is more easily protected, because it is in the midst of its infantry supports, and because the general commanding the division feels a more personal responsibility for its protection than he would feel if the artillery was in a separate and distinct command.

On the march, for instance, for the purpose of occupying as many parallel roads as possible, the corps moving under such a supposition on at least two roads, and as affording the opportunity of keeping the army closed up for rapid development on any required front of operations, the batteries of the brigade or division of artillery might be distributed among the divisions of the corps for the purposes of the march, provided the corps be

not moving into battle, or in such close touch with the enemy as to indicate the immediate approach of battle. Such a movement of the artillery would tend to reduce the risk of clogging the roads; and to increase the rapidity of the movement of the column, the infantry should surrender the roads as far as possible to the artillery, themselves marching in the fields adjoining the roads, which was the common practice adopted in Sherman's army in the Georgia and Carolina campaigns, to reduce congestion on the roads, which were wretched in the extreme.

Such distribution of artillery among the divisions of the corps should only be for protection on the march and to facilitate the rapidity of movement of the corps. On coming into presence of the enemy the corps commander should issue his orders for the concentration of his artillery, and for the employment of his guns upon any part of his line of battle, where, in his judgment, their fire would be most destructive, and also where their fire would cover the movements of the infantry to the best advantage. Although I have covered the point in the discussion of machine guns, it may not be amiss to say that when the artillery is firing from concealed positions in rear of the infantry and its machine guns are not in action, it is within the power of the corps commander to order forward to his firing line the machine guns associated with the artillery. Should the artillery however be

pushed forward into the open, its complement of machine guns should at once be restored in order that it should have the support of their fire in action.

The chief lesson of the present war in Europe, aside from that of rapid mobilization and what it accomplishes, is the marvellous development of artillery fire. I attribute this marvellous development of artillery fire to the introduction of the motor truck or automobile as a means of transport for ammunition. In no previous war could it have been possible to have concentrated the ammunition which has been expended in this war. Such a concentration of guns as the telegrams from Europe have reported as having been effected on the German front in battles preceding the successful advance on Warsaw, is not only unprecedented, but undreamt of heretofore. In one of these battles it is reported that the Germans concentrated the fire of 4000 guns upon a front of comparatively a few miles in extent along a particular portion of the Russian lines. I do not wish to be understood as expressing either belief or disbelief in the statement that the Germans concentrated 4000 guns in battery against the Russians on one narrow front. I merely repeat the statement as telegraphed to the press. The strength of their artillery must be marvellous, however, because it is believed that the Austro-German armies operating against the Russians number 2,500,000 men, and

at the very moderate rate of two guns to each 1000 men, they should have 5000 guns with the combined armies, which is entirely too small a proportion of guns to men. Of course we have no way of knowing how many guns the Austro-German army has in this field of operations, but a low estimate would give 7500 guns with the combined armies now operating against the Russians.

The crushing, smothering, blasting fire of 4000 guns on one comparatively narrow front is almost unthinkable, and if true, *such a concentration of guns could only have been effected under a flexible yet centralized organization;* and of course to have produced such a concentrated fire, army corps and armies must have yielded their guns for concentration under the order of the field marshal commanding, to be served under the direct supervision of the general of artillery on his staff.

In face of such demonstration, I think it would be unwise to continue the association of the artillery with divisions of infantry as a component part of the division, as proposed for our army in the tables of organization issued by the General Staff. Mobility is the demand of war, and the need of the extremest possible mobility is one of the lessons of the present war in Europe, as it was the lesson of our great war of fifty years ago.

When I reported to Major-General Oliver O. Howard of the army for duty, in addition to being assigned as aide-de-camp on his staff, I was also

assigned to duty with the chief of artillery of the Army of the Tennessee as Assistant Adjutant-General. The artillery of the army was brigaded by army corps, but the batteries were distributed among the divisions. The system worked fairly well, as often unphilosophical systems will work well under intelligent management. But the theory of the organization was correct—and had there been necessity for putting it into practical operation, an order from headquarters would alone have been necessary to effectuate it. After the capture of Savannah I was promoted to be the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Fifteenth Army Corps with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was consequently brought near to the artillery of the corps. The chief of artillery of the corps, Major Stolbrand, was an efficient officer, and we became friends. He used to call me the "boy Adjutant," as I had just passed my twenty-first birthday by about four months. We had many talks on the subject of the artillery of the corps, and I think I may say that we both agreed that the corps artillery should be *actually* concentrated in brigade formation, distinct from divisional control, and under the direct command of the corps commander through his chief of artillery, as the commander of the brigade.

I think the lesson of the present war in Europe in reference to artillery confirms the theory of the independent organization of artillery in brigades or divisions, free from infantry divisional control,

and under the direct control of the corps commander through his chief of artillery.

It has been reported in the press that the Secretary of War has created a commission from the officers of the General Staff, to report to him the amount of artillery which should be provided for the army. Should this commission care to maintain its credit it will report to the Secretary that his inquiry cannot at present be answered. The influence of the war in Europe is having an almost startling effect upon the calibre of field artillery, and upon the number of guns to be assembled with an army; and the method of transportation of ammunition by auto truck or automobile has so completely changed the relationship of the two arms of the service, infantry and artillery, that it would be well, before determining the supply of artillery for our army, to await the full reports of the strength of the artillery of the various armies in the present European war, especially of the German army.

My own opinion is that a considerable proportion of the ammunition now being consumed in Europe is absolutely wasted. But on the other hand, it will not do to rest upon such a supposition, because, should any possible enemy attack us with a well-equipped, well-supplied, and numerous artillery, we must be ready to meet him, at least with gun for gun.

I think the government should proceed at once

to manufacture, or to cause to be manufactured, covering a period of delivery of three years, at least five or six thousand field guns of various calibres, from the heaviest guns, heretofore considered to be siege guns, but which the present war has included in field artillery, to the regulation field gun of the light artillery of the army.

Also I think the government should manufacture, or cause to be manufactured at least ten thousand machine guns, deliveries to extend over three years. The machine gun is in its infancy, not so much in respect to its design as to its handling and use in battle. Should we find that we had provided ourselves with too many machine guns, nothing would be lost but a little money. But should we find at any time that we have too few machine guns, the loss might be incalculable.

I believe that the artillery arm of the service, the field artillery, should be greatly increased. Indeed I think both the cavalry and the artillery should be increased to the proportional strength of those arms of the service in an army of one million men. That is to say, the artillery and the cavalry should be so organized that on the breaking out of war the President could order the mobilization of an army of one million men, the army to have its full proportion of cavalry and artillery ready to take the field the moment the mobilization is completed.

I do not mean that new cavalry and artillery

regiments should at once be created in the strength required to supply these two arms of the service for an army of one million men. But I think that the result can be secured in the following manner.

The regular or active army, to consist ultimately of two hundred thousand men, to be organized as cavalry and artillery, and to be so borne on the records of the army.

A certain number of regiments always to serve as infantry in time of peace, but each regiment in the army to take in turn its tour of service and training as cavalry or as artillery.

The length of the tour of duty of regiments under instruction as cavalry and as artillery to cover a year, or a year and a half of training in each case, until all of the regiments of the army, in turn, shall have received instruction as cavalry or artillery: then the tour of instruction as cavalry or artillery to be extended to two years, and the round of training in these special services to be resumed on this basis, and to continue in respect to all the regiments of the active army.

The proportion of the troops under instruction as cavalry and artillery to be increased considerably beyond the present proportion of these arms of the service, while the balance of the troops should serve as infantry. In a surprisingly short period of time we should have the whole regular or active army converted into good infantry *and* cavalry, or good infantry *and* artillery, as the case should be,

ready on the breaking out of war to go into the field either as cavalry or artillery, or as cavalry, artillery, and infantry as the exigencies of the service should demand.

In no other way will it be possible for the army of the United States to be ready with sufficient cavalry and artillery at the breaking out of war. Under this plan the army will be fully supplied with both cavalry and artillery in the proper proportion of these arms of the service to the balance of the army, the reserves, which will constitute the infantry of the army. The whole active army of two hundred thousand men will be prepared to take the field as cavalry and artillery, if necessary, at the outbreak of war.

The reserve army, under the above plan, will consist entirely of infantry, which may be called to the colours at any moment deemed to be necessary by the President. Under the conscript system, as above outlined, the army would consist of one million men—all well-trained soldiers.

I cannot repeat too often that I do not think that thoroughness of organization should be sacrificed to haste incident to the possibility of our being drawn into the present European war, because I can see no reasonable prospect of our being drawn into this war. But that feeling of confidence in the maintenance of present peace, which has been expressed, should not close our eyes to the necessity of being prepared for war in the future. We

are surrounded by conditions and ambitions which may lead us into war at almost any time after the conclusion of the present war in Europe. No one who takes a broad view of public affairs can but be convinced of the truth of this statement. Now that the possibility of war is making itself apparent to the public mind, and now that the people are gradually becoming awakened to the wisdom of making preparation to meet the eventualities of the future, let the nation, calmly and with clearness of thought and purpose, prepare its army and navy to meet whatever contingencies may arise.

As affording an opportunity of contrasting the relative advantage of six-gun and four-gun batteries, the regiments of infantry of the present service when converted into artillery regiments, under the above suggested plan for the conversion of the whole regular army into cavalry and artillery, should be transformed, that is to say, their companies should be transformed, into six-gun batteries, which would allow them to maintain their present company and regimental organizations. This, however, is a matter of detail easy of solution. If the artillery officers should be so wedded to four-gun batteries as to make the struggle for six-gun batteries revolutionary in its effect upon the army, then the infantry regiments could be converted into artillery regiments of the war strength of the tables of organization, the surplus men of the infantry to constitute new provisional regiments

of artillery. But I must say that the only effect in my judgment of such conversion of the infantry into four-gun batteries would be the unnecessary increase in the number of officers of the army. On the basis of six-gun batteries the conversion could be effected without this unnecessary increase in the number of officers.

The same remarks apply substantially to the provisional conversion of infantry into cavalry.

There need be no fear that the army would suffer in any respect from the carrying out of this plan of converting the whole regular or active army into cavalry and artillery. The present regiments of cavalry and artillery would at once take their tour of duty as infantry, while a corresponding number of infantry regiments would take their tour of duty as cavalry and artillery regiments respectively, until the whole army had served in turn by regiments as infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

I think the effect upon the officers of the army would be broadening and uplifting. They would see the army from different points of view, and they would be the better prepared for the day to which they all look forward, when, as general officers, they would have the responsibility of high command imposed upon them.

Promotions to the rank of general are now made from among officers whose whole lives have been spent in one arm of the service, varied by special service in Washington, so that when they reach

the higher rank they look upon the army from the standpoint of their past regimental association. Passing from infantry to artillery and cavalry, and *vice versa*, they would have the opportunity of co-ordinating in their minds the influence and effect of the various arms of the service, and so become the better fitted for the higher command.

As to the men of the cavalry, I have long held that they should be drilled, armed, and manœuvered as infantry as well as cavalry, because much of their fighting will be on foot. Over thirty-five years ago I wrote that the last great charge of cavalry in battle against unbroken infantry had been made. That General, the Marquis de Galliffet, when he so gallantly led the French cavalry against the unbroken German infantry at Sedan, closed most brilliantly the history of the cavalry charge. This is not saying that the usefulness of cavalry has come to an end, nor that cavalry may not charge *broken* infantry with success; but only that the new career created for cavalry in our great war should be accepted as having opened a new field of usefulness for the cavalry of armies.

Modern cavalry was developed by us in the great war fifty years ago; although from the institution of divisional cavalry as given in the tables of organization issued by the General Staff, it would appear that much that had been accomplished in the development of cavalry in the great war had been forgotten by the officers of the army. As

taught by that war, cavalry should be élite infantry as well as élite cavalry. I do not mean mounted infantry, but cavalry which may fight on foot as infantry fights, and also fight when mounted, and otherwise perform all the functions of the best cavalry when mounted and employed exclusively as cavalry. If we stand upon the teachings of the great war we have nothing to learn from Europe as to cavalry, and the Europeans have still much to learn from us. I say this with full recognition of the brilliant handling of the German cavalry covering the advance of the German army through Belgium and into northern France, in the present war.

I have already discussed the association of machine guns in battery organization with cavalry. This association will greatly expand the usefulness of cavalry, especially when it is used as Sheridan used his cavalry in the closing weeks of the great war.

Grouping these reflections together, the following statement of organization of a fighting army of the fighting strength of 147,598 officers and men, say generally of the aggregate fighting strength of 150,000 men, is given as presenting the best form of organization for an army of that strength in the field in time of war. No account in this statement is taken of the service troops with such an army. Any one wishing to go into this branch of the subject is respectfully referred to the

1914 tables of organization issued by the General Staff.

As already stated, I prefer a brigade organization consisting of three regiments of infantry of about 1200 men each, or of the brigade strength of 3600 officers and men. I believe that a brigade of three regiments each consisting of 1836 officers and men, or of the aggregate brigade strength of 5508 officers and men, too cumbersome, and as throwing out of just proportion the relationships of the other commands of an army. I also believe that a brigade of 5508 officers and men is too large a command for one officer, because, up to and including the brigade commander, each commanding officer has so much detail work in his command to attend to, of a personal nature to the troops of his command, that his whole time is occupied, and he cannot command well so large a brigade. Consequently I have adopted for the purpose of this statement a brigade consisting of two regiments of infantry, each of the regulation war strength of 1836 officers and men, giving a total infantry strength for the brigade of 3672 officers and men. Although preferring an artillery organization of six-gun batteries, I have used the regulation battery of four guns as the basis of estimation in the following statement.

I have purposely abstained from including in the following estimate of a fighting army of 150,000 officers and men the constitution of the medical

corps, the quartermaster's corps, or the ammunition train of the army, as my purpose is to give the organization of an army of the fighting strength of about 150,000 men. The tables of organization of the General Staff have been prepared with care, and can be used in connection with the following statement, should it be desired to fill out the scheme of a war army of the fighting strength of about 150,000 officers and men with the service troops appertinent thereto.

Whether these carefully prepared tables of transportation of the General Staff would stand the test of war, I do not wish to discuss. It will be sufficient for me to say that in my opinion no general commanding an army of 150,000 men in war would allow himself to be hampered in respect to his supply trains by regulations made in the far-away War Department. He would see that his trains were organized on the basis of the war rule for transportation, viz., as small a number of wagons with the troops as possible, and as large an ammunition train as possible, and as large supply and medical trains as necessary, having regard to the distance of the front of the army from its field base. An army can live and fight in rags and without shoes, but it must have ammunition and commissary supplies. When its ammunition and commissary supplies run too near the point of exhaustion, there are but two courses open to the army, to fall back

as rapidly as possible on its field base, or to surrender.

Apropos of cutting down transportation with the troops, I may say that I have seen a wagon wheeled out of the column, its contents—officers' baggage and supplies—piled up by the side of the road and burned, the wagon being turned over to the quartermaster for the general train, because of violation of the order of the general commanding as to the allowance of transportation with the troops.

Just what the transportation of the future may be is as difficult to say as it is difficult to estimate its amount. Apparently the "army wagon" is to be altogether superseded by the auto truck or a modified form of the automobile, to be invented for army transportation, and the ammunition train of the future will be so much larger than any ammunition train that our army has ever had knowledge of that it would be idle to pretend, at this moment, to prefigure it. This suggestion is made under the reservation that I think a great deal of ammunition now being expended in Europe is being wasted, but, nevertheless, should we be forced into war with a nation so well supplied with guns and ammunition as Germany, without ourselves being ready to meet the enemy equally well supplied, we should be in a similar plight to the distressing plight of England, but without England's advantage of having allies to fight for us.

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY OF THE FIGHTING STRENGTH OF 147,598 OFFICERS AND MEN, SAY 150,000 OFFICERS AND MEN

Assuming the war strength of an infantry regiment to be 1836 officers and men, and the fire strength of each battery of artillery to be four guns, the table of organization of an army of 147,598 officers and men will be as follows:

Officers and men	
350	*1st.* General Officers and Staff Officers for the Army. *The army to be commanded by a Major-General.* Additional Staff Officers, if needed, to be detailed from the line.
	2d. A Brigade of Infantry:
3,672	*A.* Two Regiments of Infantry.
326	*B.* Two Batteries of Machine Guns—16 Guns to a Battery—32 Machine Guns.
153	*C.* A Company of Pioneers.
4,151	
	3d. A Division of Infantry: *Three Infantry Brigades as given above aggregating:*
11,016	*A.* 6 Regiments of Infantry.
978	*B.* 6 Batteries of Machine Guns—96 Machine Guns.
459	*C.* 3 Companies of Pioneers.
50	*D.* A Detachment of the Signal Corps—for signalling.
12,503	

4th. An Army Corps:

A. 3 Divisions of Infantry as given above.

B. A Division of 4 Regiments, 24 Batteries, of Light Artillery, 96 Field Guns.

33,048	*A.*	18 Regiments of Infantry.
2,934		18 Batteries of Machine Guns—288 Machine Guns.
1,377		9 Companies of Pioneers.
200		A Detachment of the Signal Corps, for signalling, and telegraphing with telegraph lines.
4,680	*B.*	A Division of Light Artillery, 4 Regiments, 24 Batteries—96 Field Guns.
1,304		8 Batteries of Machine Guns, 128 Machine Guns, with the Artillery.
612		4 Companies of Pioneers with the Artillery, mounted, or on motorcycles.
44,155		

5th. An Army:

A. Three Army Corps as given above.

B. A Division of Cavalry.

C. A Reserve Park of Artillery if the character of the campaign, and the character of the country in which the army is to operate, should admit of the use of more artillery than that provided for above.

A. Three Army Corps, consisting of:
Three Divisions of Infantry as given above.

99,144 54 Regiments of Infantry.
8,802 54 Batteries of Machine Guns — 864 Machine Guns with the Infantry.
4,131 27 Companies of Pioneers.
700 Detachment of the Signal Corps—for signalling, telegraphing, and with an Aero Battalion.

Three Divisions of Light Artillery—consisting of two Brigades each—12 Regiments, 72 Batteries, 288 Field Guns.

14,040 *a.* 72 Batteries—288 Field Guns.
3,912 *b.* 24 Batteries of Machine Guns, 384 Machine Guns with the Artillery.
1,836 *c.* 12 Companies Mounted Pioneers or on motorcycles, with the Artillery.
250 *d.* Detachment of Signal Corps for signalling and telegraphing.

B. A Division of Cavalry consisting of three Brigades of three Regiments each—9 Regiments of Cavalry.

11,646 *a.* 9 Regiments of Cavalry.
1,170 *b.* 1 Regiment of Horse Artillery under the orders of the general commanding the Division of Cavalry—24 Guns.
1,467 *c.* 9 Batteries of Machine Guns—3 Batteries with each Cavalry Brigade and

under command of the brigade commander—144 Machine Guns.

150 *d.* Detachment of Signal Corps—signalling and telegraphing.

No pioneers are provided for the Cavalry because pioneers are believed to be useless with Cavalry, but each private should carry, slung from his saddle, either an axe, a shovel, or a pick.

147,248

350 General Officers and Staff Officers for the army, other than those detailed from the line of the army.

147,598

The army to be commanded by a Major-General.

Recapitulation:

General Officers and Staff Officers		350
312 guns	Infantry	99,144
	Artillery	15,210
	Cavalry	11,646
1392 Machine Guns		14,181
Pioneers		5,967
Signal Corps		1,100
Fighting strength of the army		147,598

As stated above, reference is made to the 1914 tables of organization issued by the General Staff, for data as to the ammunition train, the supply

train, and the medical train and field hospital service, for an army of 147,598 officers and men in the field in time of war.

So far as the aero battalion, under command of the chief signal officer of the army, is concerned, I do not think that we have yet sufficient data to give its constitution authoritatively either as to officers and men, or as to aeroplanes. It is an organism in process of growth and development, and should be watched most attentively by the officers of the army.

The army, so constituted, should be maintained at war strength by drafts of conscripts from the reserve camps, each conscript being drawn for the full term of service in the army, and only assigned to the reserve army when the active army has been filled to war strength, such assignment to the reserve army being determined by the needs and requirements of the service, and to be voidable in time of war, so that the whole reserve shall be ready for active service wherever and howsoever the government shall require their service.

This statement gives the constitution of an army as a unit of organization. Other similar armies will have to be created in war, and when so created, they may be associated in combined action under the command of a superior general or general-in-chief. The unit of army organization being accepted, the development of the greater army, made

up of several such armies, follows as a natural consequence upon the demands of the war.

It will be observed that I lay stress upon the proposition that the army should be commanded by a major-general. I believe in the wisdom of the military policy that major-general should be the highest permanent rank in our army; the only exception which should be made being, that in war, when a great victory, determinative in character, shall have been won, the Congress, upon the recommendation of the President, should, as an expression of national gratitude for the victory, create the office of lieutenant-general, upon the understanding that the President should nominate the victorious general for confirmation as lieutenant-general.

The same remark applies to the still greater rank of General, which should only be conferred at the close of a great war, and as the reward for transcendent service and victory.

Should these two great ranks, lieutenant-general and general, be held as rewards for victory in war, they would be superb rewards. But if the rank of lieutenant-general should be conferred freely upon officers in peace without special war service, or upon the commanding general of an army of 150,000 men at the opening of war, where is the nation to turn for rank with which to commemorate victory?

The same remark applies to the corresponding

ranks of vice-admiral and admiral in the navy. In a thoughtless moment the last Congress created the rank of admiral, and provided for the temporary appointment, or while holding certain commands, of three admirals. As I write, I find it impossible to recall the name of but one of these "Admirals," although I am fairly well informed upon current affairs.

Is there a schoolboy in the land who does not know the names of Farragut, Porter, Dewey? Or the names of those earlier officers of the navy, with Decatur at their head, who carried the flag of the country to victory on almost every sea?

I quite understand that the argument has been made that we need higher rank in the navy than that of rear-admiral, so that when our ships join those of other navies in joint operations, the command of the international fleet may be with our flag. This is straining at an argument for increased rank which should be brushed away by an enactment authorizing the President, on the happening of such a contingency, to confer upon the commanding officer of our ships such temporary rank as will give him due status in the allied or international fleet. Such legislation would still preserve the lustre of great rank in the navy, somewhat dimmed by the profuse creation of rear-admirals, because there is little likelihood of the President's having occasion to use this power. The other argument that a fleet should be com-

manded by an admiral or by a vice-admiral because of its strength in ships and guns, may be dismissed with scant ceremony as unworthy of serious consideration.

If a thing be made common its value is lowered in the general estimation. If rank be cheapened it becomes an unsatisfactory reward for great services and great victories in war.

The effect of the promotions in the army following the Spanish War is manifested by bills introduced into Congress at its last session, in one of which provision is made for practically the promotion of one thousand officers, already in the army, without their having rendered especial service to merit promotion; and in the other, provision is made for conferring upon generals commanding territorial departments, upon the chief of staff of the army, and upon generals commanding armies corresponding to the command of a territorial department, the rank of lieutenant-general while holding such commands, and for the promotion of all bureau chiefs and all brigadier-generals of the line to the rank of major-general, in order, as the bill states, that the officers of the army may enjoy corresponding rank with their brother officers of the navy. If there be anything in this argument as to the advisability of establishing corresponding rank between the two services, it would be far better to reduce the rank in the navy to correspond with the present cor-

relative rank in the army than to advance rank in the army to correspond with present rank in the navy.

Such promotions in time of peace destroy respect for rank, and also destroy the significance of promotions in time of war for distinguished service in the field.

Are not the ranks of major-general and brigadier-general high enough and honourable enough to satisfy the ambition of any officer? Does the army remember that Grant was created lieutenant-general only after a series of victories memorable in the history of our country, and that it was as lieutenant-general he received Lee's surrender?

Do they remember that the war closed with Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, still major-generals, and that it was only after the war that a greatful country conferred upon Grant the great rank of General?

Is there any intimation anywhere in the history of the war that Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, would have been better soldiers had higher rank been conferred upon them?

Is there the slightest intimation in the history of the war that any officer disobeyed the orders of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, because they were only major-generals?

Is it not singular that with a mobile army of but thirty thousand men in the United States, it should be proposed that chiefs of bureaus in the

War Department should be created major-generals, whereas during the great war, with a million of men in arms, the chiefs of those same bureaus were brigadier-generals and colonels?

In this discussion of rank my mind goes back to the days of my youth when the highest rank in the navy was that of flag officer while at sea, and in the command of a squadron, and commodore when the flag officer had returned to his home; and when the army was commanded by Brevet Lieutenant-General Scott, breveted lieutenant-general for his conquest of Mexico.

Those were days when rank was respected in the army and the navy. Rank was valued then because it was not made common by too free promotions or too high promotions, and because it stood for faithful and efficient service. It exercised an inspiring influence upon the officers of the two services because its lustre shone brilliantly before their eyes.

I do not forget that the ranks of general and of lieutenant-general were freely used in the Southern army during the great war, but then it should be remembered that these were war ranks, in many instances conferred for gallant and distinguished service in the field, and further, that great rank was all that the South had to give as rewards to her soldiers who had won her confidence and her gratitude by faithful service in her cause. It is impossible to institute a comparison in the matter

of rank between the army of the United States and the gallant army of the South in the great war, because there is no common ground of estimation of rank upon which it may be instituted.

I could not wish a kinder or a better wish for the army and the navy, with both of which services I have most sympathetic associations, than that the gallant gentlemen of the two services should hold rank in as high respect as it was held by their predecessors in the late fifties and during the great war.

CHAPTER V

THE DIPLOMACY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

THE construction of the Panama Canal has imposed upon the United States the duty of developing a diplomatic policy of national defence: a policy which should be incorporated in our diplomacy as a rule of action for the government under all circumstances and under every administration.

The Panama Canal has materially changed our international relationships, because the canal may, at any moment, become a cause of war between the United States and one of the great Powers, or between the United States and a combination of two or more of the great Powers, anxious for the possession of this important waterway between the two great oceans, for military and commerical purposes.

We have seen the Suez Canal pass from the control of French capital and influence into the possession of Great Britain, through her purchase of the shares in the canal company which had previously belonged to the Khedive of Egypt,

and the consequent gradual expansion of the influence of Great Britain throughout Egypt. England's entrance into Egypt some thirty-five or forty years ago was in coalition with France, and upon the diplomatic assurance, which assurance was confirmed by Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, that she would withdraw from Egypt so soon as her mission of restoring order and good government in that country had been accomplished. There were those who, at the time, smiled incredulously at the solemn assurance given by Mr. Gladstone of England's intention to retire from Egypt upon the re-establishment of order, and we find her still in Egypt, her authority more firmly established than ever.

England has recently dethroned the former Khedive and enthroned a successor, through whom she now governs Egypt as suzerain, and through the government of Egypt absolutely controls the Suez Canal, which has practically become a part of England's coast-line.

Should the commercial ambition of England to possess the Panama Canal, as she now possesses the Suez Canal, become an active political force, in order that she may control the two great trade routes of the world, she might, to carry out this ambition, decide to go to war for the possession of the canal. Of one thing, however, we may be assured, England will never go to war with the United States, or with any other first-class Power,

without a powerful ally or allies, and it is natural to look to the East for the most likely ally whom she will draw within the circle of fire. The combined fleets of England and Japan would command the ocean as against the fleet of the United States, as it would be impossible for our fleet, unless augmented beyond all possible conception, to hold the sea against such a naval combination.

Nor is this the only source of danger to be apprehended as to our possession of the Panama Canal. Should Germany seek to compensate herself for the losses and costs of the present war in Europe, it might occur to her ambition to attempt the seizure of the canal as giving her a vantage ground for attack upon one or more of the republics of Central or South America, with the design of annexing their territory to her empire.

The danger of war for the possession of the Panama Canal may be restricted to Great Britain and Japan on the one hand, or to Germany and her allies on the other hand. No danger of conflict over the possession of the canal need be apprehended from any other nation or nations. Russian ambition does not lie within the region of the canal, and no other nation has either the ambition, or possesses the material or financial strength to enter into conflict with the United States for the possession of the canal.

In the position which confronts us we might study with advantage English diplomacy, for

which I venture to express the highest intellectual appreciation, drawing therefrom lessons for our guidance in the diplomatic defence of the Panama Canal. We might ask ourselves with profit, what would Great Britain do if she was in our place? No better field of study in diplomacy can be found than that of England. There is, or rather there has been, no diplomacy so fine, so thorough, and so successful as that of England. Sometimes mistakes have been made, and it looks as though some serious mistakes had been made by England in the diplomacy of the present war in Europe, but such mistakes have been rare in the past. It is a diplomacy which counts the cost, but which also takes the chances, what might be called the business chances, in all of its undertakings. It is the diplomacy of a proud aristocracy, and as such is bold, far-seeing, consistent, spirited, continuous, domineering, and crafty, in these qualities exceeding the diplomacy of a republic or of an empire. It is animated by clear cold intellect without human sympathy or generous emotion. It is friend or enemy of every nation of the world as English interests, for the time being, seem to warrant and demand. It is a tenacious diplomacy which counts on tiring out the diplomacy of every other nation, and often is a well-planned bluff, boldly put forth on the chance that the other Power may retire before its calm front. The successes of British diplomacy in the past have doubtless often surprised the Foreign

Office quite as much as they have disappointed those who have yielded before its encroachments. Conscious of her weakness as a military Power, there is one thing written deep in English diplomacy, never to go to war with a first-class Power except with efficient allies; with allies who can bear the full brunt of the war; and the strength of her diplomacy, which marks the fact that it is the diplomacy of an aristocracy, lies in the calm and clear look into the future which she takes, and the wisdom with which she prepares in peace, through alliances, for the possibilities of war in the future.

England's diplomacy for the past hundred and fifty years has been the strong right arm of the nation, through which she has built up and defended her vast world empire.

England has possessed herself of the Suez Canal that she might control that great waterway of commerce and of military convenience and power, on the route to India and the East, and it may be within the range of anticipation if not of actual belief, that when England sufficiently recovers from the effect of the present war, if her alliances shall then seem to her to be strong enough to risk another war, she may reach out her hand in an attempt to seize the Panama Canal. Should England come into possession of the Panama Canal while still holding the Suez Canal, she would possess the two great commercial and military routes between the East and the West, and so establish

her control of the commerce of the world on even more solid foundations than heretofore.

There is, however, one check upon the gratification of this ambition of Great Britain, assuming it to be an ambition, in the fact that the United States lies for over three thousand miles upon her flank; and this fact will, I think, always compel Great Britain to restrain her ambition whenever it may lead her to the contemplation of hostile action against the United States.

As a further counterbalance to such an effort on the part of Great Britain to expand her commercial relationships and her power, and also as contributing to the establishment of something in the nature of a balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, I advocate the sale of the Philippines to Germany on the condition that Germany shall guarantee, in the treaty of cession, the possession of the Panama Canal in perpetuity, by the United States. Germany, in possession of the Philippines, would require free access to them through the Panama Canal, and her interests in the islands would demand that either she or the United States should be in possession of the canal. England's domination of the canal she would regard as a direct attack upon her sovereignty.

The danger of a possible offensive move on the part of Germany against the Panama Canal is apparent, but on the other hand, Germany should know that Great Britain, unless in possession of the

canal herself, would much prefer that the ownership of the canal should remain with the United States than that it should pass to Germany. Should Germany put forth her mailed hand to seize the Panama Canal, England might deem it to be to her interest and advantage to use her fleet in support of the United States, to defeat any possible attack of Germany on the canal, and to insure its continued ownership by the United States.

On the other hand, German interests would be safer from attack, with the Panama Canal in the possession of the United States, than they would be with the canal in the possession of Great Britain or any other Power.

There are risks and dangers whichever way the subject may be contemplated, but nations like individuals must be ready to face risks and dangers, and by being prepared to meet them avoid or defeat them.

The creation of a balance of power in the Pacific, and in the Caribbean Sea the creation of such a preponderance of power in the United States as would insure the permanent possession of the Panama Canal by ourselves, should be the leading policy of our diplomacy. But such a policy demands that the United States should maintain her freedom from entangling alliances. And it may even demand that the United States should free herself from the obligation to support doctrines, which, in the nature of things, can serve no useful

purpose so far as the United States herself is concerned, and which are in themselves a constant source of danger to her peace and prosperity.

The United States should also free herself as soon and as completely as possible from the various arbitration treaties which are the monument of Mr. Bryan's diplomacy. I believe, generally speaking, in the principle of arbitration, but I think it is unsound diplomacy to bind ourselves by treaty obligations, whether it may suit our policy or not, in every case to go to arbitration. If arbitration be a desirable way to settle a dispute between the United States and any foreign Power, there will always be time enough in which to negotiate a treaty for the settlement of such question by arbitration. If, however, time should be lacking, that fact will be proof that the question is of such a nature that it cannot be settled by arbitration, and that any existing treaty providing for such arbitration would be brushed aside, as of no avail, by our possible enemy.

I am among the very few who look with anything but satisfaction upon the settlement of the *Alabama Claims* with Great Britain through arbitration. I think Mr. Sumner, with his fanciful "indirect claims," was much the better statesman of that period. His plan was to hold the *Alabama Claims* an open question until such time as Great Britain should be willing to surrender Canada to the United States in complete satisfaction and

settlement of all the claims, of whatsoever nature, held by the United States against Great Britain. This policy, if firmly held by the United States, would, I believe, have ended in the unification of the continent under our flag.

The possession of the Panama Canal by the United States presents what may be called a diplomatic-military problem. It is military in that we may at any moment be compelled to defend the canal by force of arms, and it is diplomatic in respect to the provision of a way by which we may reinforce our garrison on the Isthmus of Panama, and also in respect to the unification of our power and influence throughout the whole of the so-called Republic of Panama.

I have already discussed the military side of the problem. The diplomatic aspect of the case divides itself, naturally, between the unification of our power and control on the Isthmus, and the establishment and maintenance of means of communication and transportation for our troops and munitions of war, from our southern border, through Mexico and Central America, to Panama.

Our diplomacy in respect to the construction of an interoceanic canal has been ill-judged and unfortunate in the extreme. Beginning with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and extending through the diplomatic history of the creation of the so-called Republic of Panama, the Canal treaty with that so-called republic, and the Hay-Pauncefote

Treaty, we have steadily advanced from mistake to mistake, yielding when we should have been stern, and compromising when we should have been firm.

The creation of the so-called Republic of Panama, which had its birth and lives today under the protection of our guns, was an unutterable mistake. There was no necessity for a Republic of Panama. It is a political anachronism. It has no inherent right to live, and yet it lives under our protection, and is a source of continuing uncertainty and anxiety to the United States. One of its latest projects is a new treaty with the United States, drawn, among other things, to provide for the arbitration of issues between the United States and the sovereign power of Panama, by a court of arbitration to be "composed of one member each from the two countries interested and one each from the republics of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina," a proposition so sublimely absurd as almost to warrant the belief that its very absurdity would make it attractive to the Department of State, but for the fact of the recent change in the head of that department.

Small and weak Powers, living under the protection of strong Powers, in their own interest and in the interest of the peace of the world, should cease to exist through their annexation by the strong protecting Powers.

In accordance with this principle, the so-called

Republic of Panama should be annexed by the United States; but to compensate its inhabitants for the loss of their pseudo-independence, Panama should be at once admitted into the Union as one of the States of the United States. We should then enter upon negotiations with Colombia for the extension of the territory of Panama, that is to say, the extension of the territory and the power of the United States, over the valley of the Atrato and the valleys of the interlocking streams making into the Pacific Ocean. Of course we should be expected, and it would be simple justice to do so, to grant to Colombia some certain millions of dollars, say $20,000,000 as proposed in a treaty recently negotiated with that republic, but without according to her any especial rights of transport over or through the canal, in compensation for such cession of territory, and in general oblivion of the past. But, of course, no such payment should be made to Colombia except in consideration for the cession of territory including the Atrato route to the Pacific.

In consideration of the admission of Panama as a State into the Union, reservation should be made, in perpetuity, not only in the act of admission but also in the treaty of annexation, of the right of the government of the United States to land her troops anywhere within the territory of Panama, and to take possession of whatever land or other property she should need for military or

naval purposes within the state of Panama, compensation being made, of course, therefor, and generally to exercise complete sovereignty throughout Panama, without the necessity of asking and receiving permission from the State government to do so.

A treaty with Great Britain in reference to the construction of the Panama Canal, or of any canal across any part of America, was a serious mistake. It bound the hands of the United States when, in carrying out the great work of constructing the interoceanic canal, our hands should have been unbound and free.

If it was thought that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty stood in the way of the freedom of action of the United States in respect to the construction of the Panama Canal, all that was necessary for the United States to have done was to have pointed out to Great Britain that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which was designed to *assist* in the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, but which had always been a drag upon the United States, had become obsolete, *and that instead of aiding it only hampered* the United States in the construction of an interoceanic canal; and that as a consequence of such statement, the United States would be glad to have Great Britain join her in the abrogation of the treaty.

Had Great Britain refused to join in the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as obsolete

and ineffective,—and her action in respect to such a proposition would have been determined entirely by the firmness with which we should have made the suggestion,—we should then ourselves have denounced the treaty as obsolete and ineffective, and as no longer of use or benefit to the United States, to Great Britain, or to the world, and as standing in the way of the construction of the great interoceanic waterway by the United States, which was demanded by the commerce of the world. The United States should have accompanied such a declaration with the statement that we proposed to construct the canal across the Isthmus of Panama free from all foreign influence, and that when so constructed it would be held to be a part of the coast line of the United States, but open to the commerce of the world under such regulations as we should deem it proper to make, except only to the commerce of enemies of the United States. Then, in the natural course of procedure, we should have opened negotiations with Colombia for the acquisition of the state of Panama. It may be said that Colombia might not have cared to cede the state of Panama to the United States, but it is quite within the range of diplomacy to reconcile the views of two Powers dealing with so practical a question. We could have pointed out to Colombia the fact that it was necessary that the United States should own and possess the territory through which the canal should be constructed,

and that while we were entirely willing to pay Colombia liberally, even to the verge of absurd generosity, for the cession, it rested entirely with her to decide whether she preferred to receive such compensation for the cession of the state of Panama to the United States, or to have the United States take possession of Panama without granting compensation to her. This seems bald as read, and yet it would have been a much higher and a much more moral procedure than that which actually took place. Colombia lost Panama without compensation of any description. United States marines, it is believed, were concentrated in anticipation of the outbreak of the so-called revolution upon the Isthmus of Panama. Ships of the American navy were in the ports of Colon and Panama, or were approaching those ports, ready to land sailors or marines the moment *American interests should be jeopardized on the Isthmus.* An officer of the American army put on his uniform, and seemed to be ready to direct the course of events at Colon, the moment the so-called revolution had broken out, and it is believed that we assisted in negotiating the Colombian troops off the Isthmus of Panama. In a document sent to Congress in respect to the affair of Panama, a cable message is given from the State Department, asking one of our consuls on the Isthmus whether the revolution had broken out, and his reply is also given, to the effect that no revolution had then broken out at Panama.

A frank, straightforward diplomacy is always the best diplomacy, and always produces the best results, while yet maintaining a good understanding with the other Power or Powers. Such a diplomacy would have been a successful diplomacy in this case, and Colombia would have rejoiced in possessing many millions of American dollars, and also she would have had occasion to rejoice in getting rid of a troublesome state, which from its territorial position, was always a source of danger to herself.

While we should be perfectly willing to give Colombia, as is proposed to be given to her by the treaty now before the Senate for ratification, twenty million dollars for the cession of the Atrato route to the Pacific Ocean, and for oblivion of the past, we should oppose the ratification of the treaty as it stands today, because it is paying too high a price in money, and in the concession of rights of use in the Panama Canal proposed to be granted to Colombia, for oblivion alone.

The loss of Panama to Colombia is a *fait accompli.* Unless it should be made to the advantage of the United States to do so, I can see no reason why we should rake among the embers of the past. Our diplomacy and the diplomacy of Colombia in respect to the construction of the Panama Canal was so ludicrous and yet so tragic, that the disposition to smile at it is frozen by the amazing wrong and blunder of it.

A great nation should state openly before the world what it deems to be necessary to its growth and prosperity; and especially so should it speak when it is about to undertake a great world work of construction by which the commerce of the world can only be benefited.

As we should have spoken openly to England, to Colombia, and to the world of our rights and purposes in respect to the construction of the Panama Canal, so now should we speak openly to Panama and to the world, proclaiming the fact that the further continuance of the existence of the so-called Republic of Panama is no longer desirable, and that the time had come for the United States to annex the so-called Republic of Panama, granting to the citizens of Panama, for the loss of their shadowy independence, admission into the citizenship of the United States.

The Panama Canal, lying in territory which should thus have become a part of the territory of the United States, the United States being freed from treaty obligations to any Power in respect to its construction, would, in its very nature, have become a neutral highway for the commerce of the world, except, and only except, to the commerce of nations at war with the United States.

So far as the military aspect of the question of Panama is concerned, the United States should enter at once into negotiations with Mexico and the Central American republics for the con-

struction and maintenance of a line of railway from some point on the southern frontier of our country, through Mexico and the Central American republics, to Panama, Colon, and to the line of the canal, which railway should be under the protection and supervision of the United States, and over which the United States should have the right to transport, at all times and under all conditions, her troops, guns, provisions, and munitions of war from the United States to Panama; the recognition of any government as the permanent government of Mexico, being conditioned upon the agreement to such a treaty by Mexico.

So far as any part of this route shall have been constructed, the United States should assume administrative protection and supervision over it, and for such part or parts of the route as may not yet have been built, the United States should at once be authorized to construct the same, and when constructed to associate these sections with those already built, making a through line of railway from the United States to Panama.

The financial needs and responsibilities of Mexico incident to the civil war which has been raging in that republic for years, will impose such obligations upon her as will render the assistance of the United States necessary to aid her in arranging the burden of her responsibilities. Mexico cannot possibly establish and maintain a stable government within her boundaries without

the countenance and assistance of the United States, and one of the chief instrumentalities in the re-establishment of peace, order, and good government in Mexico would be the construction and maintenance, under the protection of the United States, of the proposed international railway of defence from our southern border to Panama and Colon. Under such circumstances it should not be difficult for our diplomacy to conclude a treaty with Mexico especially providing for the construction and maintenance, under the protection of the United States, of such an international railway, since the interests of the two nations move so harmoniously together in respect to such a project.

It might become necessary for the United States to assume considerable financial obligations in carrying out this plan, but it is believed that Mexico, with the aid and support of the credit of the United States, would be able to effect a complete rehabilitation of her finances; but in granting such credit to Mexico, the United States should be given certain privileges and rights of supervision, which, relying upon the rapid development of her resources should peace and order in the republic be maintained, would secure the United States against loss on account of the extension of such credit, while assuring to Mexico a peaceful and rapid growth and development.

In time of revolution or of domestic disturbance in any part of the territory crossed by the inter-

national railway, the United States should, by treaty, have the right to protect traffic over such international railway in the interest of the United States and of the countries through which it shall pass.

Such a policy would not only result in accomplishing its avowed purpose, of furnishing a line of railway over which reinforcements could be transported to our troops in Panama, but it would be also of value in promoting the commerce of the nations through which the railway line should pass. Such an international railway, owned in part or in whole by the United States, with the right in the United States of policing its line at all times and under all conditions, would be a substantial guarantee of peace and order in Mexico and throughout Central America, and the prosperity of the several republics traversed by such an American-owned-and-managed line of railway would be assured.

If this broadly national and American policy in respect to Panama and to the international railway should be adopted, we should be measurably assured of the safety of the Panama Canal through the facility of reinforcing our garrison covering and holding the canal and the territory of Panama, provided we should have the troops, the guns, and the munitions of war to send to the Isthmus.

Wherever the line of the international railway should approach the coast so as to bring it within

the range of the guns of a hostile fleet, a new location should be established far enough inland to remove it from the chance of hostile interruption. It is recalled that some years ago the United States caused certain railway surveys to be made in Central America, but whether these surveys would be available for purposes of construction is not known. They could be used, however, as the basis for further and fuller surveys for the location of the international railway.

Indeed a beginning has already been made in establishing our proper relations with the Central American republics as sponsors of peace and prosperity within their territory. We have had a handful of marines at the capital of Nicaragua for some time past, with the result that that nation has enjoyed peace and contentment since the arrival of the troops of the United States. The worst enemies that Mexico and the Central American republics have ever had have been, and still are, the ambitious citizens of those countries, who, for personal profit and advancement, have striven for power through revolution.

There is pending in the Senate a treaty with the Republic of Nicaragua, which should be promptly ratified, as it is in line with the establishment of closer relations between the two countries, and because it secures to the United States the possession of a defensible harbour on the gulf of Fonseca, and also insures to us the exclusive right to con-

struct an interoceanic canal across the territory of Nicaragua. The compensation for these concessions which is to be given to Nicaragua by the United States is a money compensation in the sum of three million dollars, which should be paid without a moment's hesitation. The negotiation of this treaty manifests the existence of the spirit of friendship which should prevail throughout Central America for the United States, and may be taken as an indication of the favourable reception which Nicaragua and the other countries of Central America would give to a proposal from the United States for the construction of an international railway from the United States to Panama.

The United States wants substantially no addition of territory except that already under its protection, the territory of Panama, and the small and scarcely valuable extent of territory required for the rectification of our southern frontier. The annexation of Panama would simply mean the natural and proper assumption by the United States of the sovereignty which now theoretically exists under the meaningless form of a so-called independent republic. I do not fail to recall the fact that several of our Presidents have made injudicious and entirely unnecessary remarks in respect to the sovereignty of Panama. *But facts are facts*, and it is one of the facts of history, acknowledged in every chancery in Europe, that the so-called Republic of Panama exists under, through,

and by the protection of the United States, *and for the purposes of the United States.* That we should longer maintain this so-called republic, in semi-independence, as a possible centre of intrigue against ourselves, is the surprise of the nations. It may flatter our *amour propre* to be considered altruistic, but it is not altruism so much as national thoughtlessness that induces us to maintain the pseudo Republic of Panama in existence.

In time of war, an independent government on the Isthmus of Panama might be of inexpressible annoyance, if indeed not of serious danger, to the United States and to the canal. Conflicts, at present of little or no consequence, have already taken place between the police of Panama and the soldiers and sailors of the United States. Such occurrences indicate a spirit which, under the touch of the demagogue, or under the hostile hand of an enemy, might at any moment develop into revolutionary activity, which might seriously complicate our position on the Isthmus.

In offering the people of Panama citizenship in the United States we should amply compensate them for surrendering the flimsy tinsel of so-called independence, and also since the possibility of the sanitation of the tropics has been demonstrated, the annexation of Panama by the United States would inevitably lead to the development of the country, which will be impossible so long as the

semblance of sovereignty remains in the people of Panama. Indeed, the work of development should be undertaken immediately after the annexation of Panama through the establishment, by the United States, of military colonies in the territory of Panama as a measure for the defence of the canal.

The construction and maintenance of the international railway through Mexico and Central America by the United States would tend to restore and to maintain the peace of those countries, whereas Mr. Bryan's diplomacy in respect to Mexico has been most disastrous to that country, most destructive of American interests, and remorseless as to the lives of American citizens. The American Ambassador in Mexico reported to Mr. Bryan, upon his coming into office, the condition of affairs in Mexico, ending his report with the suggestion that the United States had two courses open for action: either to recognize Huerta or to intervene for the re-establishment of peace in that distracted country. This advice was as sound advice as was ever given by a diplomat to his government. The United States neither recognized Huerta nor intervened. The result of Mr. Bryan's failure to appreciate the value of the advice of our Ambassador is before the world; a number of American citizens have lost their lives, hundreds of millions of American capital have been lost or destroyed, and the end is not yet. The United States by action or inaction is largely responsible

for lawlessness in Mexico. Her failure to realize conditions as they exist, and her withdrawal from the performance of her duties as the leading nation of the American continent, has measurably brought about the disorganization which prevails in Mexico. Instead of dealing firmly with the Mexican situation ourselves we have associated with us the diplomatic representatives of several of the South and Central American republics, to consider and decide what the United States shall do in Mexico. These meetings, beginning with the conference assembled at Niagara Falls, which was called in the name of Pan-Americanism, may establish a precedent which in the future will plague us, and may even hamper our free diplomacy in dealing with American questions from the standpoint of the interests of the United States.

I do not believe in Pan-Americanism. I see in the principle of Pan-American action on all American questions a danger to our future welfare, with the possible result in the future of the imposition of burdens and responsibilities on the United States in respect to issues in which the United States has no direct interest. I believe the time has come to narrow the action of the United States in respect to American questions to those questions and interests which concern herself, or which concern those nations lying within the sphere of her influence. And I believe that we should leave to the nations of South America, south of the

Orinoco, the consideration of all questions affecting themselves without the exercise of influence or constraint by the United States; the only exception to this proposition of dealing with the affairs of South America being that the United States should maintain a sympathetic attitude towards Colombia and Venezuela, as facing the Caribbean Sea, which necessarily includes them within the sphere of influence of the United States.

Such a policy, if adopted by the United States, would relieve us from the further enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, and would allow to the nations south of the Orinoco complete and absolute freedom in reference to the ordering of their own affairs.

The abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States would, in my judgment, induce those far-away nations of South America to draw closer to the United States than is likely to be the case so long as the Monroe Doctrine shall remain in force. Under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine those countries feel themselves free from the danger of European aggression, and consequently they are restive under the measure of obligation for their safety which they owe to the United States. Relieved from the fancied restraint upon their freedom of action by this obligation to the United States, they would at once realize their danger of attack by some one or other of the great Powers of Europe, and they would begin

to consider whether, after all, the United States is not, as she has always been, their best friend.

The narrowing of our international obligations, as often happens, would intensify those which remain in force, and we should at once announce to the world the policy of the sphere of influence of the United States, as covering and protecting, as with a shield, Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Venezuela. An attack, with the suggestion of conquest, upon any one of the countries within our sphere of influence as thus outlined, should be regarded by the United States as an attack upon herself, and should be resisted and repelled with her whole force.

To equip ourselves fully for the discharge of this duty to the nations to the south of us we should be granted by Mexico, through the rectification of our southern frontier, a port upon the Gulf of California either at Guaymas, or at some defensible point to the north of Guaymas on the Gulf, and the cession of Lower California including Magdalena Bay. This cession of territory would give us the *débouché* of the Colorado into the Gulf of California, and put us in the position to realize that vast project of usefulness, the admission of the waters of the Gulf of California into the basin of the Mohave Desert. Of course the United States should amply compensate Mexico for such a cession of territory, which, by the way, would prove no serious loss to Mexico, as the

cession would cover the lands of the rebellious Yaqui Indians, who have ever been a source of trouble to that country.

This policy of the sphere of influence should cover and protect the islands of the Gulf of Mexico and of the Caribbean Sea. It would not necessarily lead to the acquisition by war of any of these islands owned or at present controlled by any European Power, but notice should be given to all the nations holding possession of any of these islands within our sphere of influence, that the United States could not look with favour upon their sale or alienation to any Power other than to the United States, and consequently we should be ready to buy any island, or group of islands, in the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea which any European Power should wish to dispose of.

As to the negro republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo we should assume responsibility for their good government as we have assumed responsibility for the good government of Cuba. We have in both countries taken wisely the first step in this direction. The time is fast approaching when we should proclaim a protectorate over these two republics, with the consequent right of intervention to maintain peace and order within their borders.

The world would gladly welcome the creation of such a sphere of influence by the United States over Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Venezuela, and over the islands of the Caribbean

Sea and of the Gulf of Mexico, as promising peace and stable government throughout its extent. So long as these several countries maintained peace and order within their borders the United States would look on with approbation. But upon the breaking out of revolution within the borders of any one of them, the United States should at once intervene in support of the constituted authorities of the nation, and restore peace and order within its borders. As in the case of our intervention in Cuba, but one such intervention would be necessary to establish the belief in all of these countries in the friendly interest of the United States in their well-being.

The United States, under such a policy, would in due course of time surely succeed in welding these nations into a firm and substantial alliance with herself; and peace and order established within their boundaries through the exercise of the friendly influence by the United States, would insure the development of the commerce and industry of these various peoples, and secure to them a condition of national happiness and contentment which they have never known.

The diplomatic policy of the United States bearing on the subject of National Defence is, after all, simple and direct. Its cardinal principles have been stated. Intelligence and judgment alone are needed to carry such a diplomacy to a successful conclusion. But both intelligence and

judgment *are* needed not only in the State Department, but in the various countries themselves in the maintenance of our relations with these Powers. A revival of interest in the diplomacy of the nations within the sphere of influence of the United States is of first importance. In every one of these neighbouring countries we should be represented by wise, tactful, and most courteous statesmen, as it should be their duty to win the confidence of these peoples by showing them that our only interest, beyond the maintenance of the international railway always open and in operation, which should be their interest as well as our own, is in their welfare and happiness.

These American countries need capital and enterprise for their development. If American capital and enterprise could feel assured of safety, and that a friendly influence would be exerted by our government for their protection, the marvellous resources of these countries would be developed almost with the rapidity of the development of our Western States.

It should be the purpose of our diplomacy to convince these neighbouring nations that we want nothing that is theirs, and that we stand ready to defend them from attack and subjugation from whatever quarter such attack should come; and that we offer them our loyal friendship and ask for their friendship in return.

The maintenance of this policy in the face of the

world, with calmness but with firmness and continuity, will insure the blessings of peace to our own dear country, and the development of friendly relations with the nations to the south of us, which in time will grow strong and vigorous under the protection of our shield, and be ready, should the need arise, to stand by our side in war, in the general defence of the interests and the rights of America, should war ever unhappily be forced upon the United States by the ambition of any of the great Powers of the world.

POSTSCRIPT

THE PLAN OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCE

November 20, 1915.

THE newspapers of the 6th of November, 1915, gave to the country the plan of the Secretary of War for the national defence, which provides for the increase of the regular army to 141,707 officers and men, and the creation of a volunteer army of 400,000 men, which, with the organized National Guard of 129,000, will constitute a paper army of 670,707 officers and men.

It is proposed by the Secretary of War that the 400,000 volunteers shall enlist for six years, three years to be passed in what may be called the active volunteer army, and three years in the passive volunteer army. The 400,000 volunteers, under the Secretary's plan, are to be subject to two months' training each year for the period of three years.

That the Secretary can be under no illusions as to the kind of army this plan will give the country will appear from the following extract from his

statement, published November 6th, in all the papers of the country.

The Secretary of War says:

> When this system is devised and made operative the nation would militarily be in this situation: It would have, as the Constitution provides, an army raised and maintained by it, composed of a certain number constantly under arms, and a very much larger number definitely identified in personnel, provided with equipment and organization, *possessed of some training*, and subject to instant call.

The Secretary modestly states his ambition as to the character of the proposed volunteer army of 400,000 men by saying that this army will be "*possessed of some training.*" That he knows the exact value of such a limited amount of training, or rather how almost valueless it is in the making of soldiers, is shown by his interesting report of November 15, 1914, from which I have already quoted so extensively, and from which I make the following extracts. After speaking of the regular army and the National Guard, the Secretary says:

"And this is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be volunteers, and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready would take, *at the smallest possible estimate, six months.*" That is to say, six months of continuous and intensive training.

The Secretary further says:

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest.

Again in his report of November 15, 1914, the Secretary says:

"Efficient officers, above all things, cannot be improvised."

Again the Secretary says:

It is furthermore true that by intensive military training any young man of good health and average mentality *can be made a serviceable soldier in twelve months*, and, in fact, has been so made. This has been tried abroad, and I have caused it to be tried under my own administration and inspection.

Again the Secretary says in his report of November 15, 1914:

Those who are thoughtful and have courage face the facts of life, take lessons from experience, and strive by wise conduct to attain the desirable things, and by prevision and precaution to protect and defend them when obtained. It may truthfully be said that eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid in order to obtain the desirable things of life and to defend them.

And in his article published in the *Independent* of August 16, 1915, the Secretary says:

> For it must not be forgotten that the one great lesson of all of our wars is that they must be carried to a conclusion by citizen soldiers and these citizens must be trained. *To thrust untrained citizens into the field is nothing short of death by governmental order.*

Here I might rest the argument against the sufficiency of the plan of the War Department for the defence of the nation, relying upon the views of the Secretary of War, as given above, to sustain my contention.

But I ask the reader to note especially what the Secretary says as to the time required to make a soldier: "That by intensive military training any young man of good health and average mentality *can be made a serviceable soldier in twelve months.*"

And in his article in the *Independent* above quoted the Secretary says: "To thrust untrained citizens into the field is nothing short of death by governmental order."

Yet the Secretary calmly proposes in his statement published to the country on November 6, 1915, the creation of a defensive army which shall consist of 400,000 volunteers to be enlisted, one-third each year for three years, so that at the end of three years, we should have 133,333 soldiers who will have had three annual terms of two months' training under arms; 133,333 who

will have had two annual terms of two months' training under arms; and 133,334 who will have had but two months' training under arms. That is to say, one-third of the proposed volunteer army would have had but one-half the training in service, distributed through three years, required by the dictum of the Secretary of War to make "a serviceable soldier"; one-third of the volunteer army, but one-third of the training in service, distributed through two years, required to make a serviceable soldier; and the remaining third of the volunteer army would have received but one-sixth of the training in service acknowledged to be required by the Secretary of War to make a serviceable soldier.

Would not this army come within the limitations of the proposition of the Honourable Secretary that it should "concede defeat without contest," when attacked by a prepared enemy, since, under the War Department's plan for national defence, we should not have an army even with the limited training of six months under arms to put into the field to meet the enemy?

But the Secretary knows, as is shown by his official report of November 15, 1914, that it takes twelve months, or one year, to make dependable soldiers. How can he then recommend to Congress such a measure as that advocated in his Memorandum given to the country on November 6, 1915, proposing the creation of a volunteer army

of 400,000 men who may be "possessed of some training," but manifestly, from his previous statements, not enough training to make them soldiers?

The Secretary of War should be congratulated on the fact that he has himself confirmed the experience of the nation, fifty years ago, during the great war, to the effect that it takes a year to make soldiers, dependable soldiers, soldiers in fact as well as in name, by his experiment with "a Battery of Artillery, a Troop of Cavalry, and a Company of Infantry," but for the fact that he turns from his own "lessons of experience" to the dreams of those who do not understand the subject, and presents a scheme of organization for the army based upon a denial of the principle which he has so forcefully and convincingly established in his official report of November 15, 1914.

In his last official report the Secretary of War states the strength of the army as of date "June 30, 1914," to be "4701 officers and 87,781 men," or a grand total of *92,482* officers and men, *or less by 7518 officers and men than the statutory strength of the army.*

The adjutant-general of the army reports as of date June 30, 1914, *that during the previous year the desertions from the regular army had been 1 officer and 3882 enlisted men,* and that the army lost by the discharge of enlisted men from the army for various reasons outside of the expiration

of enlistments, by order of the War Department, *during the year 1044 men, thus making a total loss from these two causes by the regular army of 4927 officers and men in one year.*

The plan of the War Department published November 6, 1915, for the enlargement of the army will call for the enlistment of approximately 50,000 men to bring the regular army up to the proposed standard of 141,707, and the enlistment of 133,333 men for the volunteer army the first year after the enactment of the law by Congress for the increase of the army.

Is there any reason to believe, from the experience of the army in its recruiting service, that such large numbers of men will voluntarily offer their services to the country in time of peace for enlistment in the regular and volunteer armies? What encouragement has the country, from the experience of the past, to anticipate any such rate of enlistment? And even should such enlistments be secured, is there not reason to believe that the same proportion of desertions and discharges reported by the adjutant-general, as given above, would cause the reduction of the army below the statutory allowance of men for service?

We have the authority of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury for the statement that the country is enjoying great prosperity, and that we are approaching a period of unprecedented prosperity.

Periods of prosperity are periods of full work for the labouring men, and consequently of slack enlistments in the army, and of increased desertions from the army.

Possibly the War Department counts upon the offer of two months' experience of the pleasures of country life to attract the labouring men to the colours of the volunteer army, throwing upon the manufacturers and upon the other employers of labour, the expense and loss through the disorganization of their business, of a large part of the ultimate cost to the country of the proposed volunteer army.

I do not believe that a volunteer army of 400,000 men can be organized and maintained in peace. The stimulus of war and of danger to the nation is needed to inspire men with the ardour to enlist. Patriotism can be appealed to when danger threatens, but in cold, dry times of peace it will be impossible to awaken the enthusiasm of the people to enlist freely in the army.

I believe that the plan of the War Department as advocated by the Secretary of War in his statement of the 6th of November, 1915, will fail of creating the armies he advocates.

I have so fully discussed in this book the strength of the army required for the national defence, that I shall only refer to this branch of the subject in this postscript by saying that I regard 200,000 men for the regular or active army as the irreducible

minimum which should be provided by Congress, and that 800,000 men for the reserve army, every man of whom shall have served continuously with the colours at least one year in "*intensive training*," is the irreducible minimum which should be provided by Congress for the reserve army. This plan would create an army of one million trained soldiers to meet an enemy bold enough to challenge the sovereignty of the nation.

I believe that the day of the volunteer soldier has passed.

I believe it to be the duty of the nation to accept the lesson of demonstrated fact, and to adopt the only logical and the only democratic method of raising and maintaining armies, by and through conscription.

Through conscription the nation can fill and maintain at statutory strength the ranks of its regular or active army, and it can create and maintain a reserve army of any strength deemed to be necessary for the public defence. Under voluntary enlistment I do not believe that in time of peace either the regular army, or the volunteer army proposed by the Secretary of War, can be brought up to the strength deemed to be necessary by his statement of November 6, 1915, or be maintained at that strength.

But assuming, for sake of argument, that the plan proposed by the Secretary of War in his statement of the 6th of November could be put in

practice, such an army as it would produce would prove to be a disastrous failure at the crisis. The Secretary's plan will neither produce a dependable army, nor an army of sufficient strength to make the defence of the nation a possibility.

Can it be possible that the Honourable Secretary supposes that his volunteer army could hold the field against the trained soldiers of Germany under the command of a merciless soldier like von Hindenburg?

I have sufficient faith in my countrymen to believe if they are trained so that they shall become soldiers, and are organized into armies of sufficient strength, that they can not only hold the field against the best German army which should invade our country, however so well commanded, but also that they could drive the invaders into the ocean.

But such an army as the Secretary proposes for the defence of the country would be neither large enough nor well trained enough to hold the field against a veteran German army, commanded as such an army would surely be commanded, and fought as it would surely be fought, with the one single end in view, victory.

What of the Panama Canal? Of the Hawaiian Islands? Of Alaska? Do these possessions of the United States come within the purview of the defence plan of the Secretary of War? Scarcely,

one would fancy, from the narrowness of the plan.

Where would the mobile army of 150,000 men which I have estimated to be necessary for the defence of the Panama Canal Zone come from? Where the troops required for the defence of the Hawaiian Islands? Where those needed for the defence of Alaska? I do not speak of the defence of the Philippine Islands because I do not consider them to be defensible.

If these possessions be protected by suitable armies, how many troops will be left for the defence of the United States? So few that we shall invite attack by our very helplessness.

I do not attach too much consequence to the utterance of the German press under the stress of the present war, and yet it would be unwise to ignore entirely the element of warning to be found in the articles published, from time to time, in German papers, charged with suggestions of offensive action by Germany against the United States after the close of the present war.

Today's *New York Sun* contains a dispatch dated London, November 20, 1915, giving the following extract from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* which may be taken as cumulative evidence of a hostile sentiment in Germany toward the United States, which should be a warning to us to be prepared for any future action which Germany may take against us.

Special Cable Dispatch to the "New York Sun"

London, Nov. 20.—The *Daily Mail* today prints the following extracts from an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*:

"Few events of the war have caused such widespread or deep bitterness in Germany as the attitude of the United States after war was declared. A certain time will be required for Germany to recuperate. It would be a pity if this recuperation should be disturbed by commercial conflicts resulting from the present attitude of the United States.

"When Germany has recovered from the war she will undertake a widespread, well engineered work of education in America as to the relative merits of Germans and Britons. If necessary the mailed fist will also be applied to American aberrations.

"Meanwhile, Germany will show patience and consideration for certain weak sides of the American national character."

Does the Secretary of War believe that his 400,000 volunteers will be good enough soldiers, and strong enough in numbers, to meet the offensive of Germany? The United States needs at the very least a regular or active army of 200,000 men, and a reserve army of 800,000 men, to be raised as I have proposed in this book, to make the nation safe within her boundaries, and to hold the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska; and the only way that such an army can be raised is through conscription;

Wherefore Conscription is the Issue of the Day!

The Honourable Secretary has evidently forgotten the experience of the country with conscription in the great war when he says: "For it must not be forgotten that the one great lesson of all our wars is that they must be carried to a conclusion by citizen soldiers."

He should recall the fact that the South turned to conscription early in the great war to re-enforce her armies, and that the United States had recourse to conscription in 1863 to recruit her armies.

The Copperheads of the North, and the people of the slums of New York City, rioted in opposition to the draft, but they were reduced to order by the display of military force, and the draft proceeded.

The Spanish War lasted so short a time that it made no precedents. The last precedent affecting the nation in war, is, that the nation, during the great war, resorted to conscription for the recruitment of its armies in the field.

The country needs soldiers, not men who may have had "some training" in arms. The plan of the War Department will not give the country soldiers except in respect to the small regular or active army.

The country needs armies with which to hold the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska, as well as armies to defend the Pacific coast, the

northern frontier, and the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States, but the plan of the War Department will not supply these armies.

The people of the United States are a brave and loyal people, and will readily support any measure deemed to be necessary to insure the national safety and the national defence. They will freely pay the expense of an efficient system of national defence, but it will be wrong to require them, through heavy taxation, *to pay for what they will not receive*, which the plan of the War Department will compel them to do.

The Secretary of War has so thoroughly manifested in his official utterances an apprehension of the conditions of national defence that it may be permitted to us to hope that he will lead the nation to the light, and that he will yet bring the nation to the recognition of the fact *that the only way to create and to maintain an army is through conscription.*

M. VZ. W.

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